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Introduction
For much of the post-war period, Italy was regarded as the sick man of Eu-
rope. The Italian disease had both political and economic components:
harsh ideological divisions, chronic executive instability, an inefficient bu-
reaucracy, uneven socio-economic development, organised crime and un-
balanced public finances, just to mention the most emblematic symptoms.
In the course of the 1990s, some encouraging signs of a healing process
have, however, appeared on the scene. The most visible and relevant indica-
tor of this is certainly Italy’s entry into the Economic and Monetary Union
(emu) by the established deadline of 1998, at the same time as the other
‘core’ European countries. At the beginning of the decade, this event seemed
almost unimaginable to any observer gifted with some realism. Meeting the
Maastricht criteria would in fact have required a massive effort of macro-
economic adjustment, which in turn would have needed both a stable poli-
tics and coherent policies: two items which had always been in very scarce
supply south of the Alps.
But the entry into the emu was only the tip of the iceberg. In addition to
macro-economic adjustment, the 1990s witnessed a multitude of other re-
forms – some quite big, some small, but nevertheless significant – which
have slowly redesigned the country’s institutional fabric, enhancing its po-
litical and policy capabilities. The budgetary process has been incisively
changed, allowing a more effective management of public finances. A new
framework has been put in place for industrial relations and ‘social concer-
tation’ between the government and the social partners. The national exec-
utive has been re-organised and strengthened. Innovation has been particu-
larly important in the sphere of the welfare state (broadly conceived): im-
portant changes have been introduced in the pension and health care sys-
tems, while the highly rigid regulatory framework of the labour market has
finally started a much-needed process of defrosting. Change has affected not
only benefit formulas and service standards, but also organisational designs
and decision-making procedures.
Internationalisation – but especially the dynamics of European integra-
9
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tion – has played a major role in fostering these positive developments. In
the specialised literature, internationalisation is often portrayed as a threat
to domestic welfare state and employment regimes. Equally often, what is
suggested is that these regimes can be preserved (or successfully adjusted) by
mobilising existing state capabilities in order to neutralise or attenuate ex-
ogenous challenges and shocks.
With respect to this line of debate, the Italian experience seems to go ex-
actly in the opposite direction. First, the Italian disease (including structural
unemployment and an unbalanced welfare system) was there long before
the winds of globalisation started to blow. Second, the new dynamics of eco-
nomic internationalisation, which started to unfold themselves in the
1980s, did not produce in Italy those harmful effects on employment and in-
come distribution that made their sinister appearance elsewhere in the
oecd. Quite to the contrary, what seems to emerge from the available em-
pirical literature on the issue is that neither the foreign penetration of do-
mestic markets nor the internationalisation of Italian firms have demonstra-
bly resulted in significant job losses: as a matter of fact, the latter process has
probably generated an additional domestic demand for labour. Third, the
pressures and constraints connected with internationalisation and suprana-
tional integration have stimulated a real ‘quantum leap’ in terms of institu-
tional capabilities: in other words, they triggered a sequence of changes
which are correcting many traditional weaknesses of the Italian state, grad-
ually enabling it to act on a par with its political allies and economic com-
petitors in the inter-state arenas (including, obviously, the eu).
The transformation initiated in the 1990s is not complete. And there are
worries that Italy’s vulnerability to exogenous challenges may dramatically
increase in the new phase that the international economy is now facing,
characterised by further steps in trade liberalisation at the global level and
by a new competitive environment at the regional level, in the wake of the
Eastern enlargement of the eu. But the recently acquired institutional capa-
bilities may help Italy to respond to the new challenges – provided that such
capabilities are further consolidated and aptly mobilised. This proviso is not
a small one. As we shall see at the end of our analysis, the further consolida-
tion and apt mobilisation of the new institutional capabilities cannot be
taken for granted. But we believe that the path to an effective and virtuous
‘statehood’ is still visible and open ahead of Italy’s key political and social
actors. The sick man can get well if the right treatment is continued.
This book is aimed at exploring how the new path was embarked upon in
the course of the 1990s, against the background of politico-institutional
and economic developments in the 1970s and 1980s. The first chapter will
10 rescued by europe?
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set out the general argument and analytical framework. The second chapter
will illustrate the start-up constellation in terms of problems, policies and
actors and will discuss the endogenous and original contradictions of ‘wel-
fare capitalism Italian-style’ as they manifested themselves in the 1970s.
The third chapter will consider the consequences, opportunities and limits
of internationalisation, with particular reference to the European integra-
tion process. The fourth chapter will reconstruct the winding process of ad-
justment from its early (and largely unsuccessful) steps in the 1980s to the
turning points of the 1990s. The fifth chapter will discuss the internal fea-
tures of the Italian economic and political system which have at first ham-
pered but then encouraged the process of adjustment. We will interpret this
adjustment essentially in terms of an institutional learning process. The fi-
nal chapter will discuss the general orientation and first policy moves of the
new Berlusconi government, voted into office in May 2001, highlighting the
unsolved questions and remaining challenges of Italy’s economic and politi-
cal transition.
This book is the end result of a research project on the politics of Italy’s ad-
justment during the 1990s that we started in 1998, in the framework of a
wider comparative project on ‘The adjustment of national employment and
social policy regimes to economic internationalization’, directed by Fritz
Scharpf and Vivien Schmidt at the Max Planck Institute of Cologne. Our
participation in the Max Planck project has originated two main products:
the chapter on Italy in the book Welfare Work in the Open Economies, edit-
ed by Fritz Sharpf and Vivien Schmidt (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2000) and a short book in Italian, Salvati dall’Europa? Welfare e lavoro in
Italia fra gli anni ’70 e gli anni ’90 (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999). The present
volume constitutes a further elaboration, expansion and update of the latter
book. A number of institutions have provided us with organisational and fi-
nancial support: the Department of Political and Social Studies of the Uni-
versity of Pavia, the Department of Organisation and Political System and
the Centre for Public Policy Analysis of the University of Bologna – and their
director Giorgio Freddi – the Centre for Comparative Political Research
‘Poleis’ of Bocconi University, the Italian cnr. We thank all these institu-
tions for the kind support received. Many friends and colleagues have
helped us throughout the years, giving us precious suggestions, for which
we are very grateful. Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck have given us de-
tailed comments on the first draft of this book, helping us to improve it.
Without their encouragement we would have never brought our enterprise
to an end. 
11introduction
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We are finally thankful to Alberta Santini and Ilaria Madama for their effec-
tive assistance in data collection and editorial packaging of the final text.
We remain obviously solely responsible for mistakes, shortcomings and im-
precision. 
The text that follows is the fruit of a joint effort. Elisabetta Gualmini has
written par. 2 of Ch. ii; Ch. iii except for par. 6; par. 1,2,4 and 5 of Ch. iv;
par. 1, 2 and 5 of Ch. v; par. 2 of Ch. vi. The remaining parts have been
written by Maurizio Ferrera.
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I Adjusting to Europe: a Learning Perspective
1 Deviant Italy chooses to adjust: the puzzle
The experience of the 1990s has shown that welfare reforms are daunting
balancing acts, especially from a political point of view. Observing the way
in which the various European governments have coped with this challenge,
one is tempted to quote the lapidary comment that Samuel Johnson once
made about a dog walking on its hind legs: ‘it was not a good walk, but what
is surprising is that it managed to do it somehow’. This comment sounds es-
pecially appropriate for the Italian case. Italy’s adjustment and this coun-
try’s entry into the emu were definitely not a good walk. The pace was un-
steady, often veering in style and direction. At the most critical moment –
the second half of 1997 – a risky ‘confidence trick’ had to be played vis-à-vis
the other eu partners and, especially, the international financial markets in
order to meet the 3 per cent deficit target (Chiorazzo and Spaventa 1999).
On paper, the reform record of the 1990s looks very impressive, especially
in the field of pensions: three major reforms were passed in 1992, 1995 and
1997 (cf. Table 1.1)1. As we shall see, several criticisms can be raised against
the content, modalities and effectiveness of such reforms. But for an unsta-
ble political economy such as the Italian one having achieved emu member-
ship is what matters most at the systemic level: the dog has reached a safe
destination. Hence the puzzle: how has fragile Italy managed to ‘limp’ its
way into the exclusive emu club? What factors made the sequence of social
reforms passed between 1992 and 1998 possible? And, more prospectively:
how stable is the new institutional configuration put in place by those re-
forms? These are the central questions that this book sets out to explore.
Italy’s heavy limp in the early 1990s can hardly be questioned. The data list-
ed in Table 1.2 clearly signal the poor performance of this country compared
to its eu partners in terms of macro-economic and employment indicators.
13
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14 adjusting to europe: a learning perspective
Table 1.1 Major social reforms during the 1990s
1992 Amato reform of pensions
“Reform of the reform”in health care
1992/93 Abolition of automatic wage indexation and reform of collective bargaining
1995 Dini reform of pensions
1997 Treu reform of labour market regulations
Prodi reform of pensions
1998 Reform of means-tested benefits
1999 Health care reform
New rules on part-time and temporary employment
2000 Reform of social assistance
Table 1.2 Macro-economic and employment indicators, Italy and main EU partners
Indicators Countries 1992 1995 1998 2001
Macro- Inflation Italy 5.0 5.4 2.0 2.3
economy (%) Germany 5.1 1.8 0.6 2.4
and public France 2.4 1.8 0.7 1.8
finances UK 4.7 2.8 2.7 2.1
EU average 4.0 2.8 1.3 2.3
Deficit Italy 10.7 7.6 2.8 2.2
(%) Germany 2.5 3.3 2.2 2.8
France 4.2 5.5 2.7 1.4
UK 6.5 5.7 -0.2 -0.8
EU average 4.9 4.9 1.6 0.8
Debt Italy 107.7 123.2 116.3 109.8
(%) Germany 42.9 57.0 60.9 59.5
France 39.6 54.6 59.5 57.3
UK 39.2 51.8 47.7 39.1
EU average 63.6 70.6 68.7 63.1
Long-term Italy 13.3 12.2 4.9 5.2
Interest Germany 7.9 6.9 4.6 4.8
Rate France 8.6 7.5 4.6 4.9
(%) UK 9.1 8.2 5.5 4.9
EU average 9.7 8.7 5.1 5.0
Unemploy- Total Italy 9.4 11.5 11.7 9.4
ment Germany 6.31 8.0 9.1 7.7
rates France 10.2 11.3 11.4 8.5
UK 9.7 8.5 6.2 5.0
EU average 9.22 10.1 9.4 7.4
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The welfare state displayed in its turn very pronounced disequilibria – an
oversized pension system on the one hand; modest or no spending for many
other delicate functions on the other hand – and was plagued by internal in-
efficiencies and clientelistic manipulations. Political instability was at its
highest. The 1980s had witnessed a relatively long (by Italian standards)
season of executive continuity under the aegis of Bettino Craxi, the leader of
the socialist party (psi). The xth legislature (1987-1992), however, wit-
nessed a rapid return to cabinet instability (cf. Table 1.3). Moreover, at the
beginning of the decade, the Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) investigation
launched by a pool of Milan’s attorneys disclosed a system of massive and
widespread corruption (private kickbacks in return for political favours) in-
volving top businessmen and party leaders, ministers in office and high civil
15deviant italy chooses to adjust: the puzzle
Long-term Italy 5.4 7.3 6.9 5.8
Germany 2.3 4.0 4.9 4.03
France 23.7 4.8 4.9 3.1
UK 3.5 3.7 1.9 1.3
EU average 4.94 4.9 4.5 3.1
Youth Italy 27.2 33.7 33.8 30.73
Germany 6.01 8.8 9.8 9.13
France 23.7 27.6 26.3 20.03
UK 16.9 15.9 13.6 12.73
EU average 17.72 21.5 19.5 16.23
Employ- Total Italy 48.8 50.9 52.0 54.9
ment rates Germany 66.4 64.6 63.9 65.43
France 59.9 59.6 60.2 62.8
UK 68.2 68.6 70.6 71.8
EU average 55.42 60.1 61.4 64.1
Female Italy 34.5 35.4 37.3 41.1
Germany 55.9 55.3 55.8 57.93
France 51.4 52.2 53.1 56.0
UK 61.2 61.8 63.6 65.1
EU average 44.02 49.7 51.6 55.0
1 It refers to B.R.D.
2 It refers to Eur 12.
3 (2000)
4 (1994)
Debt:General government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of gdp.
Deficit:Net borrowing/lending of consolidated general government sector as a percentage of gdp
Long-term interest rates:10 year benchmark government bond yields.
Sources:Eurostat,Structural Indicators,various years; long-term interest rates:oecd,Financial Indica-
tors,various years.
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servants. The whole national establishment saw its credibility and legitima-
cy crumble in the space of a few months. This serious economic and politi-
cal crisis peaked in the summer of 1992 when – under the attack of financial
markets – the lira suffered a heavy devaluation and had to exit from the Eu-
ropean monetary system, while many ordinary savers were crowding banks
in order to sell their Buoni del Tesoro (state bonds), for fear of a public debt
default.
Behind this critical conjuncture lay a complex structural syndrome, with
roots well entrenched into the country’s historical path of modernization.
16 adjusting to europe: a learning perspective
Table 1.3 Italian executives,1978-2001
Government Parties in government In office from
Andreotti IV DC Mar 1978
Andreotti V DC,PSDI,PRI Jan 1979
Cossiga I DC,PSDI,PLI Aug 1979
Cossiga II DC,PSI,PRI Mar 1980
Forlani DC,PSI,PSDI,PRI Sept 1980
Spadolini I DC,PSI,PSDI,PRI,PLI; Jul 1981
Spadolini II DC,PSI,PSDI,PRI,PLI; Aug 1982
Fanfani V DC,PSI,PSDI,PLI; Dec 1982
Craxi I DC,PSI,PSDI,PRI,PLI; Aug 1983
Craxi II DC,PSI,PSDI,PRI,PLI; Aug 1986
Fanfani VI DC Apr 1987
Goria DC,PRI,PSI,PSDI,PLI; Jul 1987
De Mita DC,PSI,PSDI,PRI,PLI; Apr 1988
Andreotti VI DC,PSI,PSDI,PRI,PLI; Aug 1989
Andreotti VII DC,PSI,PSDI,PLI; Apr 1991
Amato I PSI,DC,PSDI,PLI; Jun 1992
Ciampi (technical executive) DC,PLI,PSDI,PSI,PDS Apr 1993
Berlusconi I FI,AN,Lega Nord; May 1994
Dini (technical executive) PDS,PPI,Lega Nord; Jan 1995
Prodi PPI,PDS,Dini,Verdi; Jun 1996
D’Alema PDS,PPI,Verdi,SDI,PDCI,UDR,Ri Nov 1998
Amato II (technical executive) PDCI,Democratici,UDEUR,PPI, May 2000
Verdi,RI,SDI;
Berlusconi II FI,AN,Lega Nord,CCD-CDU-Bianco Fiore Jun 2001
Abbreviations:AN (Alleanza Nazionale),CCD (Centro Cristiano-Democratico),CDU (Cristiano-Democ-
ratici Uniti),DC (Democrazia Cristiana),Dini (Lista Dini),FI (Forza Italia),PDS (Partito Democratico della
Sinistra),PLI (Partito Liberale Italiano),PPI (Partito Popolare Italiano),PDCI (Partito dei Comunisti Ital-
iani),PRI (Partito Repubblicano Italiano),PSDI (Partito Social-Democratico Italiano),PSI (Partito Social-
ista Italiano),SDI (Social-Democratici Italiani),UDEUR (Unione dei Democratici per l’Europa),RI (Rin-
novamento Italiano).
Source:Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri,Roma.
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For the purposes of our analysis, the most salient trait of this syndrome was
the marked weakness of the state. If we take the classical dimensions of
‘stateness’ highlighted by the literature on political development (Tilly
1975), Italy definitely scored poorly on all of them. The formal autonomy of
the Italian state (i.e. its legal capacity to act) was de facto constrained – al-
most paradoxically – by the excesses of formalism and legalism and by a
Constitution tuned in a hyper-consensualist vein, more preoccupied to veto
than to uphold state powers. The lack of centralised and homogeneous stan-
dards and methods for training and recruiting top civil servants (as is the
case in France for instance thanks to the Ecole Nationale d’Administration)
substantially reduced the power of the bureaucratic élites, making them
strongly dependent on the one hand on the turnovers of the political system,
on the other on clientelistic ties with pressure groups. The differentiation of
the state apparatus from non-governmental organisations had always re-
mained incomplete, especially in respect of political parties: as highlighted
by an articulated debate of the 1980s, Italy was internationally considered
as an almost emblematic example of a ‘party-state’ (Bufacchi and Burgess
1988; Vassallo 1994), with a public apparatus easily permeable by partisan
interests, if not virtually colonised by them. In terms of centralisation, de-
spite its Napoleonic blueprint the Italian state displayed a highly fragment-
ed centre (including a huge ‘para-state’ sector of semi-autonomous parallel
administrations or enti pubblici), with a disparate and incoherent reach in
the peripheries (Cassese 1984; Dente 1989). Last but certainly not least, the
internal co-ordination (both vertical and horizontal) of the various state or-
gans was very poor, especially when trying to reach substantive (as opposed
to formal) objectives: the excess of legalism, the proliferation of veto points,
the fragmentation of agencies and offices made problem-solving interac-
tions very difficult and left Italian Prime Ministers under the almost con-
stant blackmail of a multitude of disparate vetoes, originating from politi-
cal parties, bureaucratic élites or interest groups (La Palombara 1964; Di
Palma 1977; Hine 1993). The metaphor of ‘an archipelago crossed by cen-
trifugal currents’ suggested by Giuliano Amato (1990) during his first expe-
rience as Treasury Minister in 1987-89 captures well the acentric and soft
nature of the Italian state circa 1990, at the nadir of the so-called First Re-
public (i.e. the political regime in place between 1948 and 1992)2.
Why did a limping dog choose to venture in such a risky walk as the one
leading from Maastricht to the emu? Here we must call into play the pecu-
liar relationship between Italy and the eu and the role historically played by
‘Europe’ as both carrot and stick in the national arena. Ever since the estab-
lishment of the ec by a treaty signed in Rome, a number of influential do-
17deviant italy chooses to adjust: the puzzle
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mestic élite groups ‘bet’ on European integration as a wedge for stabilising
and modernising Italy’s political and economic system. Contrary to all the
other member states, Italy’s acceptance of and compliance with the rules of
Western-style liberal democracy and market capitalism could not be taken
for granted as irrevocable pledges, rooted in normative and cognitive beliefs
at both the mass and élite levels. Certainly until the 1970s and still signifi-
cantly until the fall of the Berlin wall, Italy remained a polarised polity, ide-
ologically divided, witnessing the presence of two explicitly ‘anti-system’
poles within the political spectrum: the communist pole, which expressed
the largest Communist party of the West (the pci), and the extreme right
pole, represented by a neo-Fascist party (the nhs) mustering between 2 and
8.7 per cent of the vote (Table 1.4). The extreme right and the communist
bloc were ‘anti-system’ formations in that they explicitly questioned and
challenged not only the policies pursued by the government but also the fun-
damental traits of the regime (such as, precisely, market principles, liberal-
democratic procedures, membership in the Western bloc, etc.). By anchor-
ing the country’s destiny to that of other, more pacified and stable market
democracies, the political bet of the ‘integrationist’ élite was that of keeping
polarization under control and of actually reducing it overtime. The ec an-
chor could serve a double function: it could offer incentives for a virtuous
re-orientation of economic (and thus social and even political) attitudes and
behaviours ‘from below’, in the wake of the gradually unfolding four free-
doms (workers, goods, capital and services); it could offer the integrationist
élite (not only state officials and party leaders but also representatives of the
most influential economic and social institutions) precious resources ‘from
above’ in order to legitimise (or at least justify) difficult policy measures. In
both cases, the ec would work at times as a carrot, promising or actually de-
livering desirable goods (e.g. subsidies, greater opportunities – including
migration – for both workers and firms, higher growth, the inclusion in a
prestigious club, etc.) and at times as a stick (e.g. sanctions of inefficient
practices through the penalties of the market, or forcing the Italian govern-
ment to introduce unpopular policies of liberalisation).
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the integrationist élite did not form a
cohesive and distinct bloc. They can rather be depicted as a relatively loose
‘advocacy coalition’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), transversally dis-
tributed across the various ‘pro-system’ parties and associations – including
of course the Democrazia Cristiana (dc, Christian Democracy). This was
the largest party controlling the government, forming alliances with other
smaller parties such as the Liberals (pli), the Republicans (pri), the Social
Democrats (psdi) and, since the early 1960s, the Socialists (psi). Despite
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their political misdemeanours (unveiled by the Mani Pulite investigations in
the early 1990s, but systematically practised throughout the whole First Re-
public period), the dc-led coalitions were indeed inspired by the integra-
tionist agenda and essentially pursued the European anchoring strategy
mentioned above, for purposes of domestic regime stabilisation. Italian gov-
ernments were of course interested in the specific contents of ec policies:
since the very establishment of the European Communities – to the extent
that executive instability and administrative weaknesses allowed it – they
tried to obtain all the possible benefits from the ec budget and regulations.
But the primary interest was in the anchor as such, for the systemic and vir-
tuous implications that the link with Europe could bring to an unstable and
internally challenged regime. This domestic constellation helps to explain
the peculiar style of Italy’s ec membership during the First Republic, i.e. a
seemingly paradoxical combination of federalist enthusiasm in ec arenas
and a constant failure to comply with ec norms at home. Although too
weak to take the lead, Italy always backed even the most ambitious initia-
19deviant italy chooses to adjust: the puzzle
Table 1.4 ‘First Republic’elections:parties and votes (percentage values)
Parties DC PCI PSI MSI PRI, Others
PSDI
PLI
1948 48.5 31.01 2.0 2.5 16.0
1953 40.1 22.6 12.7 5.8 9.1 9.7
1958 42.4 22.7 14.2 4.8 9.5 6.4
1963 38.3 25.3 13.8 5.11 4.5 3.0
1968 39.1 26.9 14.52 4.4 8.1 7.0
1972 38.7 27.2 9.6 8.71 1.9 3.9
1976 38.7 34.4 9.6 6.1 7.8 3.4
1979 38.3 30.4 9.8 5.3 8.7 7.5
1983 32.9 29.9 11.4 6.8 12.1 6.9
1987 34.3 26.6 14.3 5.9 8.8 9.1
1992 29.7 21.73 13.6 5.4 10.0 19.6
1 In the 1948 elections, the PCI and the PSI presented themselves jointly in the FDP (Fronte Democrati-
co Popolare),which gained 31% of the votes.
2 PSI+PSDI
3 21.7% results from the summing up of the votes of Rifondazione Comunista and those of PDS (Parti-
to Democratico della Sinistra).
Abbreviations: DC (Democrazia Cristiana), PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano), PSI (Partito Socialista), MSI
(Movimento Sociale Italiano), PRI (Partito Repubblicano Italiano), PLI (Parito Liberale Italiano), PSDI
(Partito Social-Democratico Italiano)
Sources: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, ISTAT,various years.
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tives to strengthen the ec in a federal direction. On the other hand, up until
the late 1980s, Italian governments were systematically the worst offenders
in terms of domestic transposition of ec law (Giuliani 1996, 2000; Giuliani
and Piattoni 2001). Support for federal integration was in line with the in-
terests of the integrationist élite and was also a politically promising strate-
gy for the pro-system parties as it made the stabilising anchor stronger. In-
ternal transposition was, however, difficult, owing to low stateness and
high ideological polarisation.
This paradoxical syndrome reached its apex in the 1970s. As we shall see
in Chapter 2, this was a very turbulent decade for Italy. Politically, the al-
liance between the dc and the psi entered a period of severe strain, the pci
was growing increasingly stronger, ideological radicalisation started to spi-
ral, and the country came to be plagued by terrorism. Economically, the oil
crisis precipitated an acute crisis (both monetary and real), rooted in a series
of endogenous unsolved questions. Italian governments kept their grip on
the ec anchor and warmly supported all the initiatives made in that decade
to consolidate the ec architecture (from the Werner Plan to the direct elec-
tions of the European Parliament in 1979). But domestic developments were
increasingly deviant from European standards. In 1977 the dc inaugurated
a new alliance with the pci – which under Berlinguer’s leadership had start-
ed a process of ideological and political moderation. In principle, the pci
and the trade unions were not against European integration, but were
strongly opposed to embarking upon the new ambitious initiative of the late
1970s, i.e. the European Monetary System (ems). Although it had secured
regime stability in a very critical political and economic conjuncture, the
‘historical compromise’ between the dc and the pci was thus seen as a lia-
bility for the integrationist project – also due to the suspicions that the pci’s
participation in government raised in other European capitals.
In December 1978 the Andreotti government decided to join the ems,
breaking the historical compromise with the pci and inaugurating a new
political phase known as Penta-partito (five party coalition: dc-psi-psdi-
pri-pli). We will discuss in more detail how and why this decision was tak-
en in Chapter v. Suffice to say here that, at least in hindsight, this decision
played a crucial role in redefining Italy’s link to and membership of the ec.
Participating to a hard currency regime had a number of significant policy
implications that could not be ignored or somehow ‘fixed’ via the traditional
tactics of delayed and/or incomplete implementation. Thus, upgrading do-
mestic policy performance – especially in the fiscal and social policy sphere –
became an increasingly pressing imperative. Regime stabilisation through
the European anchor remained an important goal. But in the early 1980s
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conditions had changed: the regime had indeed become more stable, largely
thanks to Europe’s sticks and carrots; but the vincolo esterno (i.e. the actual
constraints posed by ec membership) had become more serious, more de-
manding and more stringent in terms of policy performance. A thorough-
going structural adjustment was now in order.
The new pressure to adjust raised two delicate questions: a ‘what’ ques-
tion and a ‘how’ question. What changes (in what areas, through what in-
struments) were necessary to comply with the new monetary regime and to
align domestic policy performance with European standards? How could
such changes be introduced politically, given the features of Italy’s institu-
tional system? These were the two big issues that confronted the integra-
tionist élite at the beginning of the 1980s. Italy had to learn how to become
more European: and this raised both intellectual dilemmas, for which ex-
pertise and knowledge had to be mobilised, and practical challenges, linked
to consensus-building and muddling through the decision-making system
of a weak state. The 1980s witnessed some progress in terms of adjustment:
or at least improvement in putting in place some pre-conditions for adjust-
ment. However, the traditional blocks to structural reform remained opera-
tive, and the new decade began with the performance crisis signalled by the
indicators in Table 1.2. It was only after 1991 that both the substantial and
political dilemmas of adjustment were seriously and effectively tackled.
Though still partly ‘limping’, the country had to meet the Maastricht crite-
ria and be admitted into the emu. Since 1992, joining the emu was consid-
ered as the coronation of the political bet and the modernization project of
the integrationist camp. Policy-makers also clearly perceived that failing
this deadline would have jeopardized many of the hard-won achievements
of such a project. Thus, crossing the emu finishing line by the end of 1998
became a ‘must’, even if it meant walking on two legs…
The next chapters of this book will reconstruct the story of this relatively
successful journey. Before starting, however, we need to briefly present the
analytical perspective that will be used to frame our factual reconstruction.
2 Learning how to adjust: the analytical framework
The adjustment of national economies to internationalisation and Euro-
pean integration may be considered as a highly complex process of institu-
tional change. It involves various elements and aspects of the political sys-
tem: the specific instruments and mechanisms that regulate different policy
sectors (for example, the discount rate, the contributory rates or the pension
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formula); the wider rules of the game that discipline the policy-making
process and specify the prerogatives of various actors and their modes of in-
teraction (for example, the relationship between different levels of govern-
ment, between executives and parliaments, between governments and so-
cial partners, and so on); and finally the ideas, the interpretative frames, the
‘philosophies and paradigms’ that inspire public action in general (for ex-
ample, the idea of a new welfare state that ‘promotes opportunities’ instead
of ‘compensating for losses’).
How does institutional change occur? This is, of course, one of the core
questions of many social sciences and of political science in particular. In
this book, we will adopt a ‘learning’ perspective, which looks at institution-
al change as a delicate process whereby policy makers come to adjust the ex-
isting institutional status quo in the light of the consequences of past policy
and of new information3. Learning processes are particularly difficult, since
they involve the restructuring of the norms and practices that were success-
ful in the past and that have thus generated widespread trust and loyalty.
Such restructuring brings disorder and uncertainty where order and stabili-
ty reigned. This is why decision makers tend to resist change, by sticking to
the extant policy systems and political arrangements where their identity
and values can be easily legitimised and re-enforced. The more these ‘old’
arrangements are institutionalised, the more they detach themselves from
the original goals and the more they are taken for granted by the actors,
whose strategies and routines end up by preserving exactly those arrange-
ments4.
What is needed to break the cycle and bring about innovation? Obviously,
much depends on the ‘failures’ originated by the status quo and on the pres-
sure exerted by the specific problems that need to be dealt with. Failure (es-
pecially repeated failure) is a potent trigger of policy learning dynamics: it
leaves actors without solutions to the problems they face and thus originates
problem-induced searches aimed at restoring satisfactory policy efficacy
(Visser and Hemerijck 2001). As already highlighted by Heclo’s pioneering
work, the type of learning typically occurring in policy change can be assim-
ilated to ‘operational conditioning’ (Heclo 1974)5. In processes of opera-
tional conditioning, subjects finds spontaneously the possible answers to
environmental stimuli, selecting options based on the positive or negative
reinforcements obtained by their trials and errors. The logic of operational
conditioning is consequentialist, i.e. linked to the effects of behaviours and
choices. Within this logic, negative reinforcements (i.e. the penalties associ-
ated with ineffective behaviours or ‘failures’) are perhaps more important
than positive reinforcements, owing to the negativity bias that characterizes
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social actors (i.e. their greater sensitivity to losses, rather than to gains)
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 1984). Of course, both success and failure
are to some extent relative concepts, subject to variable definitions (March
and Olsen 1989). But even allowing for some degree of relativism, there are
situations in which policy failures and environmental sanctions are virtual-
ly self-evident. The Italian events of the summer of 1992 mentioned above
are a clear illustration of this: despite their increasing financial size, ad hoc
and conjunctural budgetary measures – the routine response to adjustment
pressures in the 1980s – proved to be incapable of arresting the speculative
attacks against the lira coming from external sources, while currency deval-
uation and expulsion from the ems were explicit signs that Italy had failed
an important test and was incapable of keeping up with her European part-
ners.
A critical role in the learning process is played by the orientations and
qualities of the relevant actors: for the process to start, the actors must be re-
ceptive to new information and be relatively open to modifying their beliefs
in order to perceive and correct failures. Ideological dogmatism is inimical
to experiential learning, as it freezes the ‘paradigm’ or ‘deep core’ of values
and cognitions regarding particular states of the world (Surel 2000). But,
again, the perception of failure and the willingness to search for new ways
of solving problems (including the adoption of a new paradigm) can be
greatly stimulated and enhanced by exogenous developments: for example,
the appearance of a focusing event such as a sudden crisis or a deadline,
which serves as a catalyst of public attention and forces upon actors a feel-
ing of responsibility and urgency. The Maastricht process offers an emblem-
atic example in this respect. Not only did this process specify quantitative
values to determine success or failure (in terms of inflation, exchange and
interest rates, deficits and debts), but it also attached to these values a tem-
poral dimension: member states had to be ‘successful’ by a fixed date. Both
the quantitative values and the temporal deadline had been solemnly includ-
ed in a Treaty signed by national governments after extenuating negotia-
tions and ratified by national Parliaments. Thus, the Maastricht criteria and
schedules had to be treated as ‘givens’ by domestic policy players, even when
their full and unpleasant implications became clear. It is possible that the
option of a re-negotiation continued to loom for some time in the back of
some actors’ minds. For example, a few months after his election, in May
1996, the Prodi government approached its Spanish counterpart to probe its
readiness to coalesce with Italy for a loosening of the convergence criteria
and/or timing. But the lack of readiness of the Aznar government ruled out
that option completely and prompted Prodi to embark on the only possible
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path, i.e. an extraordinary effort of financial adjustment.
The Maastricht process also induced learning-based policy change by al-
tering the significance and cost of ‘failure’. Especially for the weaker
economies, as the 1999 deadline approached it became in fact clear that be-
ing denied entry into the new emu club would originate high penalties on
the side of international financial markets. Thus, the real alternative was no
longer between adjusting for emu or maintaining the status quo: it was an
alternative between adjusting or losing ground. Actors had to choose be-
tween a potentially positive sum outcome (adjustment and entry) and a neg-
ative sum outcome (no or insufficient adjustment, non-entry and therefore
high losses for virtually all actors). Choosing in favour of the first scenario
was facilitated by the fact the losses started to hit immediately: between
1995 and 1997 the exchange and interest rates of emu candidate countries
(especially the weaker ones) were closely linked to the probabilities of ad-
mission assigned by international rating institutions. As we shall see, the
Italian events of the winter of 1995 offer a clear illustration of this choice
configuration: the low (and actually declining) probabilities of emu admis-
sion due to the political crisis and the stalling negotiations on pension re-
form resulted in high penalties on both the exchange and interest rates. Ac-
tors (especially the unions) thus learnt that failure to reform could no longer
mean maintaining the distributive status quo, but implied instead suffering
unexpected and unavoidable new losses. As the vincolo esterno was no
longer negotiable, the only option for avoiding such new losses was to go
ahead with some credible reform.
Failure-induced searches for new policy solutions require specific capabili-
ties of analysis, diagnosis, programme-based elaboration on behalf of actors
(both at the individual and collective level). Such capabilities are not always
available when failure occurs – especially if failure is originated by or associ-
ated with exogenous shocks. But they can be developed during the search it-
self. In many member states, the Maastricht process triggered off not only
substantive policy reforms, but also organizational and procedural reforms
aimed at upgrading the diagnostic and programmatic skills of policy actors
(including non-governmental actors). Though with a lesser urgency, the
processes of ‘recommended convergence’ towards common objectives based
on the new open method of co-ordination (omc) are producing a similar im-
pact on many national policy systems. This is especially the case with the Eu-
ropean employment strategy, whose effects on Italy’s weak capabilities in
terms of labour market governance will be discussed in Chapter iv.
A final important factor for policy learning processes that we would like
to highlight is the style and mode of interaction among policy-makers. The
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manner in which exchanges between actors take place – consensual and co-
operative vs. adversarial and antagonist – significantly influences the type of
decision-making outputs. In general, as is suggested by both game theory
and social psychology, co-operative and consensual modes of relationships
tend to produce superior results in terms of welfare: they stimulate commu-
nication, the exchange of information, the pooling of resources for search-
ing out innovative solutions (Scharpf 1997; Visser and Hemerijk 2001). It
must also be remembered, however, that in certain cases hyper-consensual
styles of policy-making (and certain types of corporatist settings) may lead
to stalemate and ‘immobilism’ (Crouch and Traxler 1995).
Centred as they are on problems and solutions, on knowledge and reason-
ing, learning perspectives on policy innovation tend to highlight the sub-
stantive dimension of change, the ‘what to do’ questions. But changing a
policy is always a political exercise too: it raises not only substantive dilem-
mas, but also dilemmas related to consensus building. To evoke Heclo’s fa-
mous distinctions, ‘puzzling’ (i.e. raising questions about policy problems)
and ‘powering’ (orchestrating the political consensus for changing the sta-
tus quo) must proceed together (Heclo 1974). And while it is true that the
two processes are inspired by different forms of logic, they are also inter-
twined and display significant similarities and overlaps.
A first simple point to make on this issue is that politicians (i.e. elected of-
ficials or would-be officials) are themselves learning actors qua politicians:
they puzzle about consensus strategies and adjust these strategies according
to the (political) consequences of past policies and past strategies and in the
light of experience (e.g. on electoral gains and losses). Thus, besides prob-
lem-centred, substantive learning, when analysing policy change we must
also consider the distinct form of political learning, centred on consensus
and interaction issues. Many of the dynamics discussed above (and, more
generally, in the learning literature) apply to political learning too. In this
sense, puzzling should not be regarded as a separate and parallel activity in
respect of powering (Heclo’s approach), but as a transversal one: puzzling
occurs also within powering, i.e. when actors set about building consensus
around their preferred policy solutions. The reverse is also true: powering
tends to crosscut and at time even to encompass puzzling. The play of ideas
is constantly disturbed by the contest of power (Visser and Hemerijck
2001). In the first place, the latter often defines ex ante the boundaries of
feasible programmatic solutions. As stated in the previous paragraph, in an
ideologically polarised political system certain policy solutions are simply
not an option, even if carefully designed from a substantive viewpoint: the
rules of the power game in such a system make certain policies unfeasible
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and even unthinkable – if the rules are deeply internalised by actors. In the
second place, often both the play of ideas and the contest for power take
place in the same arenas (e.g. mass media debates): substantive arguments
are thus likely to be inherently disturbed by political considerations – when
they are not from the start attempts at manipulative persuasion.
The recent literature on policy discourse (e.g. Schmidt 2000; 2001a;
2001b), argumentative persuasion (e.g. Checkel 2001) and ‘pacting’ (Cul-
pepper 2002) has suggested promising insights on how puzzling and power-
ing, the play of ideas and the contest for power, the substantive and political
dimensions of policy change can interact and combine with each other. Poli-
cy discourses are arguments about the rationale that justifies change, given a
failure of the status quo. These arguments contain both cognitive and nor-
mative propositions and typically result from serious and genuine substan-
tive puzzling. As discourse can affect actors’ preferences, it may be a pre-
cious instrument in the contest for power. Not only does discourse serve an
interactive, communicative function (Schmidt 2000) vis-à-vis the interests
affected by policy change, thus facilitating negotiation or passive acquies-
cence, but under certain circumstances it can altogether alter the beliefs and
the behaviours of relevant actors, persuading them to actively accept and
support change and thus exerting a direct causal impact on the latter. In
many continental and south European welfare states, during the 1990s poli-
cy-makers elaborated a distinct ‘vice-into-virtue’ discourse (Levy 1999),
targeting the inequities of past arrangements (e.g. over-generous disability
pensions or tax evasion) as first priority of the adjustment agenda. Such dis-
course has been very effective in changing the cognitive and normative per-
spective of social groups – including in some cases those affected by the re-
forms.
Argumentative persuasion is most likely to alter preferences, create con-
sensus and thus ‘cause’ a policy change when the persuadees face novel chal-
lenges in uncertain environments, have no dogmatic cognitive or normative
priors, when the persuaders command in their turn authoritative reputation
and ‘act out principles of serious deliberative argument’ and finally when
the interaction takes place in relatively unpoliticised settings (Checkel
2001). In the specific field that interests us, i.e. welfare state reform, another
important factor is the ideological proximity between the trade unions and
the governing coalition. Especially in consensual democracies, where policy
change is typically accompanied by tripartite negotiations, argumentative
persuasion is easier for pragmatic, centre-left coalitions, whose motives and
promises encounter higher sympathy and trust with trade unions (Ross
1998). The scope conditions for argumentative persuasion are not very like-
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ly to prevail simultaneously, especially in the most delicate policy areas. But
the presence of only a subset of these conditions is sufficient for opening sig-
nificant margins of manoeuvre for this type of mechanism and for the learn-
ing dynamics associated with it.
If discourse and argumentative persuasion can sometimes ‘power’ a re-
form into being, bypassing the traditional mechanisms of exchange-based
consensus building, the latter can in turn produce goods that may be very
important for solving both substantive and political puzzles in reform
processes. If equipped with appropriate organisational capabilities, interest
groups (and especially trade unions) can for example provide governmental
policy-makers not only with original problem diagnoses and possible tech-
nical solutions, but also with delicate ‘local and relational’ information
(Culpepper 2002). The latter is related to the preferences of the members of
the associations and with the distribution of costs and benefits of various re-
form proposals. This type of information is crucial for politicians puzzling
on how to identify a technically sound, but also politically feasible solution
to a given policy problem – especially if there is a past experience of political
failure. The Italian pension reform of 1995 illustrates this point very well.
After the political failure of the first Berlusconi government (1994) and un-
der the pressure of financial markets, the Dini government had a desperate
need to find a solution to the pension crisis, which could be accepted by the
unions. The unions knew what the alternative was (as explained above) and
in the end supplied the government with the precious local and relational in-
formation they needed. They also mobilised all their dialogic capacity (i.e.
actions aimed at encouraging problem-solving discussions among members;
cf. Culpepper 2002) to secure grass-root acceptance of the reform package
negotiated with the government. As we shall see, the aggregative and delib-
erative procedures of the Italian unions played a very important role in the
reform process (Baccaro 2002).
Emphasising the role of discourse, argumentative persuasion, relational
information, dialogic capacities and, more generally, problem-induced
learning dynamics does not exclude that policy change may also rest on var-
ious forms of political exchange, i.e. quid pro quo interactions in which ac-
tors confront their diverging goals by mobilising support and try to reach
agreements based on mutual concessions, without necessarily modifying
their original and ‘true’ preferences. Learning perspectives are not incom-
patible with exchange perspectives: they suggest however that actors’ pref-
erences are malleable and may change in the wake of extraordinary events
and/or during the course of interaction. They also suggest that knowledge
and information may not only facilitate political exchanges, but can also be
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an object of such exchanges. Between pure argumentative persuasion in
which change occurs merely as a consequence of discourse-induced prefer-
ence change and pure power confrontations in which change is the result of
juxtaposed ‘brute’ interests, backed by mobilized social supports, a wide
grey area exists of mixed forms of interaction and change dynamics. As we
shall see, the logic of exchange must be called into question for an accurate
and full account of Italy’s adjustment in some crucial moments. But the
learning perspective illustrated so far will be the main frame of reference for
our factual reconstruction. This choice is justified by two considerations.
First, as we have tried to argue, the Maastricht process put in place a number
of conditions that have widened the scope for problem-induced learning
leading to policy change. Second, this form of change has received much less
attention than it deserves in the analysis of Italy’s policy developments – de-
spite the fact that it was precisely in this country that the Maastricht process
exerted its greatest impact, given the huge ‘lack of fit’ with the convergence
criteria (Sbragia 2001). An interpretation of the 1992-1998 reforms from
this angle will also allow us to contrast that phase of Italy’s adjustment with
the post-1998 phase (and especially the new Berlusconi era) in which the
vincolo esterno and the Maastricht conditions have been gradually weaken-
ing, leading to a resurrection of more traditional dynamics of interest based
games driven by rather rigid preferences – with worrying signs of such
games degenerating again into brute power confrontations. But let us now
offer a more detailed look at how we model the dynamic of Italy’s reform
process from Maastricht to Berlusconi – the title of our book.
3 Rescued by Europe? The argument in brief
The sequence of reforms listed in Table 1.1 will be our main object of analy-
sis in the following chapters. We see these reforms as the result of a complex
learning process, prompted by a sudden change of the actor constellation in
the early 1990s, in the wake of both internal and external developments.
This learning process unfolded itself along two dimensions: the substantial
problem-solving dimension and the interactive consensus-building dimen-
sions (cf. Figure 1.1).
The starting point of the process was the ‘old’ actor constellation prevail-
ing in the First Republic (1948-1992), whose basic features, genetic roots
and problem load will be presented in Chapter ii. As mentioned above, the
European anchor already played a significant role in such constellation, es-
pecially after the lira’s entry into the ems in 1978. And in the 1980s some
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promising signs of learning-based policy change started to appear, prompt-
ed by the new winds of globalisation and the hardening of the vincolo ester-
no: these signs will be illustrated and discussed in Chapter iii. But the polit-
ical logic of the First Republic was still holding Italy’s policy making system
under its grip, and the first generation of fiscal, social and labour market
policy reforms stopped short of correcting the original sins of Keynesian
welfare Italian-style.
The early 1990s marked a critical watershed: the actor constellation sud-
denly changed. This change had two main sources. One was external, pri-
marily stemming from the new Maastricht process, internationalisation
and the link between the two. Such external developments altered in very
significant ways the costs and benefits of domestic policy options and their
distributive implications for policy actors. The second source of change was
internal, primarily linked to the crumbling of the First Republic and the
transition to the Second via the introduction of institutional reforms. This
internal politico-institutional transition had two main effects: it changed
many of the actors on the scene (the disappearance of old parties, the birth
of new ones, the formation of ‘technical’ cabinets, etc.), and it altered the
rules of both political competition and of policy-making.
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Figure 1.1 Italy’s reform sequence in the 1990s:the explanatory model
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This new constellation offered fertile grounds for the rapid unfolding of
learning dynamics, along the lines illustrated in the previous paragraph. Un-
der the increasingly stronger spurs produced by the Maastricht process and
the constraints/opportunities of the new domestic rules of the game, actors
developed new orientations, new capabilities and new modes of interaction.
The shift from a centre-right government in 1994 (the first Berlusconi gov-
ernment) to a technical executive and then to a centre-left government led
by Prodi eased the reformist process: as was argued above, it enhanced the
effectiveness of discursive factors and of dialogic persuasion both between
the government and the trade unions and between the leadership and mem-
bership of the unions themselves.
In 1998 however the actor constellation started to change again. The ac-
quisition of emu membership altered the significance and nature of the vin-
colo esterno, basically softening its pressure on domestic choices. Prodi (an
academic turned politician, embodying the fusion of technical and electoral
legitimation) was replaced by D’Alema, leader of a more ‘political’ execu-
tive and – after the brief parenthesis of the Amato cabinet – by Berlusconi,
the leader of a centre-right coalition. Substantial puzzling about a broad
project of national interest (achieving emu membership) has been gradually
replaced by interest-driven power confrontations in which analysis, argu-
ments, empirically grounded debates have become less salient. Referring
back to our initial metaphor: the dog has reached a safe destination. But its
walking posture is still far from being firm and steady.
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II The Scene in the 1970s: Light,Shadow and Thunder
For Italy’s political economy the 1970s were a complex decade, charac-
terised by at least three intertwined dynamics: 1) the institutional comple-
tion of the Keynesian welfare state (in its widest sense), in many respects ac-
complishing what had been prescribed by the 1948 Constitution; 2) the
gradual appearance of endogenous strains, largely connected with some pe-
culiar characteristics of those accomplishments; 3) the sudden break of an
exogenous crisis, linked with the well-known turbulences of the world econ-
omy. The first dynamic culminated in 1978 with a sweeping social reform
establishing the National Health Service. The second dynamic became
overtly visible in 1974, when the huge debts accumulated by the social secu-
rity funds had to be repaid. Prompted by the first oil shock, the third dynam-
ic emitted in its turn a dramatic bang in 1976, when the official quotation of
the lira had to be officially suspended for excessive devaluation.
1 The light: the rise of Keynesian welfare
In the first two and one half decades after World War ii, the Italian economy
underwent a process of remarkable growth – one of the highest in Europe –
which enabled the country to gain quite a respectable position among the
top industrialised powers. Average per capita income grew some 2.5 times
between 1950 and 1970. The domestic product boomed especially in 1955-
1969, mainly as a result of international trade and the successful penetra-
tion of foreign markets. Export-led growth forced the large private indus-
tries of Northern Italy to rapidly modernise technologically and financially,
aligning themselves with international competitors.
The public industrial sector witnessed, in turn, a marked expansion (more
marked than elsewhere in Europe), in the context of a Keynesian economic
policy oriented towards industrial planning and moderate nationalisation.
A third sector of small and medium-sized enterprises, increasingly success-
ful in foreign markets, started to flourish in various niches of production,
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taking roots also outside the traditional industrial triangle of Piedmont,
Lombardy and Liguria.
This long ‘economic miracle’ was accompanied by a gradual consolida-
tion and articulation of the state apparatus, putting in place and fine tuning
the fairly complex institutional framework designed by the 1948 Constitu-
tion. Perhaps the major accomplishment on this front was the creation of
the regions, which was completed in 1970.
The national executive remained firmly in the hands of the Christian De-
mocrats (Democrazia cristiana – dc), but during the 1960s this party struck
a new alliance with the Socialists (the so-called Center Left, formed in
1962) which was to last for the subsequent thirty years. The opposition re-
mained monopolised by a Communist Party with strong Marxist-Leninist
orientations. Though highly combative in the electoral arena, the pci was
de facto involved in the making of the most important domestic policies, es-
pecially in the economic and social field. Its involvement took place both
formally in parliament and informally, through élite concertation.
The economic miracle and the coming together of the dc and the psi of-
fered a fertile background for the expansion of the welfare state. The insti-
tutional framework inherited by the new Republican regime born in 1948
divided social protection into three separate parts: social insurance (previ-
denza), health and sanitation (sanità) and social assistance (assistenza). So-
cial insurance included six major schemes (for pensions, unemployment, tu-
berculosis, family allowances, sickness and maternity, occupational injuries
and diseases), administered by a number of separate agencies and funds for
selected occupational categories, often with diverse eligibility and benefit
regulations. Insurance coverage was limited to employees, thus excluding
the self-employed; most benefits were flat rate or related to previous contri-
butions. The provision of health services relied heavily on the private sector.
Hospitals were subject to state supervision, but with large administrative
and financial autonomy (many of them were under control of the Catholic
church). Finally, a plethora of public and semi-public agencies provided so-
cial assistance for the needy at a national and local level, paralleled by pri-
vate and church charities.
This institutional setting witnessed only a few alterations during the
1950s. Yet, at the turn of the decade, things started to change. The econom-
ic miracle had brought about greater national well-being, which in turn had
produced a growing ‘fiscal dividend’ in the public budget. In a new cultural
and political climate, social problems and policies received increasing visi-
bility and attention. Sociologists and economists started to denounce the
distortions connected to the Italian ‘model of development’, urging a new,
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serious wave of reforms. Indeed, the centre-left coalition was based on the
premise of a new wave of reforms and was committed to a radical moderni-
sation of the country (Centorrino 1976). The formation of the new coalition
was followed by several articulated reports on social reforms (Comitato di
Studio per la Sicurezza Sociale 1965; Delogu 1967; Manin Carabba 1977).
However, the list of the reforms actually implemented, at least up to the
end of the decade, remained quite limited. In 1963 the National Council of
Economy and Labour (cnel) proposed a general reform of the social insur-
ance system (cnel 1963). With respect to pensions, the cnel suggested a
radical transformation of the existing system, through the introduction of a
universal flat-rate ‘social’ pension, supplemented by occupational schemes
(thus creating a proper system of ‘social security’ against the risk of old age,
in line with the Anglo-Scandinavian model). With respect to health care, the
cnel suggested a vigorous rationalisation of the overly complex insurance
system, originally based on a plethora of occupational funds, and the exten-
sion of hospital care to the whole population, as a first step towards the es-
tablishment of a National Health Service. This proposal was mainly based
on previous suggestions made by some political parties (in particular the
psi, the socialist party) and the trade unions. The proposal gave rise to a
wide and articulated debate, which turned sometimes into harsh political
confrontations.
The cnel plan found only an extremely limited application through the
legislative process. In 1965 a law, pompously called ‘Launch of the pension
reform’, established a Social Fund administered by the National Institute of
Social Security (inps), with the aim of providing, in the future, the universal
‘social’ pension mentioned before. Yet the Fund was used simply to finance a
fixed share (called, in fact, ‘social component’) of pensions, which neverthe-
less continued to be linked to the previous occupational and contributory
status. All in all, the idea of a ‘social’ pension (as conceived by the cnel)
was soon abandoned. The idea of an extension erga omnes of hospital care
was aborted too (at least up to the subsequent decade). Perhaps the only sig-
nificant innovation was the 1962 reform of education, establishing a single
comprehensive curriculum for the 11-14 age groups (cf. Table 2.1).
From 1968 onwards, however, the institutional profile of the Italian wel-
fare state started to change rapidly, in the wake of new and heated social
conflicts and under popular and union pressures. Hospital care was thor-
oughly revised in its administrative and financial status. Until then hospi-
tals, called ipab (Institutes of Public Assistance and Charity), were partial-
ly or totally in private hands. The reform transformed the hospitals into
public institutions owned and transparently administered by the state,
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changed the health care financing system, and introduced new co-ordinat-
ing and planning institutions within the Ministry of Health Care. The pen-
sion reforms of 1968 and 1969 introduced a very generous ‘earnings-relat-
ed’ formula, guaranteeing to employees a replacement rate of up to 80 per
cent after 40 years of career at the age of 60 (55 for women). This reform
also introduced for employees the possibility of retiring after 35 years of in-
surance membership, regardless of age, with a replacement rate of 70 per
cent (this type of pension, linked to a minimum number of insurance years,
was called ‘seniority pension’, as opposed to the usual old age pension,
linked only to the age)1. Unemployment insurance was strengthened, espe-
cially as regards the Cassa Integrazione Straordinaria scheme, which gave a
generous wage compensation (70-80 per cent of previous earnings) to work-
ers laid off because of industrial restructuring or reorganisation.
This reformist zeal continued and indeed deepened throughout the 1970s.
This decade completed the new edifice built in the 1960s and in many re-
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Table 2.1 Social policy reforms,1952-1978
Social Insurance
1952 Pension reform:improvement of pension formula and establishment of pension
minima
1955 Family allowances reform
1958-1967 Pension insurance extended to farmers,artisans and traders
1968 Unemployment insurance improved
1969 Pension reform:introduction of earnings-related and social pensions,cost of living
indexation
1974 Reform of invalidity pensions
1975 Wage indexation of pensions
Health care
1968 Reform of administrative and financial regulations for hospitals
1974 Hospital care transferred to regions
1978 Establishment of the National Health Service
Education
1962 School living age raised to 14; introduction of unified post-elementary curriculum
1969 Access to higher education greatly expanded
1974 Creation of parent/student representative boards
Social Assistance
1972 Jurisdiction over social assistance and services transferred to the regions
1977 Social assistance ‘categorical’funds abolished; jurisdiction transferred to local
authorities
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spects reshaped the organisation of welfare. Following constitutional provi-
sions, regions and local authorities were transformed into the main loci of
welfare policy, gradually suppressing the health insurance and assistance
funds run from the centre. Social assistance, health care, housing and voca-
tional training, thus became the competence of sub-national governments.
New social and personal services were organised, new housing and trans-
port programmes launched and some first active labour market policies in-
augurated. Client participation and control were fostered, especially in edu-
cation. In 1978 a sweeping reform led to the establishment of the National
Health Service, replacing all pre-existing separate professional insurance
funds.
Thus in the second half of the 1970s, the Italian welfare state emerged as a
relatively distinct and coherent institutional configuration. Though largely
centred on the Bismarckian principles of social insurance typical of all Con-
tinental, conservative-corporatist welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990;
1996), in the field of health care this configuration included a ‘Beveridgean’
element – or at least a Beveridgean aspiration to universal and uniform cov-
erage (an aspiration which was already present in the 1948 Constitution).
The Bismarckian transfer schemes provided relatively generous benefits,
most of which were earnings-related and fully indexed. The formerly dis-
persed health care and social services had been replaced by a relatively uni-
tary – though highly decentralised – national and universal service, based
on citizenship; education had been reformed and greatly expanded, and
housing broadly decentralised. A process of incisive secularisation, more-
over, had accompanied these transformations, greatly reducing the role of
the Catholic church in social policy and clearly disconnecting the notion of
‘welfare’ from that of ‘Christian charity’.
The institutional growth of the welfare state was paralleled by a rapid and
substantial quantitative expansion. In the mid-1950s, total social expendi-
ture (including income maintenance, health care and social assistance) ab-
sorbed around 10 per cent of gdp – a relatively low level by international
standards. In 1970 this percentage had risen to 17.4 per cent, reaching 22.6
per cent in 1975 – a level in line with that of France or Belgium and higher
than that of Britain (Flora 1983; Flora 1986/87; Ferrera 1984).
2 A ‘guaranteed’labour market
The long economic miracle caused profound modifications of the employ-
ment structure. At the beginning of the 1950s, Italy was to a large extent
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still an agrarian country: more than 40 per cent of the labour force was oc-
cupied in the primary sector, with a large number of independent farmers
and sharecroppers. By 1970 this proportion had fallen below 20 per cent,
with the secondary and tertiary sectors at about 40 per cent each. Although
definitively more modern, in the early 1970s the profile of Italy’s labour
force continued to display some typical traits of the Italian labour market
tradition, such as the high incidence of the self-employed (about 20 per cent)
and a very low female participation rate (at about 30 per cent).
In the 1970s a generous system of ammortizzatori sociali (social shock ab-
sorbers) was brought to completion in the field of unemployment. These
were entirely based on passive policies (i.e. cash transfers) and mainly ad-
dressed to the regular adult workers who constituted the core of the employ-
ment structure. Three different but intertwined phenomena contributed to
improve social protection against the risk of unemployment: the extension
and improvement of cash benefits; the overall institutionalisation of labour
relations through the Workers’ Statute; and the rise in union power.
After the war, state regulation of the labour market rested on three main
pillars: a) a general unemployment insurance scheme; b) a scheme for short-
term earnings replacement in case of temporary redundancies (Cassa inte-
grazione guadagni ordinaria); and c) centralised employment services. We
will analyse each of these three provisions in turn.
The ordinary unemployment insurance scheme had been introduced in
1919 by the Nitti government, which was moved by sincere reformist inten-
tions, in contrast with previous liberal governments. The 1919 law estab-
lished a compulsory insurance scheme addressed to private sector workers
remaining without job, with at least two years of contributions. The al-
lowance was very low and based on a flat daily rate (180 liras for each day of
unemployment).
A new Cassa Integrazione scheme was introduced between 1945 and
1947 following a private agreement between trade unions and employers’
associations initially applying to the northern regions, and then extended to
the whole country. The allowance still required a minimum period of contri-
bution, but was related to previous earnings (60-65 per cent) and was aimed
at protecting those workers who had been temporarily hit by working time
reductions and whose re-entry into the firm was thought to be certain. The
allowance compensated the employers for the prohibition of dismissals im-
posed on them just after the declaration of the armistice (1943) up to Au-
gust 1947.
Finally, in 1949 the state monopoly on the employment services was es-
tablished by Law no. 264 (the so-called ‘Fanfani law’). In theory, the design
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of the new employment service system seemed highly coherent and articu-
lated: general competencies were given to the central administration, place-
ment procedures (and thus outcomes) had to be unbiased, in order to avoid
any discrimination. The Ministry of Labour had to implement its exclusive
competence through a network of provincial offices. The procedures were
typically bureaucratic: the unemployed had to register on compulsory lists,
their position depending on the one hand on predefined criteria such as the
professional sector, the productive category, the qualification and the spe-
cialisation, and, on the other hand, on need-related criteria such as family
dependants, the period of enrolment in the lists and family income. The un-
employed had to periodically confirm their availability for work. Finally,
the principle of automatic assignment, which the whole system was based
on, guaranteed the procedure against any discrimination. In fact, the em-
ployers were not allowed to choose any worker they preferred, but they had
to notify the placement office of the characteristics of the worker they need-
ed to hire and the worker was automatically assigned to the firm, depending
on the position on the list and the qualifications required.
From the 1950s to the 1970s, these three pillars operated in mutual rein-
forcement to the disadvantage of the outsiders of the labour market. The
amount of the ordinary unemployment insurance benefit was adjusted sev-
eral times (in 1960, 1966 and 1974), but continued to be based on a daily
rate without any connection (until 19882) to wages: between 1949 and
1974 the ratio of this sum to the average industrial wage fell from 17 per
cent to less than 9 per cent (Ferrera 1986/87). Besides monetary erosion, 
the ordinary unemployment scheme became less effective over time in terms
of coverage: many groups of irregular workers, first job seekers and, obvi-
ously, the increasing number of workers in the underground economy had
no access to unemployment benefits.
On the contrary, the Cassa Integrazione scheme literally boomed and
started to function as a substitute for the former scheme. The requirement
of ‘transitory’ reductions of working time was de facto abandoned, and the
replacement rate was increased from 60 per cent to 70 per cent. But the most
remarkable innovation was the introduction of a new social shock absorber
through Law no. 1115/1968: special short-term earnings replacement bene-
fits (Cassa integrazione guadagni straordinaria). Based on the same logic of
the regular Cassa Integrazione scheme, the new programme was introduced
to guarantee workers in cases of large-scale industrial restructuring, reor-
ganisation or conversion. In this way, the new benefit had not only transito-
ry conjunctural aims, but also broad economic and political aims: it enabled
massive dismissals and social conflicts due to workforce expulsions to be
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avoided. The benefits, which were financed through employers, and work-
ers’ contributions, amounted to 80 per cent of the pay (up to a ceiling). In
1975 after a social agreement between the trade unions and Confindustria3,
which was then incorporated in Law no. 164, the replacement rates of both
the regular and the special Cassa Integrazione were unified at the level of 80
per cent, a record high in the European scenario. In addition, the duration of
the benefits was extended to a maximum period of two years – a limit often
surpassed in practice through discretionary ad hoc measures. Throughout
the 1970s the Cassa Integrazione was extended from the industrial sector to
artisan firms of the construction sector, mining firms, the agricultural sector
and finally to state employees.
As for employment services, their functioning did not evolve in the desired
direction. They became increasingly bureaucratised over time and the
whole placement system, that was supposed to assure impartiality and fair-
ness of treatment among the workers, ended up by encouraging a parallel,
underground, labour market.
The social protection schemes against unemployment were integrated by
the introduction of a new legislation on workers’ rights. In 1970 the Work-
ers’ Statute (Statuto dei Lavoratori) marked the beginning of a new era of
industrial relations. The Statute, which was the result of a heated political
debate, strongly limited the employers’ power by imposing constraints and
sanctions in case of union activity repression. Individual and collective
workers’ rights in the factories were acknowledged and widened. The law
was to be applied in enterprises with more than 15 employees. It included
rules for the protection of the dignity and freedom of the worker, for the de-
fence of union political activities and for the exercise of a rich set of social
rights connected to the work life. The new rules on firing are particularly
worth mentioning. The old legislation on individual dismissals (dating back
to 1966) had replaced the freedom to fire foreseen by the 1942 civil code
with a new regime that allowed firings in firms with more than 35 employees
only in the case of a ‘justified’ (i.e. demonstrable) reason or ‘right’ (i.e.
demonstrable) cause. If a dismissal was declared illegal, the employer could
choose whether to employ the worker again within three days or pay a sub-
stitutive allowance corresponding to 5-12 months’ wages. The Workers’
Statute instituted the rule of compulsory re-hiring in the case of no ‘justified
reason’ or ‘right cause’ in all enterprises with more than 15 employees, thus
abolishing the option of paying the penalty instead.
In addition, the Workers’ Statute reinforced the presence of trade unions
in the workplace. This was also the result of the changed political and social
climate at the end of the 1960s. Thanks to their increased political and or-
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ganisational power, trade unions were able to emancipate from their tradi-
tional subjection to political parties, gaining a more active role in policy
making4. In 1969 the rule of the incompatibility between party and union
positions was officially established. The explosion of conflicts and strikes
during the ‘hot autumn’ of 1969 allowed the unions to take on a primary
role in the battle for reforms (for pensions, housing, taxes) and higher
wages. Union demands were unanimous: higher control on income policies,
active participation in the firm management, and ‘egalitarianism’ (i.e. the
reduction of wage differentials among genders, categories and qualifica-
tions) (Cella and Treu 1989; 1998). The 1969 agreement for the metal
workers can be considered as the symbol of this new epoch. The agreement
included a basic wage increase, full wage continuation for sick workers,
strong limitations to overtime work and the introduction of decentralised
bargaining. In the same year the so-called ‘wage cages’ (i.e. the possibility of
differentiating wages on the basis of different earning categories corre-
sponding to various geographical areas) were abolished. These ‘cages’ had
been introduced in 1961 within a joint unions’ and employer’s agreement
whose aim was to reduce earnings dispersion. Italian provinces, from the
richest to the poorest, had been divided into seven categories according to
the levels of the cost of living. If a worker belonging to the area ‘zero’ (Milan,
Turin, Genoa and Rome) earned 100, an equally qualified worker working
in a province included in the area ‘one’ (Florence, Como, Sondrio) earned 97
and a worker of the area ‘six’ (Southern Italy) gained 80. Mobility from one
category to another (as the metaphor of the ‘cage’ suggested) was discour-
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Table 2.2 Labour policies,1945-1978:a summary
1919 General unemployment insurance
1945-47 Regular short-term earnings replacement benefits (Cassa integrazione guadagni
ordinaria)
1945 Wage indexation (scala mobile)
1949 Public employment services
1955 Apprenticeship regulated
1966 Law on individual dismissals
1968 Special short-term earnings replacement benefits (Cassa Integrazione
straordinaria)
1970 Workers’Statute
1975 Improvement of wage indexation and unification of the regular and special Cassa
Integrazione scheme to 80 per cent of the previous earnings
1977 Law on youth employment
1977 Law on industrial mobility and restructuring
1978 Law on vocational training
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aged. Before the 1961 agreement wage dispersion was significantly higher
(more than 30 per cent) (Turone 1988).
The rise in power of national trade unions was reflected in a parallel rise of
union membership. Between 1968 and 1975 the members of the cisl, the
Catholic-oriented union, rose from one million to two and a half million,
while those of the cgil, the communist-oriented union, grew from two and
a half million to four and a half million (Ricciardi 1986). From 1970 to
1980 the overall Italian union membership rate rose from 33.4 per cent to
44.1 per cent, exceeding the Dutch rate (33.8 per cent), the German rate
(34.3 per cent) and the ec average rate (38.1 per cent) (Carrieri 1995: 149).
3 The shadow: an internally flawed constellation
The socio-economic and institutional dynamics illustrated thus far gave a
great and unquestionable contribution to the overall modernisation of Italy.
However, they left a number of unresolved structural questions on the floor.
Moreover, they planted some new, dangerous seeds for the emergence of ad-
ditional problems: as stated at the beginning, the 1970s witnessed the ap-
pearance of an endogenous crisis, the most visible symptoms of which con-
centrated in the sector of welfare state financing.
The unresolved questions were basically related to the persistence of the
country’s historical divisions: the socio-economic division between a rapid-
ly industrialising north and a deeply backward south; the ideological and
political division between a moderate, largely Catholic, ‘white’ sub-culture
and a radical, largely communist, ‘red’ sub-culture.
Despite the huge flows of resources channelled into the Mezzogiorno by
the central government, the southern economy was still lagging far behind
at the beginning of the 1970s. North-south differentials were still particu-
larly dramatic in occupational terms. In 1970 the unemployment rate was
4.9 per cent in the south as against 2.3 per cent in the centre-north. By 1979,
these figures had risen to 10.9 per cent and 6.2 per cent, respectively
(Gualmini 1998). In the early 1970s the first statistics on the black economy
brought to light almost three million underground workers, mainly concen-
trated in the southern regions (censis 1976). The state-assisted industriali-
sation of the Mezzogiorno, which was the privileged economic and political
strategy of the 1950s, had not had a positive impact on employment. On the
one hand, the massive creation of state-participated firms, particularly in
the manufacturing, petrochemical and steel industries (whose financing was
also made possible by draining the surplus produced in the richer regions of
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the country) originated an irreversible exodus from the countryside to the
cities and from small to large firms, obstructing the possibility to develop a
web of small and family-led enterprises, as was happening in many regions
of the north. On the other hand, the continuous rise in public employment
(which was considered particularly attractive by the younger generations)
inhibited opportunities for mobility but multiplied occasions for clientelism
(Graziano 1984; Trigilia 1992).
The north-south dualism was only one of the deep and persisting domestic
tensions of the hot 1970s. That decade witnessed also a dramatic intensifi-
cation of the traditional political divisions of the country. The most visible
symptoms were the growing competition between the Communist Party
and the governing coalitions, the widespread and heated social conflicts and
the rise of terrorism. In 1975, in the second regional elections after the es-
tablishment of the regions, the Communist Party extended its control from
the traditionally ‘red’ regions (Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria) to three
other regions (Piedmont, Liguria and Lazio), becoming the official and le-
gitimate competitor of the highly institutionalised ‘white’ block. Many ac-
tivists of the Communist Party were also members of the cgil, which in
that period turned to more radical positions on economic and social re-
forms. The waves of strikes and social conflicts that had exploded in the hot
autumn of 1969 kept their momentum. The students’ protest movements
intertwined with those of the blue-collar workers. Some of the largest and
well-known universities were occupied (Trento, Torino, Milan, Pisa). Ter-
rorist attacks made their sinister appearance, culminating in the tragic kid-
napping and murder of the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, Aldo
Moro, in 1978.
The persistence (and in some respects even the aggravation) of the old
questions was not the only shadow on stage during the 1970s. New prob-
lems were in fact opening up in the wake of the social policy and labour
market regimes built in the previous decades. Using summary formulas, we
can say that those two regimes had posed the basis of five ‘original sins’ of
welfare capitalism Italian-style, which have been (and still largely are) the
object of articulated debates and policy actions in the 1980s and 1990s.
4 Five ‘original sins’of welfare capitalism Italian-style
The first two sins can be characterised as ‘distortions’. The social insurance
reforms listed in Table 2.1 caused, firstly, an allocative distortion, clearly
favouring certain risks/functions of social policy (most notably, old age and
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survival) at the expense of certain others (most notably, family benefits and
services, total lack of employment/income and the relief of poverty). As
mentioned, the 1969 pension reform introduced what probably was, at the
time, the most generous earnings-related formula of the Western world (70
per cent of previous wages after 35 years’ work with no age threshold or 80
per cent at the age of 60 for men and 55 for women). On the other hand, the
schemes aimed at catering for the needs of large and poor families remained
underdeveloped and underfunded. At the beginning of the 1950s, pensions
and family benefits absorbed a roughly equal share of the gdp (Ferrera
1984). By 1980, pension expenditure was almost seven times higher than
that for family benefits: the highest ratio in the ec except for Greece (ec
1993). The 1969 reform set the country on the road to becoming a ‘pension
state’ rather than a modern, fully-fledged welfare state responding to a vari-
ety of needs with a variety of instruments. And even the new social activism
of the regions could do little to contrast the expansive momentum of public
pension growth, which started to crowd out – financially and institutionally
– most other types of benefits and services.
The second distortion is of a distributive nature. Centred as they are on
occupational status, all Bismarckian systems give rise to some disparity of
treatment across sectors and categories. The fragmented development of
Italy’s social insurance, however, resulted in a true ‘labyrinth’ of categorical
privileges which has very few comparative counterparts (Ferrera 1996).
The main cleavage (which had already become easily visible in the 1970s)
opposed workers located in the core sectors of the (industrial) labour mar-
ket to those located in the more peripheral sectors (semi-regular and unem-
ployed). As this strong dualism still remains one of the most important fea-
tures of the Italian employment regime, it may be useful to discuss it in some
detail.
The dualism finds its roots in two distinct phenomena: the institutional
design of unemployment schemes and the dynamics of wage policies. The
system of social shock absorbers illustrated above was mainly centred on in-
surance mechanisms. The eligible workers were those who had paid contri-
butions for at least two years of regular work. In other terms, the main bene-
ficiaries were industrial workers belonging to the primary labour market
(the so-called insiders). The two major instruments of labour policy, the un-
employment insurance and the Cassa Integrazione schemes, had adopted
this kind of logic. By the same token, the procedures for placement were
based on two different trajectories, one for the formerly employed (recipi-
ents of insurance benefits) and the other one for the other categories of job
seekers. The former could move from one firm to another without respect-
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ing the rule of the ‘call by lot’ (i.e. the numerical order of the list), but simply
responding to the employers’ ‘nominative call’ (i.e. a job offer ad person-
am); the latter were, instead, subjected to the rule of the ‘call by lot’ – which
meant no freedom of choice for the employers and automatic placement for
workers. The most immediate effect was the propensity of employers to hire
the formerly employed (the insiders) to the full disadvantage of the other job
seekers (the outsiders) (Ichino 1982).
This strong orientation of the social protection towards the insiders of the
labour market would not have been so peculiar (and perverse) if a system of
active or targeted labour policies had been established for the outsiders (as
for instance in Sweden). But this was not the case. The young unemployed in
search of first jobs or the long-term unemployed with no benefits were not
offered such programmes. Nor did they have the chance to obtain a mini-
mum guaranteed income. Only at the end of the 1970s did the government
start to encourage active policies, such as training and mobility (cf. Table
2.2), but with scarce results.
Such a distortion in the distribution of the benefits was also reinforced by
union strategies on wage policy. The social conflicts of the 1970s resulted in
significant improvements of real wages and of the indexation regime.
Unions insisted that earnings should become ‘independent variables’ (no
longer dependent on inflation and the economy in general), and the immedi-
ate beneficiaries of this kind of policy, which has become notorious as ‘re-
versed incomes policy’ (Rossi 1998), were, of course, the members of the
unions, once again the insiders5. During the hot autumn, union wage claims
pursued numerous goals: to extend union control over wage dynamics (i.e.
to bring inside the area of collective bargaining the highest number of wage
items and the greatest number of workers); to increase the wage scale; to re-
duce differentials among the various categories of workers; to fill the gap
between the less protected workers and the more protected ones; to abolish
most of the productivity- and performance-related wage components (So-
maini 1989). An impetuous rise in earnings was in fact achieved during that
period6.
Of particular importance was the reduction of wage differentials, result-
ing from the elimination of the so-called ‘wage cages’ in 1969. This system,
as already stated, was based on a list of geographic areas characterised by
different wage minima. The strikes for the dismantling of the ‘cages’, which
were thought to be a tangible sign of the undemocratic backwardness of the
past, began in 1968 both in the public and in the private sector. The opposi-
tion of employers, who on the contrary considered the ‘cages’ as instru-
ments of flexibility, was strong. The first to surrender were the employers of
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public firms, followed by the associations of the small- and medium-sized
firms and finally the Confindustria. The suppression of fixed wage cate-
gories paved the way for the strengthening of national centralised collective
bargaining, which – though representing a step forward in the institutional-
isation of industrial relations – inevitably introduced some degrees of rigidi-
ty in the regulation of the labour market, distorting incentives for both terri-
torial demand and supply of labour.
In 1975, the national trade unions and Confindustria signed an agreement
which established a new system of wage indexation for industrial workers7.
For each percentage point of increase in consumer prices, all wages were to
grow by a single flat rate amount (the so-called punto unico di contingenza).
This meant that lower wages were more strongly protected than higher
wages, leading to a gradual ‘egalitarian’ ironing out of the earnings pyra-
mid. The agreement was soon extended by the government to all employees
in the state and private sector. But the new scala mobile concealed many
counter effects: it was at the same time a powerful barrier against the infla-
tionary erosion of (lower) wages and a powerful incentive for the spiral
wages-prices-wages (and thus inflation)8.
The third original sin that characterised the start-up, ‘Keynesian’ constel-
lation has to do with the financing of public, and in particular social, expen-
diture. In 1950-1964 Italy’s public finances witnessed a phase of relatively
balanced growth, in which the expansion of outlays was matched by a paral-
lel expansion of revenues. The subsequent decade was marked, however, by
a new pattern of unbalanced growth, in which outlays continued to rise
while revenues stagnated around a figure of 30 per cent of gdp9. This ‘flat
decade’ on the revenue side created a hole in Italy’s public finances which
made things much worse when the exogenous shocks hit in the mid-1970s
(Gerelli and Majocchi 1984). In Italian debate, this hole is often referred to
as the ‘original hole’ because it marked the beginning of the public debt spi-
ral of the subsequent decades. We count it among the ‘sins’ because it was
caused by the choice of not raising taxes and delaying the modernisation of
the tax apparatus.
The shift from balanced to unbalanced growth was the product of a more
or less deliberate choice by policy-makers of the centre-left coalition. This
choice followed a long debate on the correct interpretation of Article 81 of
the Italian Constitution, which states that any law involving the disburse-
ment of public money must indicate the source of the necessary financial
coverage in advance. The debate consisted of two conflicting interpretations
on this point: an ‘orthodox’ one, which interpreted the prescription as an
obligation to balance expenditure with real revenues (i.e. with no resort to
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borrowing) and a ‘Keynesian’ one, which accepted the notion of deficit
spending in cases where this would stimulate unexploited productive re-
sources, especially through the growth of public investments. The latter in-
terpretation prevailed, and after 1965 deficit spending became the current
practice.
The development during the subsequent decade did not, however, corre-
spond to the intentions and expectations of the Keynesian school. It was not
public investment that grew, but current expenditure (transfers and subsi-
dies in particular), leading to a rapid erosion of public savings. General gov-
ernment net lending rose from 0.8 per cent of gdp in 1964 (the last virtuous
year) to 7.0 per cent in 1974 and 11.4 per cent in 1975 – the peak of the first
oil shock slump. And public deficits largely served to finance the growth of
the welfare state. Starting from the mid-1960s, the aggregate balance be-
tween statutory contributions and benefits began to be negative for many
pension and most sickness funds: contribution rates were in fact kept artifi-
cially low, in the hope of stimulating job creation but also to please social
categories which were crucial for political stability. Despite repeated ad hoc
financial aids from the Treasury, the budgetary situation of the social secu-
rity sector continued to deteriorate, and in 1974-75 the government had to
launch an extraordinary operation to repay the enormous debts accumulat-
ed by the funds, amounting to 5.2 per cent of gdp (another deep dig in the
hole).
The remaining two original sins had to do with legality and efficiency. Al-
though highly articulated from a legislative and organisational viewpoint,
the social policy configuration built between the 1950s and the 1970s was
characterised by high institutional ‘softness’. Especially in some sectors and
areas, the degree of compliance with the rules disciplining the access to ben-
efits and the payment of contributions remained very low, not only on the
side of the various clienteles of social programmes, but also on the side of
public authorities. This syndrome assumed inordinate proportions in the
sector of disability pensions, which became the privileged currency of an ex-
tended clientelistic market: between 1960 and 1980 the total number of dis-
ability pensions rose almost five times, and in 1974 (following an expansive
reform) it came to surpass the total number of old age pensions: an unparal-
leled record in the oecd area (Ferrera 1984; 1986/87; 1996).
As to the efficiency of public services (in virtually all fields of public inter-
vention), the situation of the 1970s fell short of all expectations of the Key-
nesian modernisers of the 1960s. The lack of a pragmatic culture, the parti-
san colonisation of the administrative apparatus, the opportunistic use of
public employment by the patronage system, the failure to design rational
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systems of incentives: these and other factors gave rise to an oversized bu-
reaucracy with very low levels of performance (Cassese 1974). Within the
welfare state, the problem was particularly acute in the case of health care
and employment services. The 1978 reform establishing the nhs introduced
many perverse incentives from a financial and organisational point of view:
as a matter of fact, the institutional design of the 1978 reform was largely
responsible for the chaotic developments and growing financial strains wit-
nessed by this sector throughout the 1980s. At the end of the 1970s, the ma-
jor part of the expenditure for the employment services was absorbed by
personnel wages instead of being used for employment creation initiatives
and the percentage of workers successfully employed through public place-
ment offices amounted to only 10 per cent of the total labour force (Ichino
1996). In addition, the tripartite Ministerial commissions, that were related
to the placement offices and were formed by representatives of the Ministry,
members of the unions and representatives of the employers, were often are-
nas for patronage operations. The efficiency and legality deficits were thus
partly intertwined with each other.
5 Polarized pluralism: the political roots of poor policy performance
The five original sins of ‘welfare capitalism Italian-style’ were partly the re-
sult of specific policy choices (or non-choices) made in the formative decades
of 1950-1970: choices that in their turn reflected quite closely the overall
‘political logic’ of what is currently called Italy’s First Republic (1947-
1992). This is especially true for the aforementioned distortions: the devel-
opment of a pension-heavy welfare state, financially unsound and inclined
towards particularistic-clientelistic manipulations, was highly congruent
for example with the competitive dynamics of Italy’s unstable political sys-
tem and, more particularly, with the interests of the three major parties (dc,
pci and psi). The emphasis on pensions as ‘deferred wages’ and the neglect
of family policy mirrored in fact the social doctrines of both Marxism and
Catholicism. More crucially, the expansion of a highly fragmented social in-
surance system offered ample opportunities for distributing differentiated
entitlements to selected party clienteles. It must not be forgotten, however,
that to some extent the distinctive elements of the welfare all’italiana (to use
a well-known metaphor of the national debate, cf. Ascoli 1984) find their
roots in a number of broader historical features of Italian society, such as the
traditional ‘uncivicness’ of political culture10, the above mentioned histori-
cal divisions of economic and ideological nature, the failure to create a We-
berian administration.
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The imprint left by the political logic of the First Republic on the welfare
state can be illustrated in relation to the pension policies of the 1960s. As
mentioned above, that decade witnessed an articulated debate and two im-
portant reforms, whose legacy is still largely reflected in today’s spending
patterns and interest constellations. Italy’s post-war party system has been
characterised as a form of ‘polarised pluralism’ (Sartori 1976; 1982), dis-
playing not only high fragmentation (many parties), but also a wide ideo-
logical distance between left and right. The centre of the political spectrum
was occupied by the Christian Democratic party (dc), which presented it-
self as a watchdog of Western-style liberal democracy and market capital-
ism. The left wing was occupied by the largest communist party in the West-
ern world (pci), while the right wing was occupied by a fairly strong neo-
Fascist party (msi). Both the pci and the msi were anti-system parties, i.e.
they explicitly aimed at altering in fundamental ways the country’s political
and economic regime. In this setting, electoral competition followed a dis-
tinct tri-polar and centrifugal logic. All three poles had an interest in playing
on the pro-system vs. anti-system dimension. Sitting in the middle, the dc
had an interest in expanding its votes both towards the left and towards the
right, trying to capture all potentially pro-system voters. The other two
poles had in their turn an interest in capturing all anti-system voters located
around the extremes (lest splinter parties emerge), by means of various
strategies of issue radicalisation and social mobilization. Squeezed between
the dc and the pci, the socialist party (psi) oscillated between pro-system
and anti-system stances during the 1950s, but opted for the former at the be-
ginning of the 1960s, negotiating an organic alliance with the dc and form-
ing the first Centro-sinistra (Centre-left) government in 1962. By accessing
the shrine of state power and thus exerting a direct influence on policy
choices, the socialists hoped to expand their support at the expense of the
Communists – an experiment that had succeeded in the previous decade in
other European countries.
The Centro-sinistra started with grand programmatic ambitions of re-
form and modernization. As we have seen above, in the field of pensions the
idea was that of introducing a universal first pillar scheme, supplemented by
occupational benefits. This plan could be presented as a true ‘structural re-
form’, progressive yet Western style, i.e. capable of satisfying both the redis-
tributive expectations of the workers’ movement and at the same time reas-
suring the capitalist establishment. The universalistic option would not
have harmed the already covered groups (their entitlements would remain
unaltered with the interplay of first and second pillar schemes), while it
would have benefited a large and politically crucial constituency of uncov-
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ered categories, ranging from the self-employed to the unemployed, house-
wives, marginal workers, small businessmen, the poor elderly, etc. The pen-
sion reform could serve two purposes: strengthening the pro-system atti-
tudes of such categories in general and linking them to the dc and to the psi
in particular. Although matured in a different context, a similar reform in
the Netherlands in 1956 had achieved precisely these outcomes (Ferrera
1993; Van Kersbergen 1995). Of course, the pci could not be entirely ex-
cluded from the reform game: this party had huge ‘blackmail’ power vis-à-
vis the government and could prompt vast mass mobilizations against poli-
cies that it disliked. But in 1964 a softer line was emerging within the pci,
led by Giorgio Amendola: a line sincerely interested in institutional modern-
ization and open to negotiation with the new government coalition. Thus,
for a moment a window of opportunity seemed really available for a sweep-
ing pension reform along universalistic lines: and a first move was made in
1965, with the approval of a law bearing the title of ‘Launch of the pension
reform’ (cf. supra).
The window of opportunity closed too soon, however, for putting all the
pieces together. Despite the compromising and centripetal attitudes of indi-
vidual leaders such as Moro (dc), Nenni (psi) and Amendola (pci), the log-
ic of inter-party competition continued to operate in a centrifugal direction
during the 1960s. As a matter of fact, the formation of the Centro-sinistra
worked to exacerbate the syndrome of polarized pluralism. After a harsh
campaign entirely centred on the political significance and programmatic
goals of the new coalition formula, the 1963 elections marked significant
losses for both the dc and the psi, to the advantage of the liberals (pli) and
neo-Fascists (msi) on the right and of the pci on the left (cf. Table 2.3). The
psi paid a high price for its entry into the cabinet: in January 1964 a group
of internal dissidents left the party and founded the ‘Socialist Party of Prole-
tarian Union’ (psiup). With its highly maximalist stance, this new party
conditioned the pci from the left: the xi party congress held in 1966 defeat-
ed the Amendola line and pushed the pci back towards anti-system intransi-
gence. In the same year the formation of a new Marxist-Leninist splinter
party (Partito marxista-leninista italiano) unleashed a syndrome of extrem-
ist pulverisation to the left of both the pci and the psiup. The 1968 elec-
tions poured in their turn a chilly shower on the dc-psi entente: not so
much for the dc (which came out stronger), but for the psi and the smaller
social democrats (psdi). These two parties had experimented with a pre-
election merger, which was highly penalised by the voters. Participation in
government was not delivering its promises in terms of electoral support: in
fact it was revealing itself as a dead end.
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These competitive dynamics worked heavily against the universalistic op-
tion in pension reform, especially owing to the strains and divisions inside
the left. The gains of the pci and the losses of the psi at the 1963 elections
alerted the latter party against communist competition, which was particu-
larly acute within working class voters in the industrial north: a growing
electoral constituency, increasingly unionised and very sensitive to the des-
tiny of its pension contributions. After the psiup split, psi leaders in gov-
ernment lost touch with the stronger union, the cgil: most of this union’s
cadres belonging to the socialist area adhered in fact to the psiup and this
party did not support pension universalism, pressing instead for a rigorous-
ly ‘workerist’ design of social insurance aimed at defending blue collar inter-
ests. The 1966 congress pushed the pci in the same direction, advocating
closer links between the party and workers in the defence of their current
and deferred wages. Rather than a universalistic, two-pillar pension system,
the pci started to voice for the strengthening of the existing system, with
substantial ameliorations for employees. In such a climate, in the second
half of the 1960s, no actor on the left of Italy’s political spectrum (not even
the leftist currents of the dc) had any political interest in pursuing a univer-
salistic reform design. The government was not prepared, however, to ac-
commodate the financially very demanding requests of the pci and the
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Table 2.3 Italian elections:parties and share of vote,1958-1976
Votes (%)
Parties 1958 1963 1968 1970 1972 1975 1976
PCI 22.7 25.3 26.9 27.9 27.2 33.4 34.4
PSIUP 4.4 3.2 1.9
PSI 14.2 13.8 10.4 9.6 12.0 9.6
14.5*
PSDI 4.5 6.1 7.0 5.1 5.6 3.4
PRI 1.4 1.4 2.0 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.1
DC 42.4 38.3 39.1 37.9 38.8 35.3 38.7
PLI 3.5 7.0 5.8 4.7 3.9 2.5 1.3
PDIUM 4.8 1.8 1.3
MSI 4.8 5.1 4.5 5.2 8.7 6.4 6.1
Others 1.7 1.2 1.5 0.8 1.9 1.6 3.9
Notes:1970 and 1975 = Regional elections
* In 1968 the Socialist party (PSI) and the Social-democratic party (PSDI) presented together at the
polls.
Abbreviations:cf. above,Table 1.3. PDIUM = Partito di Unità Monarchica.
Source:Ferrera (1993:266)
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cgil. In 1968 a partial deal was struck with the other two unions, cisl and
uil. But the disappointing results of the 1968 elections (partly centred, pre-
cisely, on the pension issue) re-opened the games. A big package deal was ne-
gotiated, ‘universalist’ only in the sense that all participants got some spoil.
The real winners were the pci and the cgil, which obtained the introduc-
tion for all employees of one of the most generous pension formulas ever in-
troduced in Europe, including the option to retire after 35 years of insurance
regardless of age (the infamous – with hindsight – seniority pensions). Polit-
ically, the 1969 pension reform inaugurated a new phase of all-inclusive
spoils-sharing system, extended to the pci and to the trade unions (which
gained an important role in the actual management of the pension funds, in-
cluding grass-roots decisions about disability pension applications). Insti-
tutionally, the reform created a true ‘labyrinth’ of different occupational
funds, with different regulations, easily permeable to partisan manipula-
tions and mass patronage practices. Financially, it created a spending ma-
chine that in the span of two decades brought pension expenditure up from
6.9 per cent of gdp in 1970 to 11.8 per cent in 1990 (1992 = 12.8 per
cent)11. Whatever their historical origins, and however congruent with the
political complexion of post-war Italy, the internal flaws and malfunction-
ing of the Keynesian-Fordist constellation of the 1970s rendered the country
structurally vulnerable to the external shocks that appeared on stage at the
beginning of that decade. Hitting on friable grounds, the storm thus pro-
duced more serious damage  in this country than elsewhere in Europe.
6 Enter the external challenges: from miracles to thunderstorms
Italy’s political economy stepped into the 1970s on the wrong foot. In the
wake of the wage rises of 1969, the Bank of Italy and the Treasury decided
on a monetary squeeze in 1970, which provoked a recession in the following
year. This prompted the government to shift back to an expansionist policy
in both monetary and budgetary terms. The cycle turned swiftly upwards,
but so did inflation, while the balance of payments witnessed increasing
strains. With the collapse of the dollar standard (and as a consequence of
strong speculative attacks), the lira was devaluated in 1973: a move which
did not compromise the upward trend of the cycle, but which reinforced the
already existing domestic inflationary pressures due to the price increase of
imported raw materials. Severe administrative controls were also intro-
duced on the movement of capital, to discourage its alarmingly mounting
flight abroad. In 1974 the rate of inflation had risen to 19 per cent, up from
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2 per cent in 1968. The first oil crisis produced a dramatic slump in 1975: in
that year gdp fell by almost 4 per cent. Inflation also went down. But in
1975 the above-mentioned scala mobile agreement created an infernal
(with hindsight) stagflation-multiplier whose consequences were to be seri-
ously felt for many years to come. By guaranteeing an immediate adjust-
ment of wages to prices, the new scala mobile contributed not only to the
spread of inflation throughout all branches of the economy, but fostered an
overall climate of self-sustaining inflationary expectations.
At the end of 1975, the government lowered interest rates and created new
liquidity in order to exit from the recession and support a severely ailing in-
dustrial sector. However, a new massive speculative attack was launched
against the lira, and in the winter of 1976 the official quotation of the na-
tional currency had to be suspended for forty days. When the exchange rate
market re-opened, the lira had suffered a new heavy devaluation. The vi-
cious circle devaluation-inflation-indexation brought the rate of inflation
up to 21 per cent by 1980. In the same year, public debt had mounted to
58.1 per cent of gdp (1970 = 38.1 per cent) and public deficit to 8.6 per cent
(1970 = 4 per cent) (oecd, Economic Outlook, various editions).
The macro-economic policies pursued by the Treasury and by the Bank of
Italy in the 1970s have been severely criticised as inadequate responses to
the new international context, and thus for being largely responsible for the
ailing conditions of Italy’s economy and public finances at the end of the
decade. This indictment must be tempered with at least two considerations:
the initial conditions were characterised by a peculiarly high degree of vul-
nerability; the social and political situation posed severe constraints for pol-
icy-makers. To some extent, inflation and deficits were the most viable in-
struments for dispersing the costs of adjustment in a context which allowed
very little room for the ex ante definition of policy priorities and the imposi-
tion of explicit sacrifices (Salvati 1981; 1984).
A deliberate attempt at macro-economic stabilisation was indeed made in
the second half of the decade. In 1976, following an outstanding electoral
success of the Communists, a ‘national solidarity’ majority was formed in
Parliament, including the pci. This coalition took significant decisions in
many policy domains (e.g. the fight against terrorism). More specifically, it
tried to pursue an explicit policy of ‘real’ macro-economic adjustment.
The point of departure of this attempt was a fully fledged sequence of neo-
corporatist agreements, the first ever experienced in Italy, which culminated
in the ‘eur’ union assembly in February 1978 (taken from the name of the
neighbourhood in Rome where it took place) where trade unions and espe-
cially the cgil formally turned to wage restraints. In exchange for that, the
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government committed itself to protecting the existing employment levels
and to finding innovative solutions for combating youth unemployment. A
number of fiscal measures followed, with positive effects on labour costs
and productivity. More significantly, some innovative industrial and labour
policies were introduced (cf. Table 2.2.): the new climate of social co-opera-
tion between the unions and the government offered a fertile ground for the
development of active labour market policies. In particular, three pro-
grammes are worth mentioning: the law for youth employment (n.
285/1977), the law on industrial reorganisation (no. 675/1977) and the
general law on vocational training (no. 845/1978).
The main purpose of the law on youth employment was to provide special
funds to the regions for organising and implementing vocational training
and job creation initiatives for young people in search of jobs. Regional
commissions, composed of the representatives of the regions and of the pri-
vate associations, were established in order to collect and monitor the data
and information on territorial employment perspectives and to organise
training courses. In addition, the law introduced a set of tax relief measures
to encourage the demand of labour. Finally, for the first time the law allowed
special contractual conditions for young workers, such as contracts related
to training or stages.
Law no. 675/1977 on industrial reorganisation immediately obtained
large cross-partisan approval. The big technological transformations made
restructuring and innovation particularly urgent, with heavy consequences
in terms of massive dismissals in the industrial sector. The law was aimed at
reorganising various pre-existing mechanisms of financial support to the in-
dustrial sector, the criteria and rules of state intervention, and labour policy
provisions targeted at absorbing massive dismissals in a new general inte-
grated design. A new Interministerial Committee for Industrial Policy was
set up in order to monitor conjunctural economic trends and to co-ordinate
infrastructural interventions. In the field of labour policies, social shock ab-
sorbers and active policies were given a new regulatory framework. Special
short-term earnings replacement benefits were partially modified through
the inclusion of a further case of application: the so-called ‘crisis of particu-
larly social relevance’. In addition, a new active policy was introduced: ex-
ternal mobility measures (procedure di mobilità esterna) were enacted in
order to allow the transfer of redundant workers from one firm to another or
from one region to another.
Finally, the law on vocational training (no. 845/1978) provided general
guidelines for the regions that starting from 1970 had been assigned voca-
tional training functions. The regions were given responsibility to formulate
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a detailed discipline on the regulation of training in the different areas of the
country. A fund for vocational training was set up, and the appropriate con-
nections with the European Social Fund were established.
In spite of their noble intentions, these three innovative measures were
never fully implemented. The regions did nothing but reproduce the old
public programmes, and the ec funds were hardly used. External mobility
never started since workers seemed to ‘prefer’ the generous Cassa Inte-
grazione benefits; only scattered and fragmented job opportunities for the
young unemployed were created, lacking a minimum degree of long-term
rationality and co-ordination.
The ‘real’ adjustment policy of the national solidarity coalition was there-
fore not very effective. The attempt was short lived (1976-1979) and crum-
bled due to the continuing political and ideological strains between its main
protagonists. It also met with strong institutional obstacles. The effort to re-
form and innovate the system of financial incentives to industry in 1977
clashed for example against innumerable administrative difficulties and
cumbersome decision-making procedures that basically made any change of
the status quo impossible (Ferrera 1989). The low institutional capabilities
of Italy’s governmental machinery remained throughout the decade an ad-
ditional, significant factor of structural vulnerability vis-à-vis old, new, do-
mestic and international challenges.
At the end of the turbulent 1970s, the Italian economy was thus a real
mixture of lights and shadows (with hindsight more shadows than lights).
As for the lights, after the dramatic effects of the first oil shock, the expan-
sionary macro-economic measures and the strong depreciation of the lira
(16 per cent) brought some positive effects, safeguarding the competitive-
ness of Italian products. Between 1976 and 1979 the trade balance showed a
positive trend, thanks to an attentive monetary and exchange rate policy.
The volume of export rose by 10 per cent yearly, doubling the ec average.
gdp resumed its growth, still higher than the ec average: 5.9 per cent in
1976, 3.4 per cent in 1977, 3.7 per cent in 1978 and 6 per cent in 1979. In-
vestments and consumptions were re-launched.
Based as it was on a sequence of monetary stops and goes, currency deval-
uations and export-led recoveries, this reprise was very shaky. At the end of
the 1970s, Italy’s ‘misery index’ was the second highest in Europe, after that
of Spain: inflation floated around 15 per cent, and the unemployment rate
was particularly high compared to the other ec countries. From 1976 to
1979 it grew from 6.6 per cent to 7.6 per cent, whereas in Germany it float-
ed around 3 per cent and in France and UK around 5 per cent (oecd, Eco-
nomic Outlook, various editions). This was really a specific feature of the
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Italian labour market: the persistence of high unemployment starting al-
ready from the 1970s. Only in the United States had the unemployment rate
reached such a level, but in the 1980s, unlike Italy, US unemployment was to
experience a swift downturn. Three other highlights of the Italian situation
were the concentration of unemployment in the southern regions, among
women and the young. In 1979 in the Mezzogiorno the unemployment rate
reached 10.9 per cent whereas in the centre-north it was equal to 6.2 per
cent. In the same year male unemployment amounted to 5 per cent, while fe-
male unemployment totalled 13.3 per cent. Particularly remarkable was the
growth of youth unemployment (15-24 years), which had almost doubled:
from 10.2 per cent in 1970 (against a national average of 4.9 per cent) to
25.6 per cent in 1979 (against a national average of 10.3 per cent).
The loss of employment was particularly high in traditional large facto-
ries, which in the 1970s underwent a thoroughgoing process of reorganisa-
tion. Productive decentralisation became the employers’ motto in order to
pursue economies of scale and to bypass the power of the unions. In fact, de-
centralisation allowed more flexibility to cope with the adjustments im-
posed by the market and weakened (or sometimes even zeroed) the power of
the unions, since the Workers’ Statute and its clauses on behalf of workers’
organised activity were applicable only to firms with more than fifteen em-
ployees. Flexible, small firms were gradually flourishing, especially in the in-
dustrial districts of the north-eastern regions. From 1971 to 1981 the num-
ber of firms with less than ten employees rose from 20.2 per cent to 22.8 per
cent of total firms, those with less than 20 employees from 8.7 per cent to
12.4 per cent, whereas large firms with more than 200 employees and more
than 500 employees declined respectively from 12.8 per cent to 11.1 per
cent and from 24 per cent to 19.7 per cent (Brusco and Paba 1997: 270).
The most important (and problematic) features of the Italian ‘model’ were
therefore consolidating at the turn of the decade. But policy-makers seemed
unable to interpret and react to these new premonitory signs. The changes
in the socio-economic environment were definitely more rapid than those in
the politico-institutional system, which indeed remained basically un-
changed from the post war-period to the end of the 1970s.
The 1970s closed, however, with a political coup de reins, which was to
have significant repercussions in the subsequent period: the decision to ad-
here to the newly born European monetary system (ems). The issue was
quite hot for Italy since it involved the abandonment of the old devaluation-
centred monetary policy in favour of a new (and thus more uncertain) mon-
etary regime. In the European arenas, the debate was in fact led by the
French and the Germans and actually followed with resignation by the Ital-
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ians. The decision to abandon the usual devaluation strategies that had tra-
ditionally functioned as a mechanism for the safeguarding of Italy’s com-
petitiveness involved the change of the entire monetary and economic poli-
cy. It was precisely on this issue that the national solidarity government fell,
with the pci joining again the ranks of the opposition.
In December of 1978, the lira finally entered the ems with a larger fluctua-
tion band (6 per cent instead of 2.25 per cent). The joining of the ems
marked the beginning of a new phase in Italy’s ec membership. The partici-
pation in a monetary system designed to be ‘hard’ would decisively condi-
tion the development and the management of most policy sectors. We will
discuss in Chapter v the complex dynamics which led to such a major policy
shift, which planted a first, extremely important ‘seed’ for the adjustment of
the 1990s. Prior to addressing explanatory questions, let us proceed with
our reconstruction of politico-economic developments, turning our atten-
tion to the ‘winding road’ of adjustment during the 1980s and 1990s.
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III The Winding Road to Adjustment
1 The new European constraints
At the end of the 1970s, Italy had built up an extended and articulated sys-
tem of social guarantees, after a prolonged and sustained period of econom-
ic growth. The parallel development of particularistic and distributive so-
cial policies, on the one hand, and a highly protective labour market regula-
tion to the advantage of the employees, on the other, had resulted in an inter-
nally coherent welfare system, with high levels of satisfaction among its
beneficiaries. This system appeared closed (if not impermeable) to the exter-
nal challenges, completely absorbed by the ups and downs of domestic poli-
tics, and rather insensitive with respect to the inputs and stimuli towards
change that came from outside. It is not surprising, therefore, that the sud-
den turbulences due to the changing conditions of the international econo-
my and to the process of supranational integration would soon reveal –
starting from the early 1980s – the fragility of the Italian welfare state. The
strengthening of the European arena (of its institutional identity, competen-
cies and transactions) put the original configuration of the Italian welfare
state under the double pressure of a forced financial adjustment on the one
side, and of an increasingly rapid process of market integration on the other.
The fact that the European arena can influence the evolution of domestic
policy-making, particularly with regard to social policies and labour market
regulation, is not a new phenomenon of the 1990s: on the contrary, this in-
fluence appeared for the first time at the end of the 1970s, especially after
the launching of the ems, and has continued up to the present day, after the
establishment of the emu. This is the reason why we cannot properly follow
the line of development of the Italian welfare system since the 1970s, unless
we refer directly to the developments of a major actor such as the European
Community (and then Union), which caught the attention of national deci-
sion-makers rapidly and decisively.
In this regard, the entry into the ems represents the first stage of a long
process of adjustment to exogenous challenges that came from the interna-
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tional environment and then would deeply influence the functioning of
Italy’s welfare state. The second stage coincides with the completion of the
internal market in the late 1980s, and the third with the convergence to-
wards the Maastricht parameters during the 1990s. The adjustment pres-
sure of the three stages, however, had a different weight, since it was some-
how filtered by the domestic dynamics of policy and political change. Still,
at all three stages the pressures to make national public policies conform to
supranational standards and requirements has acted as a positive stimulus
for change in the direction of greater budgetary austerity and institutional
modernisation.
Already in the first half of the 1980s some important pre-conditions for an
effective adjustment of both the economy and public finances had been
posed. But policy makers, disturbed as they were by high political instabili-
ty, the persisting challenge of terrorism and the inflationary effects of the
second oil shock, did not seem to be prepared (or rather were not capable) to
undertake incisive reforms and persevered instead with the expansionary
and distributive policy strategies of the past. The pressures stemming from
integration became more visible starting with the Maastricht Treaty
(1992), when the ‘restoring to health’ (risanamento) of public finance and
hence of economic and social policies became more a necessity than a virtue.
Moreover, in the early 1990s, the international pressures to adjust inter-
twined with the deep institutional changes following the fall of the ‘First Re-
public’. The rapid transformation of the most familiar rules and ingredients
of both the domestic political system and of the international economic en-
vironment forced Italian politicians to substantially modify their strategies
and to introduce important policy innovations.
In this chapter we will reconstruct and analyse the gradual convergence of
national policies to the stimuli and requirements of European integration
from two perspectives. On the one hand, from the perspective of the control
– and specifically containment – of public finances, a process that had imme-
diate consequences upon all social policies. On the other, from the perspec-
tive of the growing openness of markets (that is, the internationalisation
process), which has influenced the characteristics of the occupational struc-
ture and the overall organisation of the Italian welfare system. This double
adjustment to the rigorous discipline of a common economic and monetary
area and to the changed configuration of international trade – an often un-
stable and hesitant process – has slowly created the conditions for a new cy-
cle of more significant and effective reforms in the field of social policy and
labour market regulation – a goal that unfolded itself in the course of the
1990s. The next chapter will deal with this new cycle of reforms.
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2 The contradictory 1980s: testing adjustment while accumulating a huge
public debt
As far as the real economy is concerned, the 1980s were characterised by
contradictory trends. On the one hand, the entry into the ems and the re-
forms that affected the Central Bank made it possible to pursue a rigorous
monetary policy whose main goals were deflation, currency stability and
the regaining of national credibility after the gloomy performance of the
1970s. On the other hand, the renewed centre-left coalitions (under the
novel name of Penta-party governments) which remained steadily in power
for the whole decade (cf. Chapter i, Table 1.3) were not able to take advan-
tage of the changed economic conditions (a significant gdp recovery start-
ing in 1983 and continuing with the 1986 oil counter-shock, as Figure 3.1
shows) and kept on playing their traditional distributive games based on
easy spending. In terms of policy choices too, as will be shown in the next
section, the 1980s distinguished themselves for a similarly ambiguous trend.
Participating in the ems proved to be particularly important for the Ital-
ian economy, since it involved a radical transformation of monetary policy.
The entry into a fixed band of currency oscillation, though wider than the
standard one, caused the abandonment of those traditional devaluation
policies that had permitted the safeguarding of Italian competitiveness
without embarking in comprehensive strategies of real adjustment. As was
to happen again in 1992, Italy accepted the ems as an external constraint or
rather a ‘compulsory choice’ in order not to be left behind, at the periphery
of the European system. The national debate was very lively, with Carli, as
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Source: oecd,Economic Outlook,various years
Rescued by Europe  19-12-2003  20:55  Pagina 59
the leader of the Confindustria (the biggest business association), Ossola, as
Minister for Foreign Trade, and Marcora, as Minister for Agriculture,
strongly opposing entry and with the Bank of Italy highly sceptical. In the
end, Italy surrendered to the German-French axis and the first pillar of the
risanamento was posed (Dyson and Featherstone 1999).
Yet entry into the ems was not the only example of virtuous change initi-
ated by Italy in the late 1970s; just before entry, in August 1978, the nation-
al solidarity government had approved a first important reform of bud-
getary procedures (Law no. 468), aimed at controlling public expenditures
more rigorously, after a period of substantial laissez-faire in contrast with
the already mentioned article 81 of the Italian Constitution.
In fact, this article established the obligation of financial coverage for
every legislative act originating additional public expenditures, but left the
regulation of relationships between the government – which proposes the
budget – and the Parliament – which amends and approves it – to ordinary
legislation and parliamentary rules of procedure. As D’Alimonte (1978)
clearly explains, the 1978 reform responded to two different pathologies de-
veloped during the glorious age of welfare state construction: the prolifera-
tion of public agencies and entities with autonomous spending powers, and
the accelerating growth of public debt. The reform introduced two new de-
vices: the financial law and the forecasting budget (bilancio previsionale).
The financial law was a ‘substantive’ mechanism (as opposed to the ‘formal’
nature of the budget law whose task is that of photographing the extant sit-
uation) aimed at transposing the allocation of revenues and expenditures
into operational objectives, and fixing the budget changes and macro-eco-
nomic targets (such as the level of public borrowing or the net financial
deficit) to be achieved during the next year. The forecasting budget, articu-
lated in a budget based on the existing legislation and a pluri-annual pro-
grammatic budget, was aimed at projecting and planning outlays and rev-
enues in the mid-to-long term, up to the next 3-5 years. If the financial law
was intended at introducing immediate changes, the forecast budget aimed
at inserting such changes in a wider and longer-term policy framework
(Verzichelli 1999). All in all, the reform aimed at introducing an explicit
programmatic procedure that defined the expenditure targets of the public
administration, safeguarding the overall equilibrium of public finances, and
thus complying with the requirements of article 81 of the Constitution.
However, actual developments did not correspond, with these noble in-
tentions. The main characteristic of the reform, i.e. its overall programmat-
ic aim, was offset by the improper use of planning procedures made by a se-
quence of unstable cabinets, more inclined to exploit all opportunities they
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had to spend, than to stick to the budgetary targets of their predecessors. In
this way the financial law soon became an occasion for distributive initia-
tives on behalf of various particular interests, causing the fast acceleration,
rather than the much-needed containment of public expenditure.
Returning to monetary policy, the early 1980s witnessed a new wave of
austerity and stability measures stemming from an important reform. Two
years after entering the ems, in 1981, a ‘divorce’ between the Treasury and
the Bank of Italy was passed: under the new regime the latter ceased to be
the last-resort buyer of unsold government bonds, and the instruments of
monetary and credit policy were modified through the dismantling of direct
controls on credit and of administrative obligations, in favour of a more
market-oriented regulation (Addis 1987; Epstein and Schor 1987). The
most immediate aim after the ‘divorce’ was to curb inflation through a
smaller emission of currency. In addition, the new Governor Ciampi began
to call for a substantial reform of the budgetary process and for a new bar-
gaining regime in order to keep wages and productivity under control.
Ciampi’s repeated calls opened the way for the 1988 reform (cf. below),
which introduced new rules and instruments for the planning and control of
public accounts (Verzichelli 1999). As for wages and productivity, a wide
political agreement among the government, trade unions and employers’ as-
sociations was signed in 1983.
The restrictive monetary policy carried out by the Central Bank had a se-
ries of interrelated effects: inflation began to diminish, but the trade balance
progressively deteriorated both for goods and for services, mainly due to the
impossibility of using devaluation. The high interest rates, whose aim was
to stimulate the inflows of compensatory financial capitals, had a depressive
effect on domestic investments, which witnessed a constant decline (from
24.5 per cent of gdp in 1980 to 19.7 per cent in 1987) (oecd, Statistical
Compendium 1997). Public debt continued to soar (cf. Figure 3.2), and the
resort to foreign borrowing was thus inevitable.
But in the second half of the 1980s, in the wake of the oil counter-crisis,
the indicators of the real economy improved significantly. The gdp growth
rate surpassed 3 per cent while the inflation rate fell below 6 per cent. The
trade balance showed a surplus, investments rose (from 18.8 per cent in
1986 to 20.3 per cent in 1990), and exports boomed.1 The Single European
Act (1986), soon followed by the liberalisation of financial capitals (1988),
encouraged further mobility of goods and capitals outside national bound-
aries. Thus, for example, in the period 1981-1990 Italian foreign direct in-
vestments amounted to 28,707 million usd compared to 3,597 million usd
in the previous decade (oecd, International Direct Investment Statistics
1996).
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These positive economic conditions did not, however, stimulate national
policy makers to tackle the problem of public finances, in spite of their de-
clared intentions. The figures relative to public debt do not need much of a
commentary. Between 1980 and 1990 public debt rose from 58.1 per cent
of gdp to 104.5 per cent, as Figure 3.2 shows, reaching a record high in Eu-
rope (except for Belgium). In the same period the debt service increased from
4.7 per cent to 8.2 per cent of gdp and public deficit from 8.6 per cent to
11.1 per cent (cf. Figure 3.3) (oecd, Economic Outlook, various years).
Throughout the decade, public outlays remained higher than public re-
ceipts. The dynamics of social expenditure did not help the process, due to a
number of ameliorative social reforms and the continuing growth of public
employment2. Public revenues rose too, but not enough to keep up with to-
tal government expenditures.
The worrying growth of public debt was a major factor behind the second
reform of the budgetary process, introduced in 1988 by law 362, under the
auspices of Ciampi. The law established new rules and new instruments,
and in particular obligation to prepare every year, prior to the financial law,
a detailed ‘economic and financial document’ (dpef, Documento di pro-
grammazione economica e finanziaria), aimed at identifying broad eco-
nomic policy objectives, setting financial targets and offering budgetary
projections for the medium and long term. The 1988 reform was passed in
the wake of two other important changes: 1) the establishment of the so-
called ‘budgetary sessions’ (introduced in 1983 for the lower Chamber and
in 1985 for the Senate), i.e. a period starting in October entirely devoted to
the approval of the financial law and the budget; and 2) the abolition of the
procedure of secret voting with respect to expenditure decisions (1986).
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With the introduction of the dpef, expenditure targets started to be
planned well in advance, and the issue of planning was given more visibility
and attention. The dpef was presented in May (4 months prior to the actu-
al financial law) and reported on the main macro-economic goals of the ex-
ecutive, linked to an assessment of the state of the national and international
economy. Therefore, it represented an important constraint upon the gov-
ernmental action and, at the same time, a basis for the policy reform to be
proposed to (and negotiated with) the social partners. The 1988 reform,
moreover, changed the nature of the financial law, moving several public
policy issues onto the so-called ‘connected provisions’ (provvedimenti col-
legati, i.e. separate bills), and concentrating its focus on explicit changes of
the legislation in force (Vassallo 2000; Verzichelli 1999).
The sequence unfolding through the dpef, the budget law, the financial law
and its ‘connected bills’ greatly improved the overall design of Italy’s bud-
getary process (cf. Tables 3.1 and 3.2). However, the original aims of the
1988 reform were partially distorted by frequent delays in the presentation
of the dpef and a tendency to overburden the ‘connected provisions’. The
genuine implementation of the 1988 reform was also structurally limited by
the persisting approval of distributive policies, whose characteristics (dif-
fuse costs and benefits concentrated upon specific groups) well suited the
aims of the five parties in government: indeed, for these parties, considering
the high instability and the short duration of the political cycle, it was per-
fectly rational to try to attract voters through selective benefits (Dente
1991). The very short duration of the executives, with the exception of
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those led by Craxi, left very limited opportunities for the imposition of sac-
rifices – a ‘competitive blame avoidance’ syndrome that blocked any propos-
al perceived as potentially unpopular.
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Table 3.1 Policy reforms of the budgetary process,1970-1989
Before the reforms Art. 81 of the Constitution (1948)
– Budget law as the main instrument for outlays planning (general programmatic document
with no operational objectives);
– Obligatory financial coverage for special and additional public expenditures;
– Ordinary law (and no constitutional rules) for the regulation of Government/Parliament re-
lationships in the process of resource distribution.
– As a consequence: low co-ordination and no monitoring of public expenditures dynamics.
After the reforms Law no. 468/1978
– General aim: introduction of a more co-ordinated and formalised ‘budgetary process’; im-
provement of the degree of rationality and transparency of the overall budgetary policy.
– Specific aims: introduction of two new policy instruments:a) the financial law (for substan-
tial and short-term definition of fixed expenditure targets); b) the so-called ‘forecasting
budget’(for mid- and long-term planning of outlays and revenues).
1983
– Introduction of the ‘budgetary session’in the Chamber of Deputies.
1985
– Introduction of the ‘budgetary session’in the Senate .
1986
– Abolition of the procedure of secret voting with respect to spending decisions.
Law no. 362/1988
– General aim:More emphasis on the ‘programmatic’moment of the budgetary process;
widening and further rationalisation of the decision-making sequences.
– Specific aims: Introduction of two new policy instruments:a) the Document for economic
and financial planning (Documento di programmazione economica e finanziaria- dpef) for
the formulation of broad economic policy objectives, the setting of financial targets and
projections for the medium- and long-term;b) the so-called ‘connected provisions’for even-
tual modification of extant legislation and specific policy problems with no quantitative
repercussions.
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Table 3.2 The unfolding of the budgetary process after the reforms of the 1980s
March
The State General Accounting Office (Ragioneria generale dello stato) prepares outlays and rev-
enues projections for the following year based on existing legislation.
April
Ministers present to the State General Accounting Office their own budget proposals.
May
Official presentation of the Document for Economic and Financial Planning (dpef) on behalf
of the Council of Ministers.
July
The Minister of the Economy is called to ‘negotiate’the dpef with the Inter-ministerial Com-
mittee for Economic Planning and the regional governments together with the budget law
project.
September
The Committee for Economic Planning approves the dpef and the main contents of the bud-
get law.
The financial law,the forecasting budget and the connected provisions are defined and sub-
mitted by the Council of Ministers to Parliament.
October
The budgetary session opens up in Parliament.
December
Deadline for the budget and financial laws approval.
March
The Minister of the Economy presents the annual Report on the general economic situation of
the country.
April
Deadline for extraordinary ‘temporary budget’period (in case the December deadline is
missed).
May
The Minister of the Economy presents to Parliament and to the Court of Accounts the first Re-
port on current cash management.
June
Parliament receives the Court of Accounts’evaluation of the Report.
July
Parliament can approve further variations of the budget of previous year (summer budget ses-
sion).
Source:Verzichelli (1999:112)
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3 1992-2000: a Copernican revolution?
In the early 1990s, besides the alarming conditions of public finances, other
additional symptoms of crisis made their appearance: a decrease in produc-
tion, the fast acceleration of labour costs and the declining competitiveness
of the tertiary sector3. In such a difficult situation the signature in February
1992 of the Maastricht Treaty on the side of Italian government could be
seen (and was indeed seen by many national and international commenta-
tors) as an act of temerariousness or even folly. And the immediate after-
math seemed to confirm this view.
The Maastricht Treaty, as is well known, established that the third and
last stage for the completion of the monetary union – i.e. the creation of the
Euro – was to start by 1997 (with at least seven countries joining in) or at the
latest by 1999 (with no quorum). The whole process had actually begun in
1988 when at the Hannover council the ec President Delors and the Ger-
man Premier Köhl prepared a joint document on the emu’s phases. In 1989
the Delors Report envisaged three different stages for the emu and was
signed by all the central banks’ governors. The British governor also accept-
ed the agreement notwithstanding the sharp opposition of the then Prime
Minister, Mrs. Thatcher. As it is known, the wider ‘enabling’ condition for
the implementation of the emu was however the fall of the Berlin Wall and
the political weakening of France in the wake of the reunification of Ger-
many. At that point, the French government matured an interest in acceler-
ating the process of European convergence in order to counterbalance the
increasing German power. The final decisions for the emu were then franti-
cally taken in different quarters: within the Rome intergovernmental con-
ference in 1990, in three ecofin meetings and in several meetings of eu
leaders (Dyson and Featherstone 1999).
In order to participate to the common currency, member states were to
comply with specific requirements: the national inflation rate was not to
exceed the mean of the three countries with the lowest inflation by more
than 1.5 per cent; the national long-term interest rate was not to surpass
the mean of the three countries with the lowest interest rate by more than 2
per cent; the public deficit was not to exceed 3 per cent of gdp, and the
public debt was not to run beyond 60 per cent of gdp, finally, the exchange
rate was to be constantly within the range allowed by the ems. Therefore,
in the immediate aftermath of Maastricht, it seemed almost impossible that
Italy could comply with all these requirements, although the Italian repre-
sentatives, led by Prime Minister Andreotti and including Minister of the
Treasury Carli and Foreign Minister De Michelis had obtained some
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amendments to the Treaty which were substantially favourable to Italy (cf.
infra).
In the summer of 1992, after the negative result of the Danish referendum
on emu and in view of the French referendum to be held in September, a
strong speculative attack was launched against the lira. The Central Bank
tried to counterattack by wearing out currency reserves and by virtually
risking a financial collapse. The risk could be avoided, however, by some in-
terrelated circumstances that, added together, produced a sudden and
rather extraordinary turn towards a virtuous adjustment.
The turning point was the appearance of the first ‘technical’ executive4,
led by Giuliano Amato, on the Italian political scene. The last ‘political’ ex-
ecutive of the First Republic, led by Giulio Andreotti, had been oscillating
between a strategy of ‘wait and see’ and public announcements of financial
austerity, ending up with a financial manoeuvre for 1992 cutting 55,000
billion liras (28,000 million Euros, i.e. 3.8 per cent of gdp) from the public
budget. Yet this was not enough to compensate for past disequilibria. But
the outbreak of the scandal called ‘Tangentopoli’, involving several corrupt
party leaders, soon swept Andreotti’s government away. After the May
1992 elections, the new Prime Minister Amato tackled the financial prob-
lems in two steps. Firstly, in July 1992 he passed an additional ‘correcting’
manoeuvre of 30,000 billion liras (15,000 million Euros, i.e. 2.0 per cent of
gdp), and asked the Parliament to delegate to the executive the task of re-
forming the pension system, the national health service, the civil service and
local government finances. Just two months later, in late September 1992,
when the speculative attack to the currency reached its apex (the lira had al-
ready been devalued by 30 per cent), Amato managed to pass (with the fi-
nancial law) an impressive financial manoeuvre of 93,000 billion liras
(48,000 million Euros, i.e. 6.1 per cent of gdp), which can be considered as
the first fundamental step in the direction of correcting the disequilibria of
Italy’s public finances, after almost fifty years of spending profligacy5. In the
meanwhile, the executive had started to elaborate the reform plans on the
four mentioned points following Law no. 421, which had delegated those
matters directly to the executive.
In the academic and public debate, 1992 has come to be considered a sort
of annus fatalis, mainly referred to as a watershed between the ‘maladjust-
ment’ and the ‘adjustment’ era. Some authors have spoken of a ‘Copernican
revolution’ (Salvati 1997), some of a ‘big turn’ (Bodo and Viesti 1997) or at
least of a ‘profound change’ (Graziani 1998). In fact, it can hardly be denied
that 1992 witnessed a successful combination of various positive events; it
was the beginning of a rather fortunate chain of ‘policy windows’ (Kingdom
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1984) that offered the conditions for the continuation of financial adjust-
ment and thus for a positive response to international challenges. Indeed, if
one considers Italy’s economic performance in the rest of the 1990s, this
view is clearly confirmed.
The strong devaluation (by 30 per cent) and the subsequent exit of the lira
from the ems, were at the basis of a considerable export increase that al-
lowed Italy to catch up and gain a remarkable position in international
trade. The renewal of government bonds was assured by the high levels of
private savings6 and the abolition of wage indexations in 1992 generated a
positive cooling of wage dynamics (Quadrio Curzio 1996; Signorini and
Visco 1997).
Another crucial factor behind the new virtuous circle was the ability
shown by the Italian political and technical negotiators to play two differ-
ent games. The first game aimed at linking Italy with the first ‘coach’ of the
emu (i.e. the first group of countries to form the new club), and implied the
reduction of the monetary power asymmetry with respect to Germany. The
second game aimed at ‘exploiting’ monetary integration, with particular re-
gard to the third stage, as an external constraint, strict enough to force the
Italian government to neutralise and overcome the numerous obstacles to fi-
nancial adjustment represented by the mutual vetoes posed by political par-
ties (Ferrera 1991; Dyson and Featherstone 1996; 1999; Radaelli 2000).
Furthermore, the Amato government was successful in breaking away from
the past: its executive was entrusted with important delegated powers by
Parliament and thus could negotiate directly with the trade unions, since the
Parliament, delegitimised by the scandal of Tangentopoli, stayed on the
sidelines7.
These conditions also continued to facilitate the action of the Ciampi gov-
ernment, another ‘technical’ executive, which managed to gain new inter-
national credibility, freeing itself from the hold of domestic political parties.
Ciampi continued the direct relationship with the trade unions, negotiating
with them important structural reforms such as the abolition of the auto-
matic system of wage indexation (the notorious scala mobile), the privatisa-
tion of employment and placement services and the reform of collective bar-
gaining, favoured by the support of the President of the Republic and the
former Communist Party – renamed as Democratic Party of the Left (pds) –
in search for legitimacy as potential governing party (Vassallo 2000). The
Ciampi government (1993-94), like the preceding Amato government, act-
ed in two steps. Firstly, in May 1993, it approved a ‘correcting’ manoeuvre
of 12,500 billion liras (6,400 million Euros, i.e. 0.8 per cent of gdp); subse-
quently, in September 1993, it presented the financial law in advance, reduc-
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ing public expenditures by 28,000 billion liras (14,000 million Euros, i.e.
1.8 per cent of gdp) and introducing a package of measures on civil service
reform.
The scenario radically changed with the shift from the technical govern-
ments of Amato and Ciampi to the political executive of Berlusconi, the first
government elected in 1994 after the reform that introduced the majority
principle in the electoral system. The fragmentation of the coalition he was
supposed to lead, consisting of three different parties (Alleanza Nazionale,
Forza Italia and the Lega Nord), and the choice not to continue that concer-
tation with interest organisations that had been actively pursued by his pre-
decessors disintegrated the alliance. Berlusconi tried to push through a
sweeping pension reform, but the trade union opposition and the defection
of the Lega Nord on this delicate issue precipitated a government crisis. The
1995 financial law, which envisaged 21,000 billion liras (10,800 million
Euros, i.e. 1.3 per cent of gdp) of additional revenue and 29,000 billion li-
ras (14,900 million Euros, i.e. 1.8 per cent of gdp) of expenditure cuts on
pensions and health care, underwent an endless series of corrections, nego-
tiations and compromises that weakened much of its efficacy. The lira’s re-
entry into the ems again became uncertain.
After Berlusconi, another technical executive, led by Lamberto Dini, a
former Director of the Bank of Italy and Minister of the Treasury in the
Berlusconi government, managed to pass the pension reform, introduced by
Law no. 345 of 1995. The Dini government, in spite of some initial hesita-
tion, went on with the strategy of austerity and financial adjustment: a cor-
recting manoeuvre of almost 20,000 billion liras (10,300 million Euros, i.e.
1.1 per cent of gdp) in the spring of 1995 and the financial law for 1996 in-
troduced a new series of cuts, including in particular the suspension of re-
cruitment in the public sector, another inlay of the mosaic flooring that pow-
ered the way into the Euro.
The Dini government was then followed by Romano Prodi, the leader of
the Olive Tree coalition, which won the elections of April 1996. Since the
electoral campaign, Prodi indicated the entry into the emu as the main
theme of his governing strategy8. In the 1996 Document for Financial and
Economic Planning, the 3 per cent target for public deficit was already men-
tioned, even though the drastic adjustment measures needed to reach this
target were not fully spelled out. In September 1996, in the Valencia meet-
ing with Aznar, Prodi tried to convince the Spanish Prime Minister to join
forces in order to obtain a more flexible interpretation of the convergence
rules, but Aznar did not go along (Spaventa and Chiorazzo 2000). The only
way to make it into the emu was to launch yet another extraordinary fiscal
manoeuvre.
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In spite of internal contrasts with Rifondazione Comunista (RC: an old-
style communist party that was necessary in parliament to reach the majori-
ty), Prodi managed to pass a financial law of more than 60,000 billion liras
(30,900 million Euros, i.e. 3.2 per cent of gdp) based on two different sets
of components: a series of cuts (including, as we shall see, a new pension re-
form) and fiscal restrictions, and a specific ‘tax for Europe’ levied on all in-
comes. Heavily criticized by the international press, the latter was a crucial
component of the ‘confidence trick’ that Prodi and Ciampi played vis-à-vis
the international markets. The trick consisted of: 1) committing to meet the
3 per cent deficit target through a tax accompanied by the promise to pay it
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Table 3.3 The main steps of Italian financial adjustment in the 1990s
Executive Year Manoeuvre % GDP
Andreotti 1991 Financial manoeuvre of 55,000 billion liras of cuts. 3.8%
Amato 1992 Correcting manoeuvre of 30,000 billion liras in the spring. 2.0%
Financial manoeuvre passed with the financial law of 6.1%
93,000 billion liras.
Ciampi 1993 Structural reforms (privatisation of employment and placement
services, reform of collective bargaining and abolition of the 
automatic wage indexation).
Correcting manoeuvre of 12,500 billion liras. 0.8%
Financial law reducing public expenditures by 28,000 billion liras. 1.8%
Berlusconi 1994 The 1995 financial law envisaged:
21,000 billion liras of additional revenues; 1.3%
29,000 billion liras of cuts in health care and pensions expenditures. 1.8%
Dini 1995 In the spring passed a correcting manoeuvre of 20,000 billion liras; 1.1%
The financial law introduced a series of cuts including the 
suspension of recruitment in the public sector.
Prodi 1996 Financial law of more than 60,000 billion liras based on: 3.2%
a series of cuts, including the pensions reform and fiscal 
restrictions;
a ‘tax for Europe’levied on all incomes.
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back; so as to 2) obtain public recognition (informal and then formal) of
emu admission, which would rapidly bring down Italian interest rates and
thus the debt service; and 3) creating room for repaying the tax at a later
time. The trick succeeded: the Euro-tax was actually and largely paid back
in 1998. But it also succeeded because it could build on the structural re-
forms already passed in 1996/1995 (Chiorazzo and Spaventa 1999). The
RC party led by Bertinotti, with much hesitation and after having obtained
the promise of introducing a limit of 35 hours to weekly working time by
2001 on the part of the executive, finally gave its approval to Prodi’s finan-
cial law, allowing the ‘trick’ to unleash its virtuous effects.
The Prodi government also introduced a third important reform of the
budgetary process through Law no. 94 of 1997, strongly advocated by the
Minister of the Treasury Ciampi and the General Director of the Treasury
Mario Draghi, another protagonist of the Italian financial adjustment in the
1990s. The 1997 reform deeply simplified the structure of the budget, re-
ducing the budgetary items to be approved by Parliament, and establishing
homogeneous budgetary centres under the supervision of single directors
responsible for each of them. It also made the ratification procedures of the
Parliament easier and more intelligible (cf. Table 3.4)9.
While launching a phase of wide-ranging reformist activity, the Prodi gov-
ernment witnessed a marked improvement of Italy’s macro-economic per-
formance. Between 1992 and 1998 inflation fell from 5.0 per cent to 2.0 per
cent, public deficit from 10.7 per cent to 2.8 per cent, and the public debt,
after the 1994 peak of 125 per cent of gdp, gradually diminished (1998 =
116.3 per cent). The lira re-entered the ems. Interest rates started to go
down, and hopes for investments were revived. Between 1996 and 1998 the
amount of Italian privatisations was the highest in Europe: the most impor-
tant public enterprises (sme, Enichem, Eni, Telecom, etc.) and the most
renowned public banks (Cariplo, Banca di Roma, San Paolo) were sold,
thus alleviating the state budget. One year later, in May 1998, under the
Prodi government, Italy finally joined the emu with the first group of coun-
tries, in satisfactory compliance with the Maastricht parameters. 
Yet the support of Rifondazione Comunista to the Prodi government did
not last for long, and broke up exactly when Prodi’s third financial law (for
the year 1999) was in the pipeline. The RC leader, Bertinotti, asked the gov-
ernment repeatedly for a concrete ‘signal’ of a leftward policy turn, espe-
cially in terms of public subsidies for the unemployed of the south. Prodi did
not accept Bertinotti’s diktat – which would have meant going back to the
passive and distributive policies of the past in contrast with the reformist
policies of the centre-left coalition and the eu’s orientations – and the Olive
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Tree government collapsed in October 1998. A new coalition, led by D’Ale-
ma (leader of the Democrats of the Left, main heir of the old pci) with the
(unexpected) participation of former President Cossiga and his small centre
party (the udr), took its place.
The D’Alema government, the first executive led by a post-communist
leader, managed to approve Prodi’s draft financial law almost in its integral
version and to pass some of the reforms of the previous government which
were still standing by, such as the one concerning the national budget, intro-
duced by Law no. 208 of 1999. The bill’s general aim was that of conform-
ing to supranational prescriptions and procedures and in particular to the
Growth and Stability Pact’s constraints officially stated in the 1997 Amster-
dam Treaty. The budget calendar was slightly modified, and the govern-
ment was given a stronger role in the co-ordination and guidance of the
whole process (Vassallo and Verzichelli 2003). But the reform represented
also the occasion to change and correct the nature of the financial law and of
connected provisions, widening the contents of the former and limiting the
boundaries of the latter. Thanks to the new rules, the financial law became a
wider container for the modification of all public policies in force while con-
nected provisions were turned into specific policy documents aimed at sec-
toral policy change, to be approved in the springtime and no longer in the
month of November (cf. Table 3.3).
The difficulty in maintaining the coalition united – due to the plurality of
parties with different programmatic standpoints –, the difficulty in carrying
on the structural reform of the welfare state urged by various international
organisations, and finally the weakening of the centre-left coalition in the
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Table 3.4:Policy reforms of the budgetary process,1990-2000
Law no. 94/1997
– General aim: further simplification and rationalisation of budget formulation and approval.
– Specific aims: identification of pre-determined budgetary provisional units (unità prevision-
ali di base);widening of Ministries’top civil servants-responsibilities;simplification of par-
liamentary procedures;strengthening of the government’s role in the budgetary process.
Law no. 208/1999
– General aim:Adjustment of the budgetary procedure to European constraints (i.e.: the 1997
Growth and Stability Pact);modification of the financial law for the introduction of spend-
ing measures.
– Specific aims: micro-changes in the budgetary calendar and session;widening of the con-
tents to be regulated by the financial law and turning of connected provisions into sectoral
policy change documents.
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2000 regional elections posed many obstacles in the way of the Prime Minis-
ter who in April 2000 was replaced by the last executive of the 13th legisla-
ture (1996-2001) led, again, by Giuliano Amato. This executive was also
the last one of the centre-left coalition, bound to lose the elections in May
2001.
However, notwithstanding the uncertainties caused by political instabili-
ty, the post-1992 virtuous circle has borne fruit. As mentioned above, some
pre-conditions for the post-1992 virtuous circle had already been posed in
the previous decade; and several shadows still spoil the picture today, as will
be shown later. But the fact remains that the 1990s will be remembered as a
crucial decade for Italy’s firm and irreversible ‘anchoring’ to the European
core: one of the few national unifying grand objectives of the country ever
since the 1950s.
4 Italy’s international economic profile: the recovery of the 1990s
Italy’s remarkable macro-economic adjustment has been accompanied by
significant changes in the country’s international economic profile, espe-
cially as regards exports, alliances and partnerships with foreign companies
and direct financial investments. Compared to the previous decade, a strong
diversification in the geographic areas of destination, in the subjects and in
the instruments of international activities can be noticed. While in the
1980s most of Italy’s trade was concentrated in the ec countries, in the
1990s Eastern Europe, the Asian countries and developing countries have
become relevant destinations as well.
In addition, large firms, traditionally highly specialised in export activi-
ties, have been joined by small- and medium-sized firms. Contrary to what
was expected by some analysts, the depreciation of the lira favoured small
companies in search of innovative investments (Cossentino, Pyke and Sen-
genberger 1997; Brusco and Paba 1997). From 1992 to 1996 the openness
of the total economy (calculated by adding the export to the production sold
in the internal market and exposed to competition from imported goods and
services) jumped from 35.5 per cent to 43.3 per cent of gdp (oecd, Statisti-
cal Compendium 1997). In 1993 the export of goods and services grew by
12.5 per cent, one of the highest values in the oecd area, compared to only
0.7 per cent in the previous year. In the same year the balance of trade grew
from 0.3 per cent to 3.4 per cent of gdp, reaching the peak of 4.1 per cent in
1995 (oecd, Statistical Compendium 1997). It is only after 1996 that the
crisis of East-Asian countries started to have a negative impact on Italy’s ex-
port (European Economy 1999).
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Besides the export of goods, other forms of foreign direct participation
and financial investments have flourished: collaborative ventures, techno-
logical agreements, co-design and co-making (Cominotti and Mariotti
1997). From 1985 to 1995 the stock of Italian fdi grew from 3.8 per cent to
8.7 per cent of gdp (Faini et al. 1999).
In 1995 the geographical articulation of fdi (measured on the basis of the
number of employees) was as follows: 249,648 in Western Europe, 48,780
in North America and 297,119 in developing countries. In the same year
more than six hundred Italian multinationals could be counted, with 1,842
affiliates all over the world, and the total of Italian employment abroad
reached 595,547 units, about 12.6 per cent of national industrial employ-
ment. More recent estimates calculate that from 1986 to 1998 total employ-
ment in affiliates of Italian multinationals in Central and Eastern Europe
grew from 2,100 units to 102,503, i.e. 20 per cent of total Italian employ-
ment abroad (Barba Navaretti 1999).
If we compare this figure with those of the main investor countries, we no-
tice – as stated previously – that Italian multinational activity in the 1990s
was still rather low (the number of French employees in manufacturing for-
eign affiliates was 1,359,000 in 1990; the German ones amounted to
1,868,000 in 1995 and those of the US to 4,376,600 in the same year) (Faini
et al. 1999; European Economy 1999).
However, this process of internationalisation has not fully alleviated
Italy’s historical problems. Exports have indeed increased, but the ‘spe-
cialised polarisation’ of Italian industry has intensified: maximum export in
the traditional sectors (shoes, clothes, textiles, ceramics, furnishing) and
relatively small in the other sectors (especially high-tech). In addition, Italy
has remained poorly attractive for foreign investors, given the scarce relia-
bility of the state bureaucracy, public services and communication systems.
r&d expenditure is still among the lowest in the oecd countries. Between
1982 and 1994 r&d expenditure grew from 0.9 per cent to 1.2 per cent of
gdp: a small increase if compared to the United States, where it rose from
2.6 per cent to 2.8 per cent of gdp between 1982 and 1992, or France,
where r&d expenditure grew from 2.0 per cent to 2.4 per cent between
1982 and 1993 (oecd, Main Science Indicators, various years). More seri-
ously, as we will show in the next section, the social and economic gap be-
tween a highly industrialised north and a backward south has continued to
persist and even widened.
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5 Internationalisation and national employment: a multi-faceted Italy
It is not easy to explore the relationships between internationalisation and
the employment/welfare regimes in Italy: empirical investigations of these
issues are still scant, and the high diversification of Italy’s regional and sec-
toral realities makes it difficult to elaborate unitary interpretative models.
This is especially true for the internationalisation-employment nexus. The
effects of the former on the latter have been different according to the local
conditions of both factors and actors. Large and small firms, exposed and
sheltered sectors, northern and southern regions have all given their own re-
sponse to exogenous challenges. The winds of internationalisation have
blown upon all regional and sectoral realities of the country, in a differenti-
ated and often subtle way, sometimes stimulating, sometimes disturbing or
reshuffling the existing configuration of actors and resources. The overall
positive effects of the internationalisation process have intertwined with
pre-existing conditions, economic processes and institutions. Where actors
were already showing innovative capacities and were surrounded by a dy-
namic social and political environment, they were also able to take advan-
tage of the new international opportunities, triggering off virtuous circles of
development and growth, also in terms of employment: this was especially
the story of industrial districts and small/medium enterprises. Where in-
stead actors were already facing great economic difficulties and showed
weak innovative capacities, internationalisation has created more problems
than opportunities: this has largely been the story of the Mezzogiorno. In
this latter case, however, the blame must be put less on internationalisation
per se (a factor that has only worsened an originally complex and fragile sit-
uation) than on local conditions and general institutional rigidities embed-
ded in the past.
According to the most recent economic literature, Italian employment has
not suffered much from the growing openness of markets10. For the Italian
case there is no evidence of those trends that are typically associated with in-
ternationalisation in other industrial countries, such as increasing unem-
ployment among low-skilled and uneducated workers and/or a shift of
wages in favour of skilled employees. Moreover, there appears to be no sig-
nificant correlation through time between the standard set of trade indica-
tors – such as the trade balance or the degree of import penetration – and
labour market conditions. In fact, the data reveal that Italy has so far wit-
nessed a relatively low degree of import penetration from low wage coun-
tries (potentially harmful to national employment) and that the growing in-
ternationalisation of Italian firms (including the increased number of em-
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ployees in foreign affiliates of Italian multinationals) bears much less re-
sponsibility for the unemployment problems in the manufacturing sector
than developments in production technology. To put it in the words of a re-
cent, well-articulated econometric study:
‘... international trade does not seem to have been a primary cause for job
losses or increased inequality in Italy. On the contrary, there is a pre-
sumption that the overall tendency towards increased international trade
in the past two decades may have benefited, on average, Italian workers:
increasing trade possibilities have resulted in growing demand for labour
intensive manufacturers’ (Faini et al. 1999: 129).
What explains this relatively low vulnerability of Italy’s national employ-
ment to economic internationalisation? According to the debate, the answer
lies with the peculiar model of Italian specialisation in international trade.
This model is primarily based on labour-intensive productions in tradition-
al sectors and in some specialised suppliers industries, potentially very vul-
nerable to the competition of labour-abundant, low-wage economies. But
within these sectors,
‘Italy is mainly specialised in the top end of the vertically differentiated
spectrum of products. Many of these products are characterised by a rel-
atively high level of skill intensity and by a price elasticity which is not
high and is decreasing over time’ (ibidem: 106).
It is this peculiar pattern that has allowed Italy to survive well – in aggregate
terms – in the new environment, taking advantage of profitable niches in a
growing and opening world trade.
Two recent analyses (Barba Navaretti 1999; Barba Navaretti et al. 2002)
concerning the impact of internationalisation on firms’ employment levels
allow us to confirm this interpretation. According to the results of the first
one (Barba Navaretti 1999), focused on the textile and clothing sector, the
steady growth of imports due to the growing liberalisation of markets con-
tributed modestly to the decline of the domestic demand of labour, since
there were at least three other endogenous and institutional factors pushing
in that direction: the rigidity of the Italian labour market, technological
change and the particular mode of organisation of production. Italy man-
aged to increase its competitive advantages in the export markets between
1990 and 1996, owing not only to the devaluation of the lira in 1992, but
also to the widespread presence of small firms and industrial districts en-
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dowed with high levels of mobility and flexibility of adjustment (so as to es-
cape some of the heaviest rigidities of the Italian labour market). Moreover,
the data collected in this first investigation show that the investments in low
wage countries by Italian firms allow them to maintain, instead of reducing,
their employment levels in Italy.
The second research project examined in more detail the effects in terms
of employment of firms’ delocalisation strategies: 876 companies with at
least 50 employees were selected. In 1994 – the starting year of the inquiry –
608 companies had never invested abroad, while the other 268 already oper-
ated as multinationals. In the subsequent three years, 64 companies in the
first group tried to delocalise production outside Italy, while 110 in the sec-
ond group strengthened their foreign activity. Internationalisation process-
es gave remarkable results. In the companies where at least one branch had
been opened abroad, the average number of employees increased from 110
in 1994 to 127.8 in 1998 and domestic profits from 100 to 142.9. In the
firms which in contrast remained tied to domestic markets, employment
reached only 117.3 and profits 133.9. The same was true for multinationals;
in those that broadened their activity abroad, employment grew by 24.6 per
cent and profits by 39.7 per cent against, respectively, 14.6 per cent and 34
per cent for those witnessing no expansion abroad (Barba Navaretti et al.
2002).
Yet this favourable match between some niches of the international envi-
ronment and the characteristics of Italian production may not last forever.
In fact, the profitable niches of Italian producers are increasingly at risk in
the wake of some forthcoming developments of world trade11. Thanks to
these niches, however, the Italian economy has been able to withstand, in
the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the de-stabilising winds of globalisa-
tion. Italy’s unemployment problems thus appear to be primarily connected
to domestic rather than exogenous factors.
This relatively optimistic assessment must be qualified, however, by geo-
graphical area. The intensification of international trade has in fact thrown
new light on Italy’s regional and sectoral cleavages. First and foremost it is
necessary to distinguish between three different Italies: the industrialised
north – and especially the historical industrial triangle of Piedmont, Lom-
bardy and Liguria (first Italy); the ‘classical’ Mezzogiorno, characterised by
backwardness and underdevelopment (second Italy); and the so-called
‘third Italy’, comprising the north-east, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria
and the central Adriatic rim (Marche, Abruzzi). The sectoral composition
of the three Italies is also divergent. In the north companies are mainly large
and specialised in manufacturing and services. The third Italy is mainly
77internationalisation and national employment
Rescued by Europe  19-12-2003  20:55  Pagina 77
based on family-led small firms and on industrial districts specialised in
those products which are at the edge of Italy’s competitiveness: textiles and
apparel, footwear, ceramics, precision mechanics. Southern regions,
though it is not fully correct to consider them as an homogeneous territory,
are characterised by a mixed productive profile: large (and declining) firms
in the chemical, iron and steel industry (the old traditional sectors of the
state-assisted industrial development launched in the 1950s); small firms
mainly operating in the (backward) constructions and tertiary sector; and
large public bureaucracies.
The territorial concentration of firms with different sizes is particularly
significant. If we consider for instance the manufacturing sector, we discov-
er that the biggest part of total employment belongs to firms with 1 to 49
employees (more than 60 per cent in the mid-1990s), attesting to the typical
polarisation of Italian industry, and that from the 1970s to the 1990s em-
ployment in companies with more than 50 employees constantly declined,
while in companies with 1 to 50 employees it increased remarkably. The
growth of employment in small firms has thus not been negatively affected
or slowed down by international competition (Brusco and Paba 1997).
Compared to northern and southern firms, the small and medium-sized
companies of the ‘third Italy’ have registered a remarkably positive reaction
to international pressures. Their export capacity has grown closer to that of
larger firms, as these figures show: in 1992 the exported volume of sales
amounted to 18 per cent for firms with 20-49 employees; 22.4 per cent for
those with 50-99 employees, 25.6 per cent for firms with 100-199 employ-
ees and 23.5 per cent for firms with 200-499 employees. As regards employ-
ment, from 1971 to 1991 it rose from 47 per cent to 49.9 per cent whereas,
as said before, it declined in big firms from 27.2 per cent to 23.1 per cent
(ibidem).
There is a kind of a paradox in these data. According to the economic liter-
ature of the 1980s, the nexus between small firms and globalisation should
be a negative one: compared to big firms, small companies should find it
hard to internationalise due not only to size, but also to the lack of
human/financial resources and technological instruments and to the fierce
competition of multinationals. But in the Italian case these disadvantages
have not played a significant role because of the high product specialisation
of small firms on the one hand and the outstanding degree of entrepreneur-
ship and innovation that traditionally characterise the ‘industrial districts’
culture on the other. Small firms seem to have successfully exploited the new
opportunities offered by internationalisation, perceived as a stimulus to ex-
pansion and change.
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Large firms mainly operating in the north of Italy have given a more varie-
gated response to international challenges. The statement that globalisation
has had positive effects on employment holds true in general terms, but
must be qualified by time. The available data on employment in manufac-
turing reveal in fact a different, time-related vulnerability to the openness of
the economy with both contractionist and expansionary effects.
Two different periods can be identified: the first from 1985 to 1992 and
the second starting after 1992. In the first phase the big rise in imports,
which was the main result of the export strategies of the ‘early international-
ising countries’ (US, Japan, Germany, etc.), reduced the increase in the Ital-
ian labour demand (from +9 per cent to + 5 per cent). After the devaluation
of 1992, however, the trend inverted, and export growth allowed compensa-
tion of the losses of the past and had a remarkable impact on labour demand
(De Nardis and Paternò 1997). It is in fact starting from 1992 that Italy,
which is undoubtedly a ‘late internationaliser’, begins to catch up, and the
nexus between internationalisation and employment performance becomes
a very loose one.
This is revealed by Table 3.5 (drawn from the already mentioned analysis
by Faini et al. 1999), in which the changes in sectoral import penetration
from 1992 to 1996 are connected to employment dynamics. The growth of
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Table 3.5 Employment and imports:sectoral trends
1992-1996 Change in Change in Import pene-
employment import pene- tration level
(%) tration level (average value)
Mineral & non-mineral products -3.8 4.2 35.68
Non-metallic mineral products -2.4 1.2 10.83
Chemical products -3.7 3.8 35.43
Metal products -2.1 2.7 8.10
Agricultural & industrial machinery -0.8 3.4 31.53
Office machinery -1.5 -0.8 79.33
Electrical apparatus -0.3 8.4 14.75
Motor vehicles -3.3 4.2 57.75
Food,beverage and tobacco -1.7 1.5 17.83
Textile & apparel -1.1 3.6 19.68
Footwear & leather -1.3 11.5 31.65
Wood & wood products -1.9 1.1 11.23
Paper,paper products & painting -2.0 2.1 11.78
Rubber & plastic products -0.4 2.2 19.03
Total manufacturing -1.7 4.2 26.45
Source: Faini et al. (1999:120).
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import penetration, which is particularly remarkable for footwear, leather
(11.5 per cent) and electrical apparatus (8.4 per cent), does not produce a
correspondent reduction of employment, which is instead weak (-1.3 per
cent and -0.3 per cent, respectively) and better than the aggregate one (-1.7
per cent).
International challenges have thus combined with domestic economic dy-
namics, only indirectly conditioning employment and unemployment per-
formance. Prior to 1992 large Italian firms did not seem to be able to re-
spond to the import boom with expansionary strategies, preferring to stick
to domestic markets; only after 1992 did devaluation and economic recov-
ery encourage a fuller exploration of European and world markets. The ex-
port boom was so intense as to push employers to enlarge and diversify pro-
duction with positive repercussions on employment levels.
Still different is the picture of the Mezzogiorno, which at first sight may
appear as the only loser of globalisation. And in fact the big recession of
1991, the stopping of state-aid legislation in 1992, the reform of ec struc-
tural funds and the association agreements between the European Union
and East-European countries have all contributed to make the ‘old’ prob-
lems of Southern unemployment and poverty even worse (Cafiero 1997).
But, once again, the problems of the Mezzogiorno seem more the product
of the economic and industrialisation strategies of the past than of globalisa-
tion challenges. In particular, de-industrialisation and the end of state sub-
sidies, which are the result of the national legislation of the 1990s, are at the
basis of the employment collapse notable in this area of the country. Be-
tween 1991 and 1996, 600,000 jobs were lost (Bodo and Viesti 1997). Such
an employment slump has no equivalents in the past. De-industrialisation
refers to the dismantling and the abandoning of the big state-assisted indus-
tries that had been created in the 1950s. The sectoral specialisation of these
firms – iron and steel, petrol-chemical, metallurgy – did not keep up with the
times: these firms were not able to undertake processes of reconversion (in
this respect, many authors speak of a ‘lost industrialisation’, that is of a sud-
den jump from old traditional industries to tertiarisation).
But the decline of employment has been particularly dramatic in the sec-
tors which were more strictly dependent on state financial aid: agriculture (-
24 per cent between 1992 and 1996), construction (-19 per cent in the same
period) and trade (-9 per cent in the same period). In 1996 less than 38 out of
100 southern Italians of working age were employed (52 in the centre-
north) (Bodo and Viesti 1997:73). Marked by such a low employment rate
and by a high concentration of long-term unemployment, the Mezzogiorno
stands out as one of the most backward regions of the eu. In these ailing eco-
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nomic conditions, the establishment of the emu is very likely to aggravate
problems (at least in the short run): the disappearance of the exchange rate
as a mechanism of adjustment requires higher factor mobility and higher
price and wage flexibility – elements which remain quite foreign to the Mez-
zogiorno’s political and economic tradition.
If we now look at unemployment, as mentioned several times, this is par-
ticularly concentrated in the south and in some specific categories of the
labour force (women and the young). From 1980 to 1998 unemployment in
the centre-north increased from 5.8 per cent to 7.5 per cent, only returning
to 5.6 per cent in 2000. In the Mezzogiorno, from 1980 to 2000, it rose from
11.5 per cent to 21 per cent (cf. Figure 3.4). In the same period, female un-
employment increased from 13.2 per cent to 14.3 per cent, while male un-
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Figure 3.4 Total,centre-northern and southern unemployment rates,1980-2000
Source:Istat,Forze di Lavoro,various years
Figure 3.5 Youth unemployment rates in Italy compared to the oecd average,1980-2000
Source:Istat,Forze di Lavoro,various years;oecd,Labor Force Statistics,various years
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employment increased from 4.8 per cent to 9 per cent (Istat, Forze di lavoro,
various years). The 1980s were characterised by a rapid increase of female
participation in the labour market (also due to the ‘baby boom’ of the
1960s), but the demand of labour was not sufficient to absorb the increased
supply. As for youth unemployment, Italy holds a record (cf. Figure 3.5): it
soared from 25.2 per cent in 1980 to 35.5 per cent in 1987 and remained
steadily above 30 per cent throughout the entire 1990s (31.5 per cent in
1990, 32.2 per cent in 1996, 31.1 per cent in 2000, while the oecd average
in 2000 amounted to 11.8 per cent), surpassing the alarming level of 60 per
cent in Calabria, Campania and Sicily (ibidem).
Besides mass unemployment (10 per cent in 2000), a high diffusion of the
black economy should be noted: 26 per cent of gdp in 1998, which means
40 per cent of the labour force in the south and 16 per cent in the centre-
north. The black economy is mainly concentrated in the service sector (76
per cent) while in the agricultural and industrial ones its incidence is more
limited (respectively 12 per cent and 6 per cent) (Tartaglione 2001).
Finally, Italy is internationally notorious for the lowest diffusion of part-
time workers compared to the other European countries (5.1 per cent in
1980 and 8.4 per cent in 2000) (Istat, Forze di lavoro various years).
As will be shown in the next section, the opening of international markets
and the related higher mobility of citizens and workers has shaken rigid and
protected labour markets, like the Italian one, at their roots. And the adjust-
ment of the Italian labour market and labour legislation has been slow, par-
tial and in some parts ineffective, missing a big opportunity of change in or-
der to relieve Italy of old problems and institutional rigidities through a
healthy injection of flexibility.
6 Internationalisation and social policy
The impact of internationalisation on social policy has been more straight-
forward – at least in institutional terms. The vincolo esterno (i.e. the con-
straints posed directly or indirectly by international regimes and especially
by the eu) has in fact become an increasingly powerful stimulus for pushing
through measures of welfare retrenchment and rationalisation on the side of
the national executive.
In order to meet the parameters set by the Maastricht Treaty, Italy had to
seriously tackle the problems of public debt and public deficit. The pressing
need to reduce both, with a view to joining emu with the first group of coun-
tries, fostered a climate of permanent financial emergency. The margin of
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manoeuvre for tax increases was extremely narrow. Public revenues had
been growing very rapidly since the early 1980s, turning Italy into a rela-
tively big tax country by international standards. In the early 1990s the high
level of taxation, which is clearly shown in Figure 3.6, and its uneven distri-
bution (due to widespread tax evasion by some categories) started to pro-
voke clear symptoms of a tax revolt, especially among northern (self-em-
ployed) taxpayers. In such an environment, expenditure cutbacks were the
only viable strategy for containing public deficits and debt: and social bene-
fits immediately became the prime target of the new policy of risanamento.
It is true that in a comparative perspective the size of the Italian welfare
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Figure 3.6 Total tax revenue and total expenditure in Italy and total tax revenue in the oecd,
1970-2000
Source:oecd,Revenue Statistics,various years
Source:Eurostat,Social Protection in Europe (2002)
Figure 3.7 Old-age & survivors expenditure and other social protection expenditure as a share
of gdp in 1999
OECD
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system was (and still is) not out of proportion with respect to other coun-
tries. Current social expenditures amounted to 25.8 per cent of gdp in
1993: this percentage was the sixth lowest in the eu (which had an average
of 27.7 per cent), while in the same year Italy’s gdp per head was the fourth
highest (ec 1995). Six years later, in 1999, social expenditure remained al-
most unchanged (25.3 per cent of gdp) and below the European average
(27.5 per cent)12. Thus Italy could hardly be considered to be a big spender,
as shown in Figure 3.7. Yet in domestic public debates around the mid-
1990s, welfare programmes were commonly indicted as the main culprit for
the country’s severe financial problems and, more generally, for its serious
politico-institutional predicament.
Why this paradox – in the absence of a ‘New Right’ majority? There were
in the early 1990s a number of reasons that can explain this. First, despite its
relatively modest aggregate size, social expenditure was still (and by far) the
largest item of total government outlay. Second, both the pension and the
health system were in rather shaky financial and (in the case of health) or-
ganisational conditions. Demographic projections showed alarming scenar-
ios for the future: with no change of legislation, pension expenditure was
expected to increase from ca.14 per cent to ca. 23 per cent of gdp between
the early 1990s and the year 2040 (Ministero del Tesoro 1998). Third, the
deficits of legality and efficiency mentioned in the second chapter had fos-
tered a mounting ‘negativism’ against the stato assistenziale (a rather pejo-
rative term) in public debates, offering a potential source of legitimisation
to retrenchment measures. The combination of peculiarly intense fiscal con-
straints – disciplined by the eu – and the ‘bad quality’ of Italy’s social
spending opened in other words opportunities for a strategy of welfare re-
form in the name of three (largely apolitical) objectives, i.e. the risanamento
finanziario, social equity and efficiency recuperation. However faulty and
incomplete it may be, this strategy has significantly changed the overall pro-
file of Italian welfare during the 1990s.
The strategy of risanamento clashed with the resistance opposed by all af-
fected interests, and particularly by trade unions. This resistance has been
partially overcome not only thanks to an open and consensual bargaining
style (as will be shown in Chapter v), but also through a patient persuasive
action about the long-term advantages connected with financial adjustment
and the entry into the Monetary Union, particularly in terms of lower inter-
ests on debt. This latter point had a crucial impact on the reform process: the
financial adjustment was presented as a ‘fight against financial rent’, lead-
ing to tangible advantages for all workers. In fact in the early 1990s, a rela-
tively modest bank deposit amounting to 260 million liras (135,000 Euros),
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fully invested in state bonds with an interest rate of 9.5 per cent, could pro-
duce a financial rent equivalent to the average yearly wage of a metalworker
(Pennacchi 1998). The ‘bet’ proposed by the government to the social part-
ners (and repeatedly supported by Amato, Ciampi, Dini and Prodi both
publicly and privately) was to accept sacrifices (in particular, cuts of social
benefits and wage restraint) in order to reduce the enormous and unproduc-
tive interests on public debt, divert the resources thus recovered to other ob-
jectives, and give birth to a virtuous circle of growth, new public invest-
ments and more balanced redistribution (Ciampi 1998).
In retrospect, it can be said that for the most part this ‘bet’ was won: be-
tween 1992 and 1998 interest on public debt declined from 10.2 per cent to
6.4 per cent of gdp, in line with a downward trend that will probably last
for a long time, due to the convergence of Italian interest rates with those of
Germany, and the gradual restructuring of the debt stock (i.e. a positive
consequence of the emu on Italian public finances). The reduction in inter-
est rates has also produced other advantages, beyond the domain of public
finances: for example, the business sector has obtained relevant savings on
its commercial loans, and ordinary citizens have got savings on mortgage
loans. Which have been, in more detail, the timing, modalities and contents
of the ‘structural’ reforms of the 1990s in the wake of internationalisation
and the European integration process? Have these reforms been effective?
We will now turn to these questions.
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IV The Cycle of Reform
1 A difficult path
The internationalisation process and European integration have spurred a
decisive wave of reforms not only with respect to the overall management of
public finances (illustrated in the preceding chapter), but also in welfare and
labour market matters. In order to correct the financial disequilibria, several
old schemes and programmes had to be revised and restructured, also in or-
der to respond to new challenges: chronic structural unemployment and the
need to extend social protection to marginal groups while at the same time
keeping costs under control.
As elsewhere in Europe, the 1990s have brought about fundamental struc-
tural social policy changes in Italy. During the 1980s some important seeds
of change had already been planted, but the contextual conditions were not
ripe for the maturation of broad reforms. The increasing international inte-
gration acted as a positive incentive to tackle the issue of unemployment, by
experimenting with new policy strategies already adopted abroad, mainly
centred on the deregulation of labour legislation and on the introduction of
active measures. However, these new efforts represented only a drop in a sea
of passive policies and subsidy-oriented programmes, increasingly expen-
sive for the public budget. In the welfare arena too, the attempts at introduc-
ing structural reforms were repeatedly frustrated by the mass of resistance
of past policies and acquired entitlements. The policies inherited from the
1970s revealed a deeply institutionalised nature and hence high hostility to
change and innovation.
Only in the 1990s did the new wave of reforms start to produce substan-
tial results. Some reforms planned in the 1980s were effectively legislated,
and new measures and programmes were introduced in order to modernise
the labour market and restructure the welfare state in a more rational way.
The institutional changes that marked the transition from the First to the
Second Republic, the new co-operative and consensual style of interest in-
termediation adopted by the executive and the social partners and, more
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fundamentally, the perspective of the European monetary integration, have
been the main components of a new scenario of structural change: the end of
public monopoly on placement offices, the decentralisation of employment
services, new active policies and new styles of decision-making (as a re-
sponse to the prescriptions of the European employment strategy) in the
sphere of labour market regulation; the pension and health care reforms in
the sphere of social protection.
2 The 1980s: the uncertain deregulation of the labour market
The evolution of labour policies in the 1980s can be broken down into two
distinct phases, during which different policy goals were pursued: 1981-
1983 and 1984-1989. In the first years of the new decade, the government
responded to the second oil crisis-based recession and to the loss of employ-
ment in large firms in a defensive way, by expanding already existing income
support programmes and by introducing a new onerous passive policy, such
as pre-retirement benefits. In the second half of the decade, in a more
favourable economic environment, employability and active labour market
policies were promoted. In a new consensual social climate both the govern-
ment and organised interests agreed on the introduction of atypical labour
contracts, job sharing and a reform of employment services. The implemen-
tation of these measures did not, however, fulfil the original expectations
(Del Boca 1996). The policy of deregulation and flexibility still appeared
too uncertain to structurally affect the steady growth of unemployment. We
now turn specifically to the characteristics of labour market policy in the
1980s.
The decade opened with a severe crisis within large firms and a conse-
quent haemorrhaging of jobs. The case of Fiat is particularly emblematic in
this respect: in 1980 a ‘state of firm crisis’ was officially declared by the gov-
ernment, and more than 20,000 workers were put into the Cassa Inte-
grazione Straordinaria scheme at zero hours (that is, they were suspended
from the productive process without being formally dismissed, and with
earnings replacement benefits). The internal divisions of trade unions and
the hostility of white-collar workers towards the aggressive strategy and
claims of blue-collar workers made the situation of the labour movement
very difficult, precipitating a serious crisis. In those years the Cassa Inte-
grazione scheme reached its apex: only in manufacturing, from 1977 to
1984 the paid hours jumped from 170 to 674 million (Pugliese and Rebeg-
giani 1997)1. The slump of large companies and the parallel proliferation of
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small firms, embedded in the post-Fordist productive paradigm of flexible
specialisation, also meant the slump of national trade unions that had con-
solidated their presence and counted most of their members in exactly those
companies.
Like the French, the German and the Spanish governments, the Italian
Penta-party governments (Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Demo-
crats, Republicans and Liberals) tried to face the consequences of increasing
unemployment in large companies by encouraging a subsidised exodus from
work through pre-retirement benefits. Law no. 155/1981 established the
possibility of accessing to pensions, for workers over 55 (male) and over 50
(female) fired by industrial firms outside the building sector, thereby dero-
gating from the existing rules. This derogation was to apply only in 1981,
but it was prolonged up to 1987 and then again throughout the 1990s2. But
while in Germany and France pre-retirement schemes were established for
encouraging generational turnover, in Italy (as in Spain) they soon turned
into an instrument for avoiding socially risky dismissals, with no effects on
workers’ mobility and employment. In other words, pre-retirement schemes
were used as a purely passive policy device.
In the context of alarming unemployment, also linked with the rapid rise
of female participation in the labour market connected to the baby boom in
the 1960s and higher levels of education, it was no longer possible to rely
purely on medium term interventions and on income support subsidies. Es-
pecially in the Mezzogiorno it was necessary to radically change the strate-
gy of labour policy for expanding the productive capacity of firms and fos-
tering job creation. In order to pursue such an ambitious goal, the idea of a
new social agreement with economic interest groups was launched, which
was aimed at restraining wage costs and thus inflation and at introducing
new active labour policy provisions. In this way, the world ‘deregulation’ of-
ficially entered the political discourse. In 1983 the national trade unions, the
national employers’ associations and the Minister of Labour signed an im-
portant social pact. As already mentioned in Chapter iii, this was the sec-
ond example of corporatist agreement after the (deceiving) ones that had
taken place in the period 1977-1978 during the governments of national
solidarity when trade unions decided to commit themselves to wage re-
straint in exchange for direct participation into the economic policy making
(Turone 1988). The negotiation was in fact a complex political exchange in-
volving incomes policies, fiscal policies and incentives policies. Fiscal policy
had to tackle the effects of inflation, incomes policy had to slow down the
dynamic of labour costs and tax relief (especially on social security contri-
butions) to assure the approval of the employers, who traditionally were not
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favourably inclined towards social agreements. The outcome was a cut (by
15 per cent) of the scala mobile allowance (i.e. of the part of the wage which
varies on the basis of the growth of the cost of living), which meant a sub-
stantial reduction of increases in future salaries. As regards the collective
bargaining system, the agreement established a general hierarchical struc-
ture and posed strict limits upon firm-level bargaining, which could no
longer decide on issues agreed upon at higher levels of agreement. As far as
labour policies are concerned, the agreement introduced a set of new policy
instruments favouring higher flexibility in the labour market (Law no.
863/1984).
The concerted action of 1983 was followed only one year later by a second
social agreement between the government, the employers and the unions,
whose main object was a further restrictive reform of the wage indexation
mechanism – the inflationary engine of the scala mobile illustrated above.
The agreement failed because of the increasing conflicts between the Com-
munist Party (supported by the cgil union) on the one side and the Socialist
Party led by Craxi with the other two trade unions on the other side. Given
the great reluctance of the Communist Party to reach a consensual solution,
Prime Minister Craxi decided to cut wage indexations by decree in February
1984. Against these cuts a referendum was called, supported by the Com-
munist Party; however, the referendum failed, and the cuts were maintained
(Accornero 1992).
Law no. 863 of 1984 introduced three new instruments, all belonging to
the family of deregulative policies: a) work-sharing agreements (the so-
called solidarity contracts); b) work and training contracts; and c) part-time
work. The aim was to stimulate the creation of employment opportunities
for the outsiders of the labour market: women and the young unemployed.
Solidarity contracts were a form of working time reduction and sharing.
The Catholic-oriented union, cisl, drawing a lesson from the French exam-
ple, was one of the strongest promoters, viewing these contracts as a soli-
daristic instrument aimed at facing the problem of youth unemployment in a
period of rapid technological transformation. Workers were to accept a re-
duced number of working hours to avoid dismissals or to encourage new re-
cruitment. In the first case solidarity contracts were called ‘internal’ or ‘de-
fensive’ contracts; in the second case they were defined as ‘external’. Both of
them required a preliminary agreement between the firm and the unions and
allowed for a reduction of working time starting from 20 per cent. For de-
fensive contracts, the government provided the workers with an earnings
compensation of 50 per cent and the employers with some contributory re-
lief. If the reduction of working time was over 20 per cent, employers got a
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relief of 25 per cent of the total contributions (30 per cent in the southern re-
gions); if the reduction was over 30 per cent, the relief amounted to 40 per
cent of contributions. As regards the ‘external’ contracts, the employers got,
for each new employment contract, a contribution of 15 per cent of the
gross wage from the state for the first year, 10 per cent for the second, and 5
per cent for the third. Social contributions were lowered at the level of the
employment contract of apprentices.
The second instrument, work and training contracts, allowed the hiring of
young workers aged between 15 and 29 for a maximum duration of two
years with a variable wage, in firms and public administrations which were
not in a situation of restructuring or crisis. The work experience had to be
combined with professional training through the help of the regions. The ac-
tual timing and modalities of work and training activities were specified by
projects presented to and approved by regional committees for employment.
Regions could establish specific agreements with the involved firms and
agencies, in line with ec regulations. As in the case of solidarity contracts,
the employers’ social contributions were fixed at the level of the employment
contract of apprentices. Moreover, after one year work and training con-
tracts could be converted from fixed-term to permanent contracts.
Finally, the new regulation of part-time work aimed at responding to
women’s increased participation in the labour market. It allowed the reduc-
tion of working time with respect to the standard fixed by the collective bar-
gaining system and introduced a special list of part-time workers to be used
by public placement offices. The law recognised two different kinds of con-
tract: horizontal part-time, where the reduction of working time was based
on a daily scale, and vertical part-time, where the reduction of working time
was spread over the entire year. Both contracts had to specify the worker’s
duties and the organisation of working time.
The implementation of the three measures was highly differentiated.
Work and training contracts immediately achieved remarkable success: they
rapidly spread throughout the country, mainly because of their generous
(for the employers) incentive structure. Solidarity contracts, on the con-
trary, were very scarcely taken advantage of. Employers were not so keen on
changing regular working time and production regimes. The few contracts
that were activated in practice had only defensive goals. Part-time working
was also not a success. For the first time Law no. 863 officially promoted an
instrument that had previously been left to free negotiations between work-
ers and employers, and now could become a major answer to the increased
participation of women into the labour market. Yet it continued to be rarely
used – in comparison with other European countries – mainly because of its
high non-wage costs (cf. Table 4.1).
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Some other active policies were introduced in the second half of the decade.
In 1986, Law no. 44 established a set of financial incentives for young em-
ployers, aged between 18 and 29, creating new firms and co-operatives.
Beneficiaries had to reside in the southern regions. In 1987, Law no. 56 reor-
ganised the structure of the Ministry of Labour, established new regional
agencies for promoting active employment and modified the procedures for
placement. This reform represents the first step of the employment services
reform eventually passed in the subsequent decade3. The new provisions
were generally aimed at enhancing active labour policies and services and at
creating a new balance between the state and the regions, enhancing the role
of the latter.
As to the ministerial structures, an Observatory of the labour market was
established at a central level in order to monitor occupational trends in all
economic sectors and produce data and analysis. The General Directorate
for Workforce Placement was transformed into the General Directorate for
Employment, with new responsibilities in the field of active policies. At the
local level, social committees for employment were established in order to
co-ordinate and implement active policies for mobility. The regional agen-
cies for employment became technical and advisory bodies of regional com-
mittees. The general philosophy on which the new reform was based was to
convert the traditional placement offices, originally conceived as instru-
ments of bureaucratic certification and intermediation between labour de-
mand and supply, into structures apt for planning and implementing active
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Table 4.1 Incidence of part-time employment* in selected countries,1985-2000
Italy Germany United France Netherlands
Kingdom
1985 7.5 11.0 19.7 11.2 19.5
1987 8.1 11.0 20.8 12.3 26.4
1989 8.8 11.6 20.2 12.2 27.7
1991 8.8 11.8 20.7 12.0 28.6
1993 10.0 12.8 22.1 13.3 27.7
1995 10.5 14.2 22.3 14.2 29.0
1996 10.5 14.9 22.9 14.3 29.3
1997 11.3 15.8 22.9 14.9 29.1
1998 11.2 16.6 23.0 14.8 30.0
1999 11.8 17.1 23.0 14.7 30.4
2000 12.2 17.6 23.0 14.2 32.1
Source: oecd,Employment Outlook,various years.
* Part-time jobs refer to people who usually work less than 30 hours per week.
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labour policies. The main task of these agencies was to stimulate the match-
ing of labour demand and supply through specific initiatives aimed at in-
creasing the level of employment and inclusion of weak categories in the
labour market.
Finally, Law no. 56 of 1987 allowed placement offices to derogate from
the automatic system of numerical call for new recruitment, particularly
where there were specific sectoral agreements with firms or business associ-
ations.
In conclusion, the 1980s represented an ambiguous decade for labour
policies. New active measures were introduced, and higher flexibility was
fostered. But the innovative policy choices did not seem to be enough to af-
fect the structural factors of unemployment. Certainly, the existing system
of ammortizzatori sociali (and especially the Cassa Integrazione Straordi-
naria) played a primary role in helping (large) Italian firms to reorganise, re-
convert and restructure in response to the intensifying challenges of interna-
tionalisation. But the situation of the weak segments of the labour force
continued to deteriorate over the decade. The new active instruments were
institutionally timid, poorly implemented and not systematically funded.
This notwithstanding, the expenditure related to active policies rose, and a
more balanced ratio between active and passive policies financings was not-
ed: from 1985 to 1989 active policies expenditure increased from 0.45 per
cent to 0.77 per cent of gdp, whereas passive policies diminished from 1.33
per cent to 0.9 per cent (oecd, Employment Outlook 1996). But these new
resources were unable to significantly alter the logic of public intervention
in this policy sector.
3 The chaotic restructuring of the welfare state
Despite their unremitting lip service to the exigencies of financial adjust-
ment, the various penta-party governments that held office during the
decade did not accomplish much in terms of welfare modernization. Since
the beginning of the decade, proposals for a new pension reform were dis-
cussed in Parliament and included in the agenda of the different cabinets.
All these proposals went in the same austerity direction: rationalising the
system, raising the age of retirement and trimming benefit formulas in order
to restore financial balances in the medium and long term.
The financial and organisational problems raised by the newly established
Servizio Sanitario Nazionale – ssn (1978) – in turn prompted an articulated
debate on how to ‘reform the reform’. The proposals in this field included
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changes in the overall chain of command from central government down to
the regions and to the local health units; the limitation of the power and
competencies of partisan organs at the local level; the exclusion from cover-
age of higher-income categories; the enactment of stricter controls over
providers and (later in the course of the decade) the introduction of quasi-
market relationships between public purchasers and providers. Neither the
pension reform nor the ‘reform of the health reform’ made much progress
until the early 1990s. The 1980s did however witness some first cuts in both
sectors: relatively peripheral and not very effective cuts in the case of pen-
sions, more substantial ones in the case of health.
In the pension field, starting in 1983, a number of measures were taken
that were aimed at subordinating some entitlements to the actual income
conditions of recipients and at controlling abuses. Income ceilings were es-
tablished for maintaining the right to minimum pensions and to multiple
benefits (e.g. an old age and a survivor pension). The rules concerning inva-
lidity pensions were in their turn completely revised in 1984, tightening
medical criteria and introducing periodical reviews of the physical condi-
tions of the beneficiaries.
Though important in symbolic terms, these steps in the direction of a
greater ‘targeting’ of Italy’s social insurance were only modestly effective in
financial terms. Not only were they programmatically limited to the mar-
gins, so to speak, of the system, but they also activated some counter-devel-
opments that largely neutralised their positive impact on costs. The ascer-
tainment of the income requisites for minimum pensions and multiple bene-
fits was entrusted to the inps, the social insurance institute. But this insti-
tute lacked both the technical instruments and the formal powers to imple-
ment accurate controls: thus, the introduction of income testing4 produced
enormous organisational chaos, many injustices (unwarranted withdrawals
and, much more often, unwarranted confirmations of benefits based on
false income declarations on the part of beneficiaries) and a massive increase
of litigations between recipients and the social security administration,
which had to be cleared with a general amnesty at the end of the decade. The
most absurd epilogue of the 1983 targeting provisions came in 1993/94,
when the Constitutional Court ruled that they were partly illegal and forced
the government to repay arrears for several trillion liras.
In the field of invalidity, the cuts were also largely circumvented, in this
case not through legal action but through the mobilisation of a lateral chan-
nel. The new discipline introduced in 1984 only regarded, in fact, the inva-
lidity benefits paid by the inps on the basis of contributions, but did not af-
fect the non-contributory benefits paid by the Ministry of the Interior. The
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second half of the 1980s witnessed a huge increase in precisely these latter
benefits, which almost completely offset the restrictive impact of the new
inps regulations (Ferrera 1996). Thanks to this articulated organisational
restructuring and institutional ‘relocation’, the traditional particularistic-
clientelistic circuits were kept in full operation throughout the decade, pos-
sibly widening the aforementioned deficit of legality.
The 1984 reform forced this ‘clientelistic market’ to change its currency
(from the contributory to the non-contributory invalidity benefit), the arena
for its transactions (from the inps to the Ministry of the Interior), the place
and modalities of the ‘benefit-hunting’ (from the regional committees and
the inps medical committees to the prefectural committees for public aid, in
connection with the administrative boards and medical committees of the
local health units or USLs on the one hand, and the public health care agen-
cies on the other). But the actors of the clientelistic exchange continued to be
the same: parties, trade unions and patronage institutions. Moreover, the
amount of financial resources channelled through the clientelistic circuit re-
mained the same. In fact, between 1984 and 1990 inps invalidity pensions
decreased of 712,000 units. But for the most part this decline was offset by
an increase of 510,000 units of the invalidity allowances paid by the Min-
istry of the Interior, with an evident syndrome of substitution.
Cutbacks were more substantial and more effective in the field of health-
care. Alarmed by post-reform expenditure increases and aware that a new
‘reform of the reform’ would take its time, the penta-party government in-
augurated a policy of ‘financial management’ of the health system aimed at
curbing the demand for services by imposing expenditure ceilings to the re-
gions and by making users pay in part for services. The annual budget bill
became the instrument par excellence to run the health-care system from the
centre. Allocations were set on the basis of available public funds, to be
shared out among the regions. The savings deemed necessary to remain in
line with the ceiling were produced through co-payments and other cuts (re-
duction of facilities, staff, investments, etc.).
Co-payments or “tickets”, as they are known by the Italian public, were
(and still are) without doubt the most visible and the most unpopular instru-
ment of government action in the health-care sector throughout the 1980s.
As in the field of pensions, the turning point was 1983. Alarmed at the wor-
rying increase in health-care costs (especially for prescription drugs) in the
previous two years, the government decided to change the co-payment from
a modest fixed fee to a percentage, making consumers pay 15 per cent of the
cost of the drugs. This percentage was then raised on several occasions in
later years, reaching 30 per cent in 1989. The ticket was also extended from
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drugs to diagnostic tests and referrals (i.e. consultations with specialised
physicians prescribed by family doctors). Although heavily criticised, the
co-payment policy generally achieved its aims, which were primarily finan-
cial. Besides bringing revenues to state coffers, co-payments did stabilise
health-care consumption, especially as regards pharmaceuticals.
As noted for the pension sector, health care ‘targeting’ through user
charges did produce a number of perverse counter-developments. To miti-
gate the social impact of such charges, detailed legislation on exemptions
was passed during the decade, combining different criteria (income, type of
illness, family and work status, age, etc.). But Italian patients soon learned
how to exploit the loopholes of this legislation. Exactly like inps, the Na-
tional Health System bureaucracy lacked moreover the organisational ca-
pacity to administer the norms in force. The result was a rapid increase,
through time, of the number of exempted consumers, which reached the im-
pressive figure of 25 per cent in 1989, accounting for 75 per cent of total
pharmaceutical expenditure. Only part of this increase can be attributed to
the gradual relaxation of co-payment norms. To a large extent, it must be
attributed to a growth of frauds and abuses, in the form of unfaithful decla-
rations (of income status by users or of health conditions by physicians, or
both) and free riding on exemption cards by non-exempt users.
If on the expenditure side the 1980s were definitely an ambiguous decade
(continuing expansion, accompanied by various chaotic attempts at re-
trenchment), on the revenue side the dominant trend was much clearer: in-
creases on all fronts. Contributory rates were repeatedly raised, especially
for self-employed categories. In aggregate real terms, the revenue from con-
tributions paid by both employers and the insured rose by 48 per cent be-
tween 1980 and 1990, increasing from 16.2 per cent to 17.4 per cent of
gdp; the real size of contributions from the self-employed almost doubled in
the same period. The total tax take of general government also grew ex-
tremely rapidly during the past decade, rising from 30.2 per cent to 40 per
cent of gdp between 1980 and 1990. According to eu calculations, Italy’s
actual average tax rate on the incomes of employees rose by 11.4 percentage
points (from 31.8 per cent to 43.2 per cent) in the period 1980-1993, as
against an average eu increase of 6.2 percentage points. The actual average
rate on the incomes from self-employment rose in its turn by as much as 18.8
percentage points in the same period (from 21.7 per cent to 40.5 per cent),
as against an average decline of 6.4 percentage point in the eu5.
Through this rapid and intense increase of taxation, Italy fully completed
during the 1980s its catching-up march with respect to the revenue levels of
her European partners, filling the distance created by the ‘flat decade’ of
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1965-1975, during which revenues remained stagnant despite soaring pub-
lic spending (cf. supra, Chapter iii). But this remarkable tax adjustment did
not suffice to cure the structural imbalance of national accounts. As previ-
ously mentioned, the deterioration was due to a large extent to the self-sus-
taining dynamic of the ‘debt spiral’ in an unfavourable international con-
juncture. But the internal imbalances of the welfare system (especially pen-
sions) did play a relevant part in the story6.
4 The 1990s: the ‘new deal’of the labour market
The 1990s marked a turning point in the history of Italian employment poli-
cy. On the one hand, the alarming state of the labour market, especially dur-
ing the first half of the decade, called for extensive reform of the institution-
al framework of both the demand and supply of labour. On the other, there
were certain compelling external challenges (firstly in the form of the urgent
need to remedy the country’s financial position to gain entry into the emu,
and then in the form of the European employment strategy), which com-
bined to speed up the modernisation process.
Labour market indicators point to a split between the first and the second
half of the 1990s. The negative trend following the 1992-93 recession was
balanced by more positive developments during the second half of the
decade, and in the 1998-2000 period in particular, in the wake of economic
recovery and outstanding American growth.
From 19937 to 1995, the employment rate fell from 53.1 per cent to 50.6
per cent following twenty years of positive growth; this contraction was
more marked in the case of male workers (employment fell from 68.2 per
cent to 65.9 per cent) – the majority of whom were employed in large indus-
trial companies – than it was for women (from 35.8 per cent down to 35.4
per cent). From 1995 onwards, a slight recovery was seen (from 50.6 per
cent to 53.5 per cent in 2000), in particular during the 1998-2000 period
(+1.8 per cent) and especially among female workers (+ 4.2 per cent). The
increase in the employment rate encouraged people to look for a job, lifting
the overall participation rate by 2.2 per cent (from 51.1 per cent to 53.3 per
cent) during the period from 1995 to 2000.
The unemployment rate rose continuously over the decade up until 1999
(from 10.1 per cent in 1993 to 11.8 per cent), before dropping to 10.6 per
cent in 2000 and then to 9.3 per cent by the end of 2001: this latter figure
was the most positive since 1989. The drop in unemployment was mainly a
female phenomenon (female unemployment fell from 16.2 per cent in 1995
to 14.5 per cent in 2000).
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Despite these positive signs, the most deeply rooted features of the Italian
labour market remained largely unaffected: youth unemployment (among
15-24 year-olds) remained at a particularly high level overall during this
decade (from 30.4 per cent in 1993 it rose to 31.1 per cent in 2000); the em-
ployment rate for the over-55s decreased from 32.3 per cent in 1993 to 30.8
per cent in 2000; figures for the long-term unemployed also fell (61 per cent
of total unemployed in 2000 compared to 48 per cent in 1993), especially in
the south (68.5 per cent in 2000 compared to 57.4 per cent in 1993); and the
deep divide between north and south remained largely intact (in 2000 the
unemployment rate reached 27.6 per cent in the south against 4.9 per cent in
the north) (Istat, Forze di lavoro 1993-2000).
In such a situation, the achievement of the quantitative targets fixed by the
European Union during the Lisbon and Stockholm summits in March 2000
and March 2001 – according to which the total and female employment
rates should respectively reach 70 per cent and 60 per cent by 2010, while
the unemployment rate should go down to 4 per cent – seems rather unreal-
istic given that the current gap in employment amounts to 15 per cent for the
total working population, 20 per cent for the female population and 22 per
cent for workers over 55. Even if we take into account the black economy,
which if ‘legalised’ would push up the employment rate by 7-8 percentage
points, the road to European standards appears a long and hard one.
Nevertheless, the effort put into policy reform was quite remarkable – as
we have already shown – especially compared with the little that had been
achieved during previous decades8. The main innovations introduced dur-
ing this decade can be grouped into three areas: a) the privatisation and de-
centralisation of employment services; b) the introduction of policies for lo-
cal development; and c) the strong promotion of flexible labour contracts.
The reform of employment services still constitutes (in 2003) one of the
main challenges for Italy, and in particular for the country’s regional and lo-
cal governments. Legislative decree no. 469 of December 1997, following
article 1 of Delegated Law no. 59/1997 on administrative decentralisation,
provided for three main changes: institutional decentralisation (that is, the
transfer of placement powers from the Ministry to the regions and local gov-
ernment9); the promotion of a preventive approach to placement instead of
the old bureaucratic one; the entry of private organisations into the field of
provision of employment services, after fifty years of public monopoly.
Between 1998 and 1999, Italian regional governments were involved in
passing regional laws implementing national prescriptions. Job centres were
set up throughout the country at the provincial level (one for each 100,000
inhabitants), thus giving the provinces back their former political and ad-
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ministrative status, which has been further reinforced after the revision of
Heading v of the Constitution in March 2001 (Constitutional Law no.
3/2001)10 broadening the regions’ individual and joint competencies.
At the regional level, a new body governing and co-ordinating employ-
ment measures was created under a variety of different names (Labour
Agency, Employment Authority, etc.). The new agency employs personnel
from the former Regional Agencies for Employment (governed by the Min-
istry and the former regional labour departments) and has considerable or-
ganisational problems due to the heterogeneity of the skills and expecta-
tions of its staff. Besides their control and supervisory functions, Labour
Agencies have the duty to provide technical support to the provinces imple-
menting the reform, through the co-ordination of the Computerised Em-
ployment Information System (Sistema Informativo Lavoro) – an electronic
data set covering labour demand and supply – through the development of
research into the local dynamics of the labour market, and through the mon-
itoring and evaluation of labour policy impact.
Furthermore, Decree 469/1997 set up two important bodies for integra-
tion and concerted action: the Tripartite Regional Commissions (Commis-
sioni regionali tripartite) and the Inter-institutional Co-ordination Com-
mittees (Comitati interistituzionali di coordinamento). While the former in-
clude representatives of regional public institutions, trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations, the latter include representatives of the various levels
of local government (regional, provincial and municipal). Compared to the
old Regional Employment Commissions (Commissioni regionali per
l’impiego), these new bodies should be more involved in the planning and
implementation of labour policies, thus avoiding possible conflict. Similar
tripartite commissions were also established at the provincial level.
In addition to decentralisation, the main innovation of the 1997 reform
was a brand new approach to placement, more in keeping with European
recommendations. Placement was seen as a fundamental part of active
labour market policies and not just – as in the past – as a series of purely ad-
ministrative functions (Varesi 1998; Ghirotti 1998; Reyneri 1998). In ac-
cordance with the preventive approach widely adopted in northern Euro-
pean countries, employment centres should go beyond the mere bureaucrat-
ic certification of unemployment and provide consultancy, orientation and
pre-selection services designed to get the unemployed into the labour market
as soon as possible (within 12 months in general and within 6 months in the
case of those who receive unemployment benefit, as stipulated by Legislative
Decree 181/2000). The main beneficiaries of such services should be those
people often excluded from the labour market (the young, women and the
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long-term unemployed), thanks to a series of measures directly linked to the
needs of local areas. The provinces are thus free to draw up and implement
specific measures in the fields of job creation, counselling and orientation
with the supervision and technical support of the regional governments.
Another policy innovation in the sphere of employment services has been
the admission of private organisations into the field of job placement ser-
vices. Notwithstanding the formal requisites that have to be satisfied, pri-
vate organisations (unions, employers’ associations, non-profit-making as-
sociations, etc.) were allowed to set up their own employment centres,
which compete with the existing public ones. The liberalisation of employ-
ment services was also accompanied in 1997 by the introduction of tempo-
rary employment, after two European Court of Justice rulings against the
Italian government for failing to comply with eu directives. Moreover, in
2001 the new Berlusconi government (cf. infra) announced the abolition of
the ‘sole purpose’ constraint, that is private agencies’ duty to restrict activi-
ty exclusively to one single mission, i.e. placement, which means that pri-
vate agencies can now provide a range of different services (placement, ori-
entation and selection) and that competition between public and private in-
stitutions is further encouraged (the subject of heated debate, together with
claims and protests made by regional and provincial governments, worried
that they might be deprived of their central functions)11.
At the beginning of 2003, placement reform still does not appear to have
been achieved in full. In the northern regions, the implementation process
has been more rapid and efficient, while in the southern regions some delays
and inefficiencies – especially in terms of staff competencies – continue to
jeopardise the reform. The shift from a bureaucratic culture to a preventive,
result-oriented approach appears to be slow. It is not surprising that the Eu-
ropean Commission has repeatedly urged the Italian government to com-
plete the reform according to specific quality standards.
Localism and territorial autonomy were also the goals of new local devel-
opment policies, the second big innovation characterising the 1990s, and
provided for in Law no. 662/1996 following the Employment Agreement
signed by Prodi, the unions and the business associations. Under the head-
ing ‘negotiated planning’ (programmazione negoziata) one can find a wide
range of policy measures designed to foster local entrepreneurship, valorise
local resources and institutional capabilities, and create new jobs. The nu-
merous programmes are primarily based on a mixture of training and job
creation, qualification and work. The most widespread and significant mea-
sures are territorial pacts and area contracts. Both of them are designed to
encourage employability in depressed areas. These policies can hardly be
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considered mere labour policies, given that they incorporate the wider con-
cept of integration in the labour market, based on local, urban and industri-
al development, or on the revitalisation of the territory as a whole. This new
approach has been seen as the new answer to the socio-economic problems
of the Italian south after the demise (in 1992) of the state’s top-down special
measures, which had failed to achieve the expected results. The shift from
top-down subsidised industrialisation to bottom-up local autonomy consti-
tutes the new answer to the south’s traditional problem of social and eco-
nomic development.
Territorial pacts consist of operative procedures and bargaining tools de-
signed to promote the development of businesses, co-operatives and em-
ployment measures in a given area, through the utilisation of productive and
natural resources that characterise that area. Bargaining does not rely upon
the traditional triangle of unions, employers and the government, but on a
wider network of private and public subjects (such as banks, chambers of
commerce, non-profit-making associations, etc.), who are to share common
policy problems and jointly fund the various measures. In 2000, more than a
hundred territorial pacts had been submitted to the National Committee for
the Economy and Labour (Comitato Nazionale per l’Economia e il Lavoro
– the body competent for recommending public funding: cnel), 71 for the
south and 38 for the centre-north. Ten of these pacts are ‘European pacts’,
that is, they are financed by special European funds (Ministero del Lavoro
2001).
Area contracts have the same goal as territorial pacts: i.e. to encourage
employability in under-developed areas. They differ from the pacts in that
they cover areas where industry already exists (albeit in crisis). They are
signed in order to avoid mass redundancies. Unions are prepared to waive
the national contractual standard and to agree to wage and administrative
flexibility. Furthermore, area contracts are becoming increasingly common,
with 15 in 2000 (13 in the south and only 2 in the north), corresponding to
16,328 new jobs (ibidem).
The third main line of governmental action in the 1990s was the encour-
agement of flexible and atypical employment contracts, mainly during the
second half of the decade, thus further developing a process that had already
begun in the 1980s. During the 1990s, policy-makers quickly became aware
of the success of flexible labour contracts as a key channel for labour market
entry. Numbers soon proved them right. In the 1998-2000 period, the per-
centage of part-time jobs grew from 4.9 per cent to 8.1 per cent, while tem-
porary work – two years after its initial introduction – accounted for
399,289 jobs: fixed-term contracts rose from 5.1 per cent to 9.3 per cent,
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continuous and co-ordinated employment contracts (a widely used form of
temporary contract) jumped from 6.9 per cent to 9 per cent, and in-work
training contracts and apprenticeships finally surpassed the 8 per cent mark
(ibidem).
The promotion of greater flexibility in the labour market began with the
legalisation of temporary work in June 1997 – as we have already men-
tioned. The so-called Treu Law (from the name of the then Employment
Minister) officially dismantled the existing public monopoly on job place-
ment established in 1949 (Law no. 264). Temporary employment was pro-
gressively extended to the various branches of the private sector, and subse-
quently to the public sector (from August 2000 onwards) both for highly
skilled and unskilled jobs. Large urban centres in northern Italy have been
the main areas of expansion of this new form of employment, and male
workers and young workers below the age of 40 have been its main protago-
nists. Temporary work agencies – both national and international – have
been proliferating all over the country in recent years.
Another measure designed to encourage temporal flexibility was the revi-
sion of norms on part-time working, which had never been very successful
in Italy. In April 1999 a decree law provided tax benefits for employers who
wanted to avail themselves of part-time work in order to hire new employ-
ees, particularly in small and medium-sized enterprises. The law was specif-
ically designed for working women with families and young workers below
the age of 25. The measure was modified in February 2000 by Legislative
Decree no. 61 which, as a response to ec Directive 97/81, introduced the so-
called ‘elastic clauses’ for the flexible organisation of company production:
it also gave employers the chance to take on part-time employees within the
limits fixed by collective bargaining (part-time work could account for up to
10 per cent of weekly working time). The following year, in February 2001,
Legislative Decree no. 100 further modified rules on part-time employment,
shortening the period of notice required (from 10 days to 48 hours) for each
change made in the organisation of working time and reducing overtime
payments.
European law and recommendations also played an important role with
regard to fixed-term contracts. In 1993, Law no. 221 made a combination of
temporary contracts and mobility allowances (a state subsidy in case of col-
lective dismissals) possible. Four years later, in 1997, Law no. 196 abolished
the automatic conversion of temporary contracts into life-long contracts in
those cases where employees continued working, replacing it with wage
compensations. All of these innovations were considered to encourage em-
ployability. Then Legislative Decree 386/2001 finally implemented ec Di-
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rective 70/1999, liberalising application, eliminating the need for employers
to demonstrate their reasons for fixing the term of a contract, and weaken-
ing the role played by collective bargaining in establishing the maximum
percentage of workers who could be employed on temporary contracts.
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Table 4.2 Major employment policies,1981-2001
1981
Early retirement pensions (Law no. 155)
1984
Solidarity contracts (internal and external – Law no. 863)
Training and employment contracts (Law no. 863)
Part-time work (Law no. 863)
1986
Young entrepreneurship (Law no. 44)
1987
Regional Agencies for Employment (run by the Ministry) and partial liberalisation of place-
ment procedures (Law no. 56)
1991/92
Promotion of female employment (Law no. 125/1991 and Law no. 215/1992)
1992/93
Abolition of automatic wage indexing and reform of collective bargaining
1995
Territorial pacts (Law no. 341)
1996
Area contracts (Law no.662)
1997
Temporary work,revision of fixed-term contracts,work fellowships,continuous training (Law
no. 196).
Decentralisation of employment services and active labour policies,privatisation of place-
ment functions (Legislative Decree no. 469)
1998-onwards
Yearly National Action Plans for Employment
1999-2001
Revision of part-time and temporary employment contracts as a consequence of ec directives
1999-2001
Promotion of the new economy,social inclusion policies and equal opportunities measures
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As for the so-called quasi-employment contracts (lavoro parasubordina-
to), in February 1999 the Senate passed a bill which tried to regulate the
considerable numbers of quasi-subordinate or quasi-autonomous workers
still deprived of any form of social protection: this it did by establishing
some basic rules concerning employment rights, dismissal and work organi-
sation (Altieri and Carrieri 2000). Given that the Law remains to be ap-
proved, quasi-subordinate wages have been tied to subordinate workers’
wages by the 2000 Budget, while collective bargaining retains its central
role here.
It is widely recognized that the promotion of atypical contracts con-
tributed to the employment growth of the second half of the 1990s (especial-
ly in the period from 1995 to the spring of 2001) when 1,500,000 new jobs
were created (Sestito 2002). Most of these new workers are to be considered
flexi-workers, i.e. people (in particular women and first job seekers) who en-
tered the labour market with a working time formula that was always less
than full. At the end of the 1990s, the diffusion of flexibility seemed to be an
incontrovertible trend of the Italian labour market even though the risks of
precariousness and jobs’ bad quality were emphasised in the national de-
bate.
As we shall see, this emphasis on flexibility has intensified with the arrival
of Berlusconi.
5 The impact of the European Employment Strategy on domestic policy
making
The reforms illustrated so far have been partly inspired in their general goals
by the European Employment Strategy (ees). The latter has exerted a signif-
icant impact also on the organisational dimension of employment policy-
making – especially in terms of capacity building12. 
As is well known, the ees was officially launched with the Amsterdam
Treaty of 1997 (article 128), even though the White Book on Growth, Com-
petitiveness and Employment of 1993 and the conclusions of the Essen
Council in 199413 were important precedents. Though remaining an exclu-
sive competence of national states, employment policies have become part
of a wider process of multilateral governance, based on horizontal co-ordi-
nation and control relations among the member states and on vertical rela-
tions with eu institutions, involving general policy orientation, monitoring
and evaluation (Bonoli and Bertozzi 2002; Trubeck and Mosher 2003).
The ees consists of various elements and stages. Each year the Council of
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Ministers is called to draw up a series of guidelines on the basis of the gener-
al situation of the labour market and of specific proposals of the Commis-
sion, the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. In the second
stage, these guidelines have to be converted into specific policy aims by the
member states within ‘National Action Plans (naps)’, which in the third
stage of the process have to be submitted to the Commission for assessment.
The results of such assessment are presented in a Commission and Council
joint employment report, which may include individual recommendations
to national governments. The ees is therefore aimed at fostering conver-
gence among national labour markets, without however imposing hard reg-
ulations. Through the principle of subsidiarity and the instruments of soft
laws, incentives and opportunities are offered to national governments that
hold their legislative powers intact (Balboni and Buzzacchi 2003).
The Amsterdam Treaty provisions received formal (and anticipated) rati-
fication during the extraordinary ‘jobs summit’ held in Luxembourg in No-
vember 1997. On that occasion, four main principles (or pillars) were indi-
cated as the core objectives for national labour market policies: a) employ-
ability (i.e. the promotion of new skills and incentives); b) entrepreneurship
(the creation of new firms and businesses); c) adaptability (the modernisa-
tion of working conditions and the promotion of company flexibility vis-à-
vis external challenges); and d) equal opportunities (especially in terms of
reduction of the gender gap in the labour market). The four pillars were fur-
ther specified during the European Councils of subsequent years: greater
emphasis was placed on the policies for social inclusion, on the employabili-
ty potential of the knowledge economy, and on the problem of the quality of
jobs.
If the most explicit goal of the ees is to drive national policies towards
common strategic priorities and standards (i.e. to make them converge), an-
other related purpose is that of affecting the modes and styles of the labour
policy-making process as such. One clear aim on this front has been the pro-
motion of dynamics of policy learning and change based on experience: past
failures and success in each country have become the basis for cross-nation-
al benchmarking and peer review exercises, in the framework of the open
method of co-ordination (De la Porte and Pochet 2002).
For Italy, responding to the demands of the ees raised multiple problems.
The strategy took shape within Anglo-Saxon and northern European policy
paradigms and values, resting on the primacy of prevention, active mea-
sures and efficient public employment services. On the contrary, the Italian
model of labour policy was traditionally marked by the dominance of pas-
sive policies, by a hyper-bureaucratic system of placement and by the lack of
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evaluation and monitoring capabilities. The organisational structure of the
Ministry of Labour, characterised by high internal fragmentation and by
the juridical culture of its staff, did not favour any development of problem
solving and ex-post evaluation skills. When the ees took off, the Italian
government had virtually no institutional equipment for collecting and
analysing data and thus for formulating articulated empirical diagnoses of
the existing challenges and elaborating policy solutions along the general
lines set by the European strategy. In 1987 a General Direction for the
Labour Market Observatory had been created, and the exigency to set up a
Labour Market Information System providing on line information to em-
ployment offices had slowly emerged. An ad hoc commission had been es-
tablished, but the political and material support to such initiatives remained
weak, and thus little progress had been made. Scarcely formalised was also
the representation of the Ministry of Labour in international bodies and de-
cision-making arenas. The relationships with institutions like the oecd,
the ilo and the European Union were carried out on the basis of personal
ties and contingent events.
In addition, the pressures coming from the eu combined with domestic re-
forms and in particular with the launching of administrative decentralisa-
tion (discussed in the previous paragraph), whose consequence for the Min-
istry was the gradual loss of important competencies and responsibilities:
the reforms foresaw for the Ministry only a role of general orientation, con-
trol, supervision and international representation. Domestic decentralisa-
tion dynamics inaugurated a phase of institutional transition, which made
the response to the new eu soft laws more difficult and complicated. This
notwithstanding, a slow process of structural adjustment (concerning the
organizational network responsible for employment policies) and cognitive
learning (concerning the norms, beliefs and preferences of the various actors
of this network) began to develop – a process characterised at first by extem-
poraneity and improvisation, but which subsequently led to institution-
alised innovation and change.
In order to draw up the first naps, those for 1998 and for 1999, two ad
hoc commissions were set up inside the Ministry, composed of a small group
of external experts, without any direct involvement of the Ministry’s staff,
which indeed opposed various bureaucratic obstacles to these new initia-
tives. The 1999 nap was marked however by a broadening of the circle of
actors: the Presidency of the Council (held by D’Alema) got involved in the
preparation of the plan through its economic department, which precisely
in those months had undertaken an internal re-organisation with a view to
equipping the Prime Minister’s office with greater policy capabilities in the
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most crucial sectors. The 1999 experience taught an important lesson: the
naps not only need to be prepared and packaged in order to submit them to
Brussels, they also need to be defended within the peer review processes and
bilateral meetings with the European Commission that take place after their
formal submission: they must be accompanied all the way through the Lux-
emburg process, all the year round (and especially when the Joint Employ-
ment Reports are drafted). In 1999, despite the institutional investment
made in its preparation, the Italian nap was not adequately supported in the
follow-ups of the official presentation: the expert Committee responsible for
the document disbanded after the formal deadline, and the ministerial bu-
reaucracy felt neither involved nor was it capable of performing the task.
The change of Labour Ministers during the summer of 1999 (Bassolino left
his post to Salvi, both from the DS party) did not improve the situation: the
‘experts’ committee system revealed itself as an inadequate organisational
response to the increasingly articulated demands of an increasingly institu-
tionalised process of multi-level governance of European labour markets
and domestic employment policy regimes. Another lesson that had to be
learnt in the critical juncture of 1999 was the urgent need to develop moni-
toring and evaluation skills in order to respond not only to the ‘declarative’
demands of the ees (what are your plans), but also to its ‘accounting’ de-
mands (have you reached your targets).
The turning point in Italy’s participation to the Luxembourg process
came in 2000. In the winter of that year, a new unit called ‘Monitoring
Group’ was established within the Ministry’s cabinet with the task of col-
lecting an updated data set on labour market trends and policies. The Group
operated as an inter-service committee of administrators belonging to vari-
ous directorates and ministries (Presidency of the Council, National Insti-
tute of Statistics – istat, National Institute of Social Insurance – inps, In-
stitute for Labour and Training – isfol, etc.). This was indeed a relevant
step in the overall reorganization of the policy-making process: a new actor
capable of providing empirical data and technical knowledge on the real dy-
namics of the labour market appeared on the scene – with firm roots in the
central administrative apparatus – and it began to play a pivotal role in the
existing, loose and inconclusive employment policy network. Soon after its
creation, the Monitoring Group started to produce a series of Monitoring
Reports on labour market trends and policies, which have rapidly estab-
lished themselves as the standard reference source for knowledge and analy-
sis and thus as a reliable basis for policy planning and evaluation. If com-
pared to the 1997 status quo, the progress made by Italy in terms of capaci-
ty building appears remarkable, as explicitly recognised also by recent Joint
Employment Reports.
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In the wake of such progress, starting from the third round of the Luxem-
bourg process (2000), the Italian government has begun to play a more ac-
tive role not only in the ‘descending’ phase (guidelines application, new nap
formulation, old nap evaluation), but also in the ‘ascending’ phase (guide-
lines’ definition, nap’s defence, contents of the Joint Employment Reports).
From a technical point of view, a small but dynamic epistemic community
(including not only the Monitoring Group but also the Italian delegates to
the Employment and Social Protection Committee and some economic advi-
sors of the Labour Ministry and the Presidency of the Council) gradually
formed itself and started to perform brokerage functions between the na-
tional arena and the supranational one. From the political point of view,
both Salvi (as Minister for Labour) and D’Alema (as Prime Minister) mo-
bilised to shape the agenda of the Lisbon European Council (spring 2000),
seeking alliances with other countries on issues considered relevant for Italy.
One of the achievements of this strategy was the recognition of the impor-
tance of the regional dimension of the labour market (and thus of employ-
ment policies) in the conclusions of the Lisbon summit and in the 2001
guidelines.
The elaboration of the 2001 nap (the fourth round) was also assigned to
an ad hoc committee co-ordinated by a technician, but this time the expert
committee worked in close contact with the Monitoring Group. The May
elections and the change in government (from Amato to Berlusconi) played
as disturbing events for Italy’s participation to the 2001 round of the ees.
At the end of the summer, the new government submitted to Brussels an ad-
dendum to the May nap, putting greater emphasis on flexibility. But that
same addendum also included, for the first time, some quantitative targets,
based on the scenarios elaborated by the Monitoring Group. Starting from
2002, the whole ‘nap-empl’ process at the national level has been inter-
nalised within the executive machine. External experts have lost their
prominence, and the process (including of course the actual drafting of the
plan) is now managed by the Labour Ministry, under the close supervision
of one of the undersecretaries (i.e. deputy ministers). In sum, between 1997
and 2003 the Luxembourg process has been fully incorporated within
Italy’s policy-making system, and there can be little doubt that this incorpo-
ration has prompted a marked upgrading (in some areas, the creation ex
novo) of crucial policy capabilities.
However, some dark spots remain in the picture. As stated above, institu-
tional adjustment and capacity building at the national level has taken place
in a context of increasing administrative decentralisation. This culminated
in the Constitutional reform of 2001, which has delegated most compe-
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tences in the field of employment to regions and local governments. The in-
stitutional capacities of these new actors are still relatively weak and ex-
tremely varied throughout the national territory. While regions such as
Piedmont, Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany have made significant
efforts to equip themselves with the skills to perform the new tasks (and
some have even started to experiment with Regional Action Plans for em-
ployment, in full syntony with the ees), most southern regions are lagging
far behind – while facing at the same time the highest problem loads in terms
of unemployment and labour market modernization. The new framework
of centre-periphery relations rests on co-ordination and support mecha-
nisms which are still in a fluid state and poorly effective. Thus, what has
been gained in terms of policy capabilities at the national level since 1997, in
the wake of the ees, has been partly offset by the centrifugal dynamics of
administrative decentralisation. As we shall see in the final chapter, this
problem affects a wide range of public policies and raises some serious
doubts about the stability and sustainability of the new institutional con-
stellation laboriously put in place by the reform cycle of the 1990s.
6 A sequence of reforms in the welfare state
After a decade of chaotic attempts at retrenchment, in the sphere of social
protection the 1990s witnessed the emergence of a more coherent policy of
re-structuring and modernization. Several legislative interventions were
passed in the field of pensions. The first one dates back to 1992. While
maintaining the overall architecture of the system established in 1969 (oc-
cupational schemes and earnings-related formulas), the 1992 Amato reform
introduced a number of significant innovations in a restrictive direction af-
ter decades of ameliorations. The main provisions of this reform can be sum-
marised as follows: elevation of the retirement age from 55 to 60 for females
and from 60 to 65 for males (private employees), to be phased in by the year
200214; gradual elevation of the minimum contribution requirement for
old-age benefits from 10 to 20 years; gradual extension of the reference peri-
od for pensionable earnings from the last 5 years to the last 10 years (and to
the whole career for new entrants in the labour market); elevation of the
contribution requirement for seniority (i.e. early retirement) pensions of
civil servants with a very gradual phasing in; a new increase of contribution
rates and a restrictive reform of the general indexation mechanism, which
abolished wage-indexation.
The Amato reform did face at first harsh opposition from the trade
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unions. The climate of financial emergency of the summer of 1992 and the
negotiational style of Amato eased the reform process, however. In Septem-
ber and October 1992 a number of strikes were declared, in which union
leaders were publicly contested for their willingness to negotiate. Amato’s
concessions were able however to defuse this upsurge of protest: in particu-
lar, Amato dropped the proposal of elevating the minimum contributory re-
quirement of seniority pensions for private employees from 35 to 36 years as
well as the proposed freezing of indexing for 1993; in addition, all workers
with at least 15 years of contributive seniority were exempted from the new
rules.
As a follow up of the 1992 reform, new provisions for supplementary pen-
sions were passed in 1993. The ‘second pillar’ had been traditionally under-
developed in Italy, due to the presence of a highly generous first pillar and of
generous rules regarding severance payments. The latter (the so-called trat-
tamento di fine rapporto – tfr) play a very prominent role (almost 2 per
cent of gdp). Employers are obliged to set aside ca. 7.5 per cent of gross
wages, with a guaranteed yield of 1.5 per cent per year, supplemented by 75
per cent of the yearly inflation rate. Workers obtain the sum set aside for
them when they change jobs or when they retire. Thus, the tfr scheme op-
erates largely as a second pillar pension scheme in disguise and partly as a
sort of unemployment insurance. At the beginning of the 1990s, the idea
emerged that the tfr should gradually be transformed into a fully fledged
and explicit second pillar scheme. The new provisions introduced in 1993
made some first steps in this direction: they introduced a co-ordinated legal
framework and fiscal incentives for the establishment of occupational sup-
plementary funds and foresaw the possibility of diverting the tfr contribu-
tions into such new funds. The Ciampi government, which took office in
1993, decided in its turn new penalisations on seniority pensions as well as
controls on the beneficiaries of disability benefits, to contain the above-illus-
trated frauds.
The impact of the Amato reform was not insignificant, both in terms of
cost-containment (cf. Figure 4.1 below) and in terms of equity, especially
thanks to its provisions on civil servant’s ‘baby pensions’ (i.e. their tradi-
tional entitlement to retire with only 20 years’ contributions, at very early
ages). But the persisting crisis of public finances, the continuing increase of
pension expenditure (in spite of the cuts) and the pressures of international
agencies such as the imf, the oecd and eu institutions convinced the gov-
ernment in the course of 1993/1994 that a more incisive reform was needed.
In the fall of 1994 the Berlusconi government, voted in office in the spring
elections, disclosed a new reform plan resting on very severe measures: high
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penalties for seniority pensions (a 3 per cent reduction per each year of re-
tirement prior to the legal pension age), a reduction of the replacement rate
from 2 per cent to 1.75 per cent per year for those workers who had not been
affected by the Amato reform and a switch from actual to programmed in-
flation in the indexing mechanism of all pensions. Not previously negotiated
with the unions, Berlusconi’s plan raised massive protests: on October 14,
1994, a first general strike was called, and two weeks later as many as one
million workers crowded the streets of Rome in one of the largest popular
manifestations since decades. The issue of pensions raised unprecedented
tensions between the executive and the President of the Republic, Mr. Scal-
faro, who recommended separating pension reform from the financial law
for 1995, that needed to be approved by the end of 1994. The issue also orig-
inated irremediable strains within the majority, with the Lega North (op-
posed to reform) precipitating a cabinet crisis. As an emergency measure,
Berlusconi was able to enact a more rapid schedule for the phasing in of the
new retirement age as well as a temporary freeze on all seniority benefits
(Cazzola 1995). After the approval of the financial law in December 1994
Berlusconi fell and was replaced by Lamberto Dini’s technical cabinet. The
trade unions agreed to negotiate into force with this government a new
broad reform by the first semester of 1995. In May 1995 the new Dini gov-
ernment succeeded in striking the agreement with the trade unions, which
was approved by Parliament the following August.
The new co-operative approach of the trade unions can be explained by at
least four factors. First of all, the trade unions had undergone an internal
process of maturation: the reform-oriented components of the movement
grew stronger, supplying an articulated platform of proposals to the nation-
al leadership. The second factor was the concerted style of policy-making
introduced by Dini (who was ‘technically’ supported in the Parliament also
by left parties), very different from the adversarial style adopted by Berlus-
coni (Natali 2001). The third factor was the significant number of conces-
sions granted to the trade unions by the Dini cabinet about the phasing in of
the pension reform. Finally, there were the very concrete spurs of the inter-
national markets. As a consequence of the political crisis and the ensuing
loss of credibility of the Italian government, interest rates started to soar in
the winter of 1995, and the lira witnessed an alarming fall against the
Deutschmark. The unions thus learnt that refusing the reform was not equal
to maintaining the status quo, but making things much worse. In other
words, they somehow understood by means of a ‘negative re-enforcement’
that the arguments of the governments and of the Bank of Italy in favour of
pension reform were well grounded and accepted the bet proposed by them.
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We will return to the characteristics and significance of these learning
processes in the next chapter.
The main novelty of the Dini reform has been the introduction of a new
contribution-related formula in place of the earnings-related formula in
force since 1969. The pension is no longer related to pensionable earnings,
but to the total amount of contributions paid in throughout the working ca-
reer. Since this change represents a sort of Copernican revolution not only as
regards the Italian welfare state, but also within the general context of Euro-
pean pension systems, it deserves a closer analysis.
Since 1975 (including the 1992 Amato reform) the Italian pension formu-
la linked the pension amount to previous earnings, counting 2 per cent of
the latter for each year of insurance seniority. For example, if pensionable
earnings amount to 100 and the years of insurance seniority are 40, the pen-
sion amounts to 80 (2 per cent x 40). Thus, what mattered was only the du-
ration, not the effective amount of contributions paid in. The 1995 Dini re-
form, on the contrary, has directly linked the pension to this amount. To cal-
culate future pensions, the total amount of contributions effectively paid by
an insured worker will be divided by an actuarial coefficient that depends on
the age of retirement (the pensionable age can vary between 57 and 65).
This coefficient will be revised every ten years in order to take into account
demographic and economic trends. The contributory rates can be revised
too, depending on the same trends. The new contribution-related pension
will be indexed to inflation, and the elderly without sufficient contributory
rights and below a specific income threshold will receive a social allowance
financed by fiscal revenues. A series of ‘credits’ are foreseen for contributory
interruptions due to parental and care leaves, i.e. such periods count as if
contributions had been paid. Even if it simulates the logic of a funded sys-
tem, the new system will maintain a pay-as-you-go type of financing: contri-
butions paid in by active workers will not add up to a cumulative fund, but
will be immediately used to pay current pensions.
Apart from new contributory formula, the Dini reform has introduced
other important novelties: a new flexible retirement age for both men and
women (57-65); the phasing out of seniority pensions by 2008; the gradual
standardisation of rules for public and private employees; the graduation of
survivor benefits according to income; and finally stricter rules on the cumu-
lability of disability benefits and incomes from work, as well as tighter con-
trols on beneficiaries.
Besides changes on the benefit side, the Dini reform also rationalised and
raised contribution rates and widened the contribution base by extending
compulsory pension insurance to special categories of self-employed work-
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ers15. The reform included also new provisions on second pillar pension
funds, establishing the conditions for setting up these funds also for civil
servants and strengthening the tax incentives for diverting the tfr contri-
butions into the funds. According to estimates made at the time of the re-
form, the Dini provisions were to produce savings on the order of 0.6 per
cent of gdp per year between 1996 and 2005. A revision of the key parame-
ters of the system was foreseen in 1998 in the event of savings falling short of
expectations (Mira d’Ercole and Terribile 1998: 192)16.
The autumn of 1992 also marked an important turning point as regards
health care: the ‘reform of the reform’ was finally approved. This trans-
formed the local health units (usl, the basic structure of the ssn) into ‘pub-
lic enterprises’ with ample organisational autonomy and responsibility. The
USLs are no longer to be run by elective political committees but rather by a
general manager appointed by the regions based on professional qualifica-
tions and with a private contract, renewable after five years if performance
is satisfactory. Larger hospitals, formerly acting as branches of the usl, can
now establish themselves as independent public hospitals agencies, with au-
tonomous organisation and administration. These public hospital agencies
must operate with balanced budgets. Budgetary surpluses can be used for
investments and staff incentives, and unjustified deficits will jeopardise their
autonomy. The reform also brought changes in the financing regulations.
The central government maintains overall planning responsibilities; that is
it pays for a standard set of services that must be guaranteed to each citizen
in each region. In this way, each region will continue to receive a predeter-
mined amount of resources by the centre, in accordance with its own popu-
lation (with some corrections). However, whatever remains to be paid in
each region in addition to its standard yearly endowment must be covered
with regional resources (higher co-payments or taxes). The regions and the
usl managers will thus be encouraged to actively participate to contain
costs and promote an efficient use of resources within their jurisdictions.
The implementation of the 1992 reform started in 1994; it must also be
added that rather severe restrictions were introduced in 1993 and 1994 re-
garding co-payment regulations and the system of exemptions, also with a
view to discouraging frauds and abuses on the side of both patients and
physicians.
The 1992-1995 reforms represented major breakthroughs with respect to
the institutional legacies of the past. They were also, however, the result of
social and political compromises in which the government had to make a
number of concessions with regard to its own original plans. The most evi-
dent concession regarded the introduction of the new pension formula: the
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Dini reform exempted all workers with more than 18 years of insurance se-
niority by August 1995 from the application of that formula (i.e. the same
cohorts that had already been exempted from the Amato reform three years
earlier).
But the approximation of the emu deadlines was keeping Italian authori-
ties under acute budgetary pressures: soon after each one of these compro-
mises, the government thus relaunched its reformist efforts, even widening
the scope of its ambitions. In this vein, the new centre-left ‘Olive Tree’ coali-
tion led by Romano Prodi and voted into office in the spring of 1996 made a
comprehensive reform of the stato sociale one of its highest priorities. In
January 1997 Mr. Prodi appointed a Commission of experts to draft a
broad plan for reform. An articulated report was submitted by this Com-
mission (known as the Onofri Commission, after the name of its chairper-
son, a Bologna economist). The Commission elaborated a comprehensive
plan of reforms: an effort that had not been repeated since the early 1960s
(when the cnel drafted its own plan, as illustrated in Chapter ii). Consid-
ering the relevance of the Onofri Commission’s proposals, a closer look at
them is useful.
Acknowledging the ‘double distortion’ which characterises Italian social
expenditures (with respect on the one side to the risks protected, and on the
other to the beneficiaries), the Onofri Commission pointed out first of all the
general path to follow within the process of reform: the aim of the reform
was not to reduce expenditure levels (which were substantially in line with
those of other eu countries, according to the data for 1994), but to promote
an incisive internal re-equilibration (with some savings in the short term, to
facilitate entry into the emu). As the Commission’s Final Report states, the
two main objectives of the internal re-equilibration were to be:
‘On the one hand the reduction of the resources directed to ensure similar
levels of income for middle income groups at work as well as after retire-
ment, through public pensions (the hyper-protection of the economic
risk of old age) and the redeployment of such resources for the economic
risk of unemployment/lack of income, now underprotected. On the other
side, the generosity of certain provisions on behalf of ‘standard’ employ-
ment has to be corrected in order to increase (or introduce ex novo) the
protection of the really weaker social categories’ (Commission for the
analysis of the macro-economic compatibility of the social expenditure,
Final Report, 1997:11).
In order to achieve this double objective, the Commission articulated a se-
ries of more specific proposals, grouped into four main chapters:
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1 The introduction of additional measures of retrenchment and rationali-
sation of public pensions. Despite a positive evaluation of the basic princi-
ples and elements of the Dini reform, the Commission also pointed out its
weaknesses, with particular regard to the scope of application of those prin-
ciples and elements, which was considered too limited. According to the
analysis of the Commission, the phasing in of the new system was too slow,
burdening the younger generations with the costs of change. The Commis-
sion therefore proposed, in order to consolidate the new regime more rapid-
ly, to overcome the remaining elements of iniquity and to introduce a new
pillar of supplementary pensions. The specific proposals were:
a. a complete and quick implementation of all the parts of the Dini reform,
with particular regard to the harmonisation of the rules about pension-
able age, minimum contributory seniority, pensionable earnings, evalu-
ation of working career, yearly yield of contributions, maximum pen-
sionable amount, cumulation, inability and invalidity pensions;
b. a clear separation between social insurance and social assistance, identi-
fying those provisions belonging to social assistance and managed by
the National Institute of Social Security (inps) in order to shift their
financing to general taxation;
c. the introduction of new measures to complete the design of the new sys-
tem, i.e. more specifically: unification (and not only mere harmonisa-
tion) of all existing pension schemes or, alternatively, recognition of fi-
nancial and managerial autonomy only if certain specific pension
schemes can prove to be self-sufficient based on long-term technical fi-
nancial projections; universal application of the contributory formula,
without any exception; revision of the coefficients of conversion accord-
ing to automatic procedures; increase of the minimum pensionable age,
in order to reduce the rates of contribution;
d. the acceleration of the transition to the new regime by means of the 
elimination of existing differences of treatment, particularly with 
respect to seniority pensions;
e. the resolute acceleration of the development of supplementary pensions,
also with respect to the public sector.
2 An articulated reform of unemployment benefits and employment pro-
motion schemes: acknowledging that the existing system of unemploy-
ment benefits and active labour policies was ‘incoherent and almost un-
governable’, the Commission proposed a reform aimed at establishing
three different tiers of protection:
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a. first tier in case of temporary suspension of employment with job preser-
vation: here the instrument of protection should be an insurance scheme
similar (but more circumscribed) to the existing ordinary Cassa Inte-
grazione;
b. a second tier in case of job loss: here, in line with the main European sys-
tems, the instrument should be a ‘general unemployment benefit’, unify-
ing all different forms of unemployment benefit within the Italian welfare
system; and finally
c. a third residual tier in case of exhaustion of the right to insurance bene-
fits.
With regard to labour policies, the Commission also proposed to centre
public policy upon active measures, empowering both vocational training
and placement services.
3 A further rationalisation of the incentive structure within the National
Health System. In this case proposals were made with regard to the financ-
ing of the national health system (acceleration of the law on the self-financ-
ing of regions) and to the provision of services (revision of the division of
competences between central administration and regions). Also, the Com-
mission put forward several suggestions with regard to organisational inno-
vations (for example in the hospital sector) and recommended a swift intro-
duction of supplementary health insurance schemes.
4 The reform of social assistance, based on the following principles: a bal-
anced mix between universalism, with respect to beneficiaries, and selectivi-
ty, with respect to the provision of benefits; a redefinition of needs and bene-
fits centred upon citizenship in general (not only the elderly, not only cash
transfers); empowerment of local governments within a national legislative
and programmatic framework. More in detail, the Commission proposed:
a. the rationalisation and unification of existing cash transfer schemes, and
the introduction of new schemes: a minimum income scheme and a Fund
for dependent persons in need of long-term care;
b. the empowerment of local administrations;
c. the establishment of standardised and reliable procedures in order to per-
form the means and asset-test.
The Onofri report was the object of a rather heated debate in the summer
and autumn of 1997. In the budget law for 1998, the Prodi government tried
to adopt many of the Commission’s recommendations. The fierce opposi-
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tion of the Refounded Communists (whose votes were crucial for reaching a
majority in parliament) and the difficult negotiations with the social part-
ners forced the government, however, to substantially scale down its ambi-
tions. In the field of pensions, Prodi was able to introduce some cuts of se-
niority pensions, especially for public employees: their contributory re-
quirement for claiming a seniority pension was fully aligned with that ap-
plying to private employees, thus tightening the Amato provision of 1992.
Contributions for the self-employed were raised, a temporary freeze on the
indexation of higher pensions was introduced, and some steps were made on
the ‘harmonisation’ front. However modest (with respect to the govern-
ment’s original ambitions), these cuts had the advantage of being immedi-
ately effective and thus gave a small contribution (0.2 per cent of gdp) for
reaching the budgetary targets for 1998. The most important recommenda-
tion of the Onofri plan, i.e. a much faster phasing in of the new pension for-
mula introduced in 1995, could not be adopted, and by opening a cabinet
crisis the Refounded Communists were able to obtain the exemption of
blue-collar workers from the cut in seniority pensions17.
No reform was passed in the field of unemployment insurance either. But
the government was able to push through some important innovations on
the social assistance and ‘selectivity’ fronts. More transparent rules for the
financing of social assistance were introduced, and the budget law for 1998
– which was approved in December 1997 – delegated the executive to take
measures in two important directions: 1) the introduction of a new ‘indica-
tor of socio-economic conditions’ (ise), based both on income and asset cri-
teria, to be used as a yardstick for all means-tested benefits; and 2) the intro-
duction of a new (experimental) scheme of ‘minimum insertion income’ or
rmi, i.e. a last resort guaranteed safety net administered by local govern-
ments. Both the ise and the experimental rmi were actually introduced in
the course of 199818.
In the field of health care, finally, a third reform (after the 1978 and the
1992 reforms) was introduced in June 1999. This established new rules with
respect to the financing competences of the centre and the periphery, a new
regulation of the relationships between hospital doctors and the National
Health Service (imposing on hospital doctors the incompatibility between
full-time employment and private activities outside the hospital), and a new
regulatory framework for supplementary health insurance funds.
This sequence of reforms has not fully eradicated the distributive and al-
locative distortions of the Italian welfare state that have been described in
Chapter ii. They have, however, made significant steps in this direction.
More importantly, they have planted promising institutional seeds for a dy-
namic of recalibration (see Table 4.3).
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On the one hand, the setting of more transparent and clear-cut boundaries
between social insurance and social assistance as well as the consolidation
of new instruments such as the ise and the rmi will work to strengthen that
safety net of means-tested and need-based benefits and services which has
been historically lacking (or very weak) in Italy19. In this vein, the D’Alema
government formed in October 1998 decided to raise social and minimum
pensions and to introduce two new means-tested benefits: an allowance for
families with three or more children, and a maternity allowance for women
not covered by compulsory insurance. In its turn, the Amato government
(the last ‘Olive Tree’ cabinet, in office until June 2001) introduced in the au-
tumn of 2000 a broad ‘framework law’ of social services and assistance.
This law is very important and highly innovative in that it sets rather articu-
lated standards of service that must be guaranteed by all regions. Moreover,
just before the end of its mandate (June 2001), the Amato government pro-
posed a comprehensive National Action Plan against poverty and social ex-
clusion, in the wake of the new ‘inclusion process’ launched by the eu.20
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Table 4.3 Main reforms of social protection,1983-2000
1983
First measures of retrenchment of public pensions
New user charges for health care
1984
New rules on invalidity pensions inps
1992
‘Amato’pension reform
Health care ‘reform of the reform’
1995
‘Dini’pension reform
1997
‘Prodi’pension reform
1998
Introduction of a new ‘indicator of socio-economic conditions’(ISE) for means-tested benefits
Introduction of a new (experimental) scheme of ‘minimum insertion income’
1999
Third reform of SSN
Allowances for families with many children,and maternity allowances for women not covered
by compulsory insurance
2000
New framework law on social services and assistance
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On the other side, the new architecture of the pension system will work to
gradually downsize, or at least to contain, the further expansion of a sector
that has been historically oversized. It is true that, in spite of the reforms, at
the beginning of the 2000s, Italy still displays one of the highest ratios of
pension expenditure/gdp in the whole oecd area and that the situation is
still going to worsen for at least two decades (cf. Chapter vi below). But if
we look at the internal structure of social expenditure, we can see some
promising developments. Between 1996 and 1999, for the first time in sever-
al decades, the share of old age and survivors pensions out of total expendi-
ture declined slightly (from 65.9 to 64.0 per cent). The share of family bene-
fits, on the contrary, increased slightly from 3.5 to 3.7 per cent (Eurostat,
Depenses et recettes de protection sociale, Luxembourg 2000), while in
1999 the function ‘social exclusion and housing’ registered a figure differ-
ent from zero, i.e. 0.2 per cent. These are only decimal variations, but they
are in any case encouraging. Furthermore, the significance of the 1992-2000
reforms must be appreciated in contrast with the status quo. According to
the estimates of the Ministry of the Treasury (1998), in the absence of re-
forms, pension expenditure would have reached the impressive peak of 23.2
per cent of gdp in the year 2040, before starting to decline. As we shall see
in the concluding chapter, after the reforms, the peak is expected to reach
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Figure 4.1 Pension expenditure projections,1995-2045
Source: Ministero del Tesoro (1998)
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‘only’ about 16 per cent of gdp in the year 2033. The virtual stabilisation of
pension expenditure may not have been enough to cure the long-standing
disease of Italy’s unbalanced welfare state. But it has certainly contained its
fatal aggravation (see Figure 4.1). The reforms of the 1990s have also start-
ed to give the Italian pension system a more balanced architecture, putting
in place some pre-conditions for the development of the second pillar, thus
relieving the first from its functional overload. Last but not least, such re-
forms have significantly enhanced the overall equity of the pension system.
This has been achieved in several ways: by eliminating the legal privileges of
civil servants and the de facto advantages enjoyed by the self-employed after
the 1990 reform; by abolishing the premium enjoyed by workers with more
dynamic careers (typically white collar and managerial staff) under the
earnings-related formula, linking benefits to last or best years; by increasing
social and minimum pensions.
Of course, the appreciation of the path followed during the last decade
should not make us neglect what remains to be done: the recalibration of the
Italian welfare state is far from complete. For the most part, the agenda is
still that of the Onofri plan: streamlining pensions and consolidating social
assistance. But the successful continuation of the reform process is linked to
the dynamics of Italy’s political system. It is to these dynamics that now we
turn our attention.
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V Reforms as Outcomes of Institutional Learning
In Chapter i we already presented the analytical perspective that we find
most promising for explaining the sequence of reforms that took place in
Italy during the 1990s. While we recognize that such a sequence rested to
some extent on the traditional logics of ‘political exchange’, i.e. quid pro
quo bargains struck between governing authorities and the social categories
most affected by the reforms, we wish to emphasise in our explanation the
role played by learning dynamics, i.e. processes through which salient poli-
cy actors come to modify their preferences under the spur of unforeseen
events, past policy failure, sudden constraints, and a particular kind of in-
teraction, based on argument and persuasion. In Italy the years between
1992 and 1998 witnessed a combination of internal and external develop-
ments that offered a peculiarly fertile ground for the unfolding of such dy-
namics. The fall of the ‘First Republic’, on the one hand, and the Maastricht
process, on the other, drastically changed the overall policy-making constel-
lation: new actors appeared on the scene; the rules of both the domestic and
the eu games underwent a sudden and significant alteration; the cost and
benefits of the various policy options (and thus their distributive implica-
tions) became very hard to quantify and predict, also in the wake of the ex-
tremely high volatility of financial markets. Political exchanges remain al-
ways possible in such unstable constellations, but they get more difficult: ac-
tors become more uncertain about what exactly to demand of whom. They
thus mature an interest in a common search for policy solutions that can sta-
bilise the constellation as such, rather than bring specific advantages to their
part. Of course partisan consideration continues to be salient also during
this search. But a distinct fil rouge (which can be traced back to a ‘learning
logic’) will run through the actors, interactions and policy-making in this
type of environment: a thread consisting of genuine puzzling exercises (of-
ten joint, cross-actor exercises) around the nature of the crisis, the possible
path(s) of institutional stabilisation and the technical solutions to policy
challenges.
In this chapter we will illustrate how this syndrome operated during
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Italy’s journey into the emu, breaking the vicious circle of the past and
paving the way for a novel, reform-oriented virtuous circle. Building on the
factual reconstruction offered in the previous chapters, we will restate in a
more articulated fashion our ‘anchoring’ argument (i.e. how and why the
Italian élite opted for European convergence) and will then focus on the po-
litical logic that inspired the 1992-1998 reforms.
1 The vicious circle: spoils-sharing governments, inefficient bureaucracy and
distributive policies
Up until the 1980s the high institutionalisation of the Keynesian welfare
state and of the regulated labour regime centred on passive-distributive
policies, on a disproportionate protection for the insiders and a persisting
exclusion of the outsiders, originated a highly resistant vicious circle, sus-
tained by an interest coalition including powerful industrial unions, centre-
left governments and weak employers’ associations.
Why did the (distorted) ‘welfare capitalism Italian-style’ survive and in-
deed consolidate throughout the 1980s, despite its manifold perverse effects
of an allocative and distributive nature and its increasing mismatch with re-
spect to a rapidly transforming social and economic environment?
As has already been mentioned, the answer lies primarily with the ‘politi-
cal logic’ of the ‘First Republic’ and more particularly with four interrelated
ingredients: a) a spoils-centred model of party government; b) a weak and
inefficient public administration; c) a highly institutionalised system of po-
litical relations between the government and organised interests; and finally
d) the distributive nature of labour and social policies. All of these factors
were embedded in the context of proportional representation (epitomised
by the electoral system), which fostered interest fragmentation and a partic-
ularistic distribution of benefits. In the 1980s some efforts to modify these
ingredients were attempted, but their effectiveness was not very high, owing
to the strong resistance of the supporters (and obviously main beneficiaries)
of the status quo.
As is well known, the Italian political system was characterised – at least
until the end of the First Republic – by high party fragmentation and lack of
competition (Sartori 1982; D’Alimonte 1978; Cotta 1987). Multiparty
coalition cabinets were not based on clearly defined and shared pro-
grammes, but rather on the proportional distribution of offices and spoils
(cf. par. 2 of Chapter ii). These unstable executives were led by Prime Min-
isters with a weak role of co-ordination, while the ministers who borrowed
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their legitimisation directly from political parties enjoyed high autonomy.
The lack of vertical co-ordination between the Prime Minister and the other
ministers was reflected moreover in weak horizontal inter-ministerial co-
operation. In such a fragmented context, the capacity to introduce innova-
tive public policies was hindered by interest group pressures and partisan
vetoes (Fabbrini 2001). The best strategy of survival for the various cabinets
was to respond to all the inputs and micro-demands coming from social and
political groups by formulating on the one hand general, ambiguous and
therefore ineffective public policies and on the other hand by multiplying
particularistic laws and regulations in order to distribute advantages and
benefits to those social categories whose electoral support seemed to be par-
ticularly important. The continuous and cost-irresponsible reception of all
particularistic claims had dramatic consequences on public finances, bu-
reaucratic efficiency and the quality of policies and services.
This micro-sectional style of policy-making, characterised by a very low
degree of overall substantive coherence, intersected with a system of public
administration marked by high centralisation, a top-down, hierarchical im-
plementation style and weak problem-solving capacity (Freddi 1989; 1990;
Capano 1992). Up until the 1990s the structure and functioning of central
ministries remained virtually unchanged with respect to the nineteenth-cen-
tury tradition: staff immobility, low decentralisation, a legalistic culture and
the obsessive respect of formal rules were the main features of this system,
which remained almost impervious to the logic of efficiency and efficacy.
In this fragmented political environment, occupied by a multitude of po-
litical actors, unstable and multiparty coalition governments and an inef-
fective public administration, a thick network of exchanges and negotia-
tions between the government and interest groups was bound to flourish.
This is especially true for the major trade unions: after the ‘hot autumn’ of
1969 the unions acquired an informal guarantee of involvement in social
and economic policy-making. In the 1980s, a paradox emerged: labour
unions considerably weakened, but their inclusion in policy-making grew
deeper roots. It was the executive that, in a period of alarming economic cri-
sis, searched for union approval and help, in order to legitimise its actions
and programmes (Gualmini 1997b; 1998). In the 1990s, this tight relation-
ship found a more formalised structure in the practices of concertazione and
incomes policy that were officially introduced by the 1993 Ciampi agree-
ment (cf. par. 5.). Interestingly enough, the employers’ associations (Con-
findustria in particular) did not contrast the development of corporatist 
policy-making. In the 1960s and 1970s, when employers were still weakly
organised, they accepted trilateral agreements in order to restore peace in in-
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dustrial relations and at the plant level. In the 1980s, in a period of increased
employer power, they supported and participated in corporatist practices,
since they had the opportunity to influence the government and obtain
favourable legislation, such as industrial subsidies and tax privileges.
Another important factor for the institutionalisation of welfare capital-
ism Italian-style was the content itself of social and labour policies. This
content can be referred to as micro-distributive: highly concentrated (selec-
tive) benefits and widely dispersed costs. Micro-distributive policies were
the ‘poisoned gift’ of the economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s and of
the political strategies pursued by the centre-left governments of the 1960s
and 1970s, which were inclined to incorporate a growing number of social
categories in the welfare state (cf. supra, Chapter ii). Distributive policies
are indeed particularistic; contrary to universalistic policies, they encourage
fiscal irresponsibility and create loyalty and rising expectations in their ben-
eficiaries (Pierson 1993; 1994; Ferrera 1998). They generate incentives for
client groups to organise and mobilise in defence of their entitlements.
It is important to remark that the vicious circle we have described so far –
vicious because it assured the perpetuation of an unsustainable policy path
and hindered every attempt at reform (North 1990) – was a fully coherent
system from an internal perspective, a ‘tightly coupled’ system (Weick
1976). Beneficiaries were obviously keen on supporting it, unions agreed on
distributive policies, employers received appealing incentives, and the gov-
ernments of the Centro-sinistra or of the Penta-partito could meet the de-
mands of their voters and distribute spoils among the various coalition part-
ners.
But around 1990 the castle began to crumble, under the pressure of grow-
ing claims on the side of outsiders, the explosion of costs and the radical
transformations of the external economic environment. And starting in the
early 1990s the first timid signs of a new virtuous circle began to emerge. We
now turn our attention to this new circle.
2 Towards the Second Republic: from vices to virtues?
In the early 1990s, the transformation that in the domestic debate was de-
fined as ‘the transition from the First to the Second Republic’ together with
strong pressure to meet emu deadlines shook the old model of Italian-style
welfare capitalism to its roots. The two dynamics combined to produce a
virtuous chain of policy reforms.
During the first half of the 1990s, the Italian party system underwent
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some rather dramatic and sudden changes. First and foremost was the dis-
covery of a dense, all-pervasive network of political corruption involving
prominent political leaders and party members, which led to a snowballing
delegitimisation of the ruling class. As a result of the ‘Clean Hands’ (Mani
pulite) investigation (a name coined by the pool of judges working in Mi-
lan), an extensive network of illegal financing and fiscal fraud involving
both politicians and well-known businessmen was brought to light, thus
underlining the very close (and risky) connection between politics and busi-
ness. In the ‘Tangentopoli’ storm (Milan was depicted as ‘Bribesville’), sev-
eral employers and political leaders were convicted by the courts, and a large
section of the First Republic’s ruling élite subsequently retired from public
life.
The dramatic effects of Tangentopoli intersected with major changes in
the structure of the political system. In 1991 the positive results of the refer-
endum on the ‘single preference vote’ – which reduced the number of candi-
dates for the lower Chamber that voters could choose in their ballot from
four to one – opened the way to the reform of the electoral system, which
was transformed from an almost pure plurality system to a new majority-
rule system (i.e. first past the post). This reform was officially passed after
the results of the electoral referendum held in April 1993.
One year later, for the first time ever in Italy, two large party coalitions
stood against each other to gain electoral support. The bipolarisation of the
political contest marked the end of the so-called conventio ad exclunden-
dum (agreement to exclude) in relation to the communist party, whereby the
communists had been isolated and forced into permanent opposition. This
was also a consequence of the end of the ‘Cold War’, so clearly symbolised
by the fall of the Berlin Wall. The ‘pro-system/anti-system’ cleavage – which
had moulded and ossified the Italian party system – began to lose salience,
and opposition parties gained increasing credibility with regard to their
governing credentials. Moreover, in the very same year, 1989, under Oc-
chetto’s leadership, the Italian Communist party had taken a fundamental
step in the direction of a more ‘liberal’ philosophy, much closer to that of the
existing European social-democratic parties. This step was symbolised by
the change in party name from the Communist Party to the Left Democratic
Party (pds) and later Left Democrats (ds).
Let us now take a closer look at the profound transformations that the po-
litical system underwent during this period. In the first place, after the 1994
elections the old political parties were hit by an irreversible electoral and or-
ganisational crisis. The cornerstones of the five-party coalition, i.e. the
Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the Social Democrats, the Republicans
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and the Liberals, practically evaporated into thin air. Secondly, the crisis of
these political parties brought about another crisis, one concerning the en-
tire party system and its above-mentioned characteristics: its polycentric
structure, the lack of competition, the predominance of centre-based coali-
tions, its weak leadership capacity. Thirdly, the crisis marked the nadir of an
entire political class. In 1994, 71 per cent of deputies were elected for the
first time. There were many reasons for dissolution of the old political élite
besides Tangentopoli: the emergence of numerous internal party conflicts,
the loss of control over the executive, the inability to change and the entry of
new competitors into the political arena (Cotta and Verzichelli 1996; Fab-
brini and Vassallo 1999). The fourth factor was the setting up of new par-
ties and movements. After the electoral success of the Northern League
(Lega Nord) back in 1992 (a party whose main aim was to eliminate strong
state centralisation and its suffocating system of taxation), 1994 saw the
birth of a new centre right political movement led by Silvio Berlusconi,
Forza Italia, which in the space of four months managed to organise itself
and win the election.
Other important factors that characterised this period of transition in-
cluded the gradual process of separation of the national executive from the
grip of political parties, and the consequent changes in inter-institutional
relationships. In fact, the demise of the First Republic changed the nature of
relations between the various different political institutions. Relations be-
tween the executive and the President of the Republic shifted in favour of
the latter, while relations between the executive and Parliament moved in
favour of the former, and finally the relationship between the judiciary and
the general political system was marked by the dominance of the judges.
A stronger national executive made the introduction of structural reforms
easier. The technical cabinets headed by Amato, Ciampi and Dini (cf. Table
1, above) were allowed to work in the absence of any strict party control and
could thus enjoy greater autonomy and have a more direct say in governing
the policy-making process.
This autonomy, on the contrary, was rather limited in the case of the
Berlusconi government, formed in May 1994 after the first election had
been won with the new majority-rule electoral system. This executive did
not, however, last long due to inner conflict and tension. The coalition was
in fact based on two different alliances: Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale
(the renamed neo-Fascists) in the south, Forza Italia and the Lega Nord in
the north. The presence of the Lega Nord in the government brought with it
a non-conventional opposition between the independentist, entrepreneurial
claims of the North and the State-centred culture of southern Italy, which
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overlapped with the more traditional political contrast between right and
left. Furthermore, Berlusconi’s government was constantly subjected to the
strict control of the President of the Republic, Scalfaro, mainly due to the yet
unresolved conflict between the Premier’s business interests and his public
office. After only six months, the Berlusconi government fell due to the
withdrawal of the Northern League from the majority, basically on the pen-
sion issue (cf. Chapter iv), which touched upon this party’s electoral inter-
ests in the North. The Berlusconi government was replaced by a technical
coalition led by Dini.
In April 1996 Berlusconi tried to repeat the victory of 1994, but was de-
feated by the leader of the centre-left ‘Olive Tree’ coalition, Romano Prodi.
The new executive included some innovative elements which made ob-
servers believe that the period of institutional transition had come to an end:
the rules of turn-over and alternation had worked; the government was
strengthened in relation to Parliament1; and the role of the Prime Minister
was reinforced against that of his ministers (Fabbrini 2000; 2001). But the
events that occurred during the entire centre-left legislature (1996-2001),
characterised by the formation of four different governments, showed that
the shift to a real majority-rule democracy was still underway.
A few months after victory (in January 1997), the ‘Olive Tree’ coalition
set up the third parliamentary commission for constitutional reform under
the guidance of D’Alema, the leader of the coalition’s biggest party (the
Democratic Party of the left which was about to change name once again
– at the 1997 congress in Florence – becoming the party of the Left Demo-
crats – DS). The D’Alema commission was established together with the
leader of the opposition, Berlusconi, with the aim of introducing extensive
reforms of the country’s system of government (towards a majoritarian for-
mat), of the structure of the Italian state (in a federal direction) and of the
working of parliament (involving the abolition of a perfect bicameral sys-
tem, the simplification of law-making, the creation of a regional senate,
etc.). Like its predecessors (the Bozzi commission and the De Mita commis-
sion in 1983 and 1993, respectively), the D’Alema commission ended up by
producing a bill which got sunk in Parliament under the weight of vetoes
and conflicts between various parties both inside and outside the majority,
which in particular failed to see eye-to-eye on the multiplicity of govern-
mental models (from the purely presidential to the purely parliamentary).
Notwithstanding the failure of the bicameral commission – which, as a
matter of fact, the Prime Minister remained somewhat distant from – dur-
ing the Prodi government some important reforms were passed by means of
ordinary policy-making procedures: reforms such as the establishment of
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administrative federalism thanks to the so-called ‘Bassanini laws’ (59 and
127/1997) and the (related) reform of government ministries (legislative de-
cree 300/1999).
The Bassanini reform reorganised the distribution of political and admin-
istrative power between central and local levels, introducing a wide-ranging
devolution of competencies from central ministries to regional and local
governments. This transfer of power took place in a number of crucial poli-
cy sectors, like commercial activities, labour policies, welfare and trans-
portation. This process meant the decisive reorientation of the role of sub-
national levels of government, inducing a clear degree of differentiation
among the performance and institutional capacities of the various different
Italian regions. The provinces and municipalities saw their role strength-
ened, even with respect to the regions, contrary to what had happened in the
past2.
The reform of the ministries was the other side of the decentralisation
coin, and the new provisions were designed to be implemented as of the fol-
lowing legislature. The reduction and merger of ministries (from 18 to 12),
the clear separation between political and management functions, the intro-
duction of departments and executive agencies within the ministries togeth-
er constituted the main goals of the reform, which tried to imitate the British
managerial experience of the 1980s3 (Gualmini 2003).
In October 1998, an increasing divergence within the governing coalition
between the Premier and Rifondazione Comunista (a ‘hard left’ party origi-
nating from the old Italian Communist Party – the pci – who supported the
coalition but had not entered the majority and the executive) emerged over
the 1999 financial law, leading to the fall of the Prodi government. The ex-
ecutive was defeated, 313 votes against 312, but was nevertheless the Italian
Republic’s second longest-lasting executive after the Craxi government of
the 1980s (August 1983-August 1986).
The first (October 1998 - December 1999) and second (December 1999-
April 2000) D’Alema governments, supported by the new party set up by
the former President of the Republic Cossiga (udeur) and including cer-
tain fugitives from Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party, marked the confirmation
once again of political parties’ weight in the distribution of office, and of
Parliament’s strength to the disadvantage of the Prime Minister. The num-
ber of technical ministers and technical undersecretaries fell significantly,
the ministries were shared out among seven different parties compared with
five in the previous executive, and the role of D’Alema, notwithstanding his
efforts to maintain a presidential style, was simply one of primus inter
pares. As a result of all this, the fragmentation of the centre-left coalition
grew significantly.
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Furthermore, the second government headed by D’Alema inevitably fell
early on (April 2000) due to the negative performance of the centre-left
coalition in the 2000 regional elections, notwithstanding the international
legitimisation gained by the Premier during the diplomatic events preceding
the war in Kosovo.
A well-known figure on the Italian political scene, Giuliano Amato was
appointed by the new President of the Republic, Ciampi, to form a new gov-
ernment without calling elections: its explicit task was to pass the Budget
and to conclude the reform of the electoral system. Amato led the govern-
ment until May 2001, without succeeding in completing the said reform
(since the referendum of May 2000 on the final abolition of proportional
representation did not achieve the quorum). Nevertheless, it did manage to
take another step towards federalism. The Constitutional Law of March
2001 (no. 3) – which was finally approved by a consultative referendum in
October 20014 – broadened the number of exclusive and joint powers held
by sub-national governments. More in detail, it turned over the logic of arti-
cle 117 of the Constitution where regional competencies were listed, defin-
ing in the first place the exclusive legislative powers of the state (foreign pol-
icy, defence, immigration, citizenship, justice, financial and monetary poli-
cy), in the second place the subjects for joint state-regions competency (edu-
cation, work safety, pensions, health, trade, etc.) and finally delegating all
remaining matters to the exclusive competence of the regions.
The debate on the autonomy and legislative role of sub-national govern-
ments continued to remain a central issue within the second Berlusconi gov-
ernment, elected in May 2001. The project on devolution, strongly support-
ed by Bossi, which should further empower regional and local governments
in the field of education, health and local security, worked as an important
pay-off for the participation of the Lega Nord in the centre-right coalition.
But the second Berlusconi government and its main policy strategies will be
the subject of the next chapter.
3 Financial adjustment in the name of Europe: what should be done?
It is within the two aforementioned contexts (the old vicious circle and the
emerging virtuous one) that the process of structural adjustment, described
in Chapters iii and iv, has taken place and shape. How can we interpret this
process in terms of learning? As mentioned in Chapter i, in order to answer
this question, we have to distinguish between two different challenges to
which the adjustment has responded. The first challenge was of a substan-
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tive nature and has essentially regarded ‘what to do’, both in terms of goals
and instruments. The second challenge was of an essentially political nature
and has regarded ‘how to get the reforms passed’, given the obstacles of the
decision-making process and the social resistance to change. These two
challenges presented themselves with a slightly different timing: substantive
puzzling (i.e. the analysis of problems and the search for possible solutions)
came prior to ‘powering’ (the orchestration of consensus and the actual ex-
ercise of power to change things). In part, the two exercises have also in-
volved different actors: a more restricted circle of architects of the adjust-
ment, with the Bank of Italy and the Ministry of the Treasury as main pro-
tagonists, in the first case; a wider circle of builders, including also political
actors at the highest levels of government and parliament, and major inter-
est group and party leaders, in the second case. Yet the overall process re-
mained relatively integrated, with strong interdependencies and links be-
tween the two circles and levels of action. And if we try to reconstruct the
main lines of this process, we can see that it took place through a sequence of
approximations, through various trials and errors, within the typical logic
of ‘operational conditioning’, which, as argued above, is one of the classical
and most efficient modes of learning5.
From a substantive point of view, the first step consisted of the elaboration
of a correct diagnosis of the new problems originated by the shocks of the
1970s, acknowledging the failure of the status quo in various sectors of
public intervention. On the basis of this diagnosis, a slow process of institu-
tional design and planning was started – both with regard to the objectives
and to the instruments of governmental action – outlining an increasingly
richer and more articulated reformist agenda. The irreversible anchoring to
Europe – and in particular to the emergent European monetary system – im-
posed itself as the overarching priority of this design. This choice should not
be taken for granted at the time when it was made: between the 1970s and
the 1980s, there was still much scepticism and uncertainty about what to do
even within those circles that were most favourable and open to the external
world and to Europe (Radaelli 1999). But the ‘European pin’ gradually
managed to reinforce itself, and a strong advocacy coalition gathered
around it in order to spell out and underline all the implications of the exter-
nal constraint (the vincolo esterno) with regard to the contents, modalities
and timing of domestic policy-making, obviously starting from monetary
and budgetary policies6. For the most part, it has been a coalition that
crossed traditional ideological and party cleavages, made up of a central nu-
cleus of professors from academic, political and administrative environ-
ments, accustomed to international meetings and exchanges7. Even if these
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actors elaborated substantially original projects, we have to take into ac-
count that numerous solutions to domestic problems were determined by a
process of comparative learning, that is emulating and adapting solutions
already experimented with by other countries. The speed of these processes
has been ever accelerating. Not only did the various actors start to learn
faster and with more effectiveness, but the target itself (the European Com-
munity, and then Union) started to move: after twenty years of relative insti-
tutional stability, between the 1970s and the 1980s the integration process
began to walk faster, originating three constitutional revisions (the 1986
Single Act, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty)
and three enlargements (firstly to Greece, then to Spain and Portugal, and fi-
nally to the Nordic countries and Austria). Thus, in correspondence with
each advancement of the European building, the project of institutional ad-
justment and internal modernisation had to be renewed and accelerated.
In the previous chapters we have described the programmatic confronta-
tions and institutional innovations, trials and errors through which the dif-
ferent decision-makers (starting from those defined as ‘architects’ of the fi-
nancial adjustment) learnt what to do in order to ‘Europeanise’ Italy pro-
gressively, with particular reference to public finances, welfare and labour
markets. Before turning to the second challenge (and therefore to the specif-
ic dynamics of political learning), we will elaborate on two important phases/
aspects of the anchoring process: the decision that made this process virtual-
ly irreversible, i.e. the entry into the ems in 1978; and its ‘external side’, i.e.
the contribution given by the Italian architects to the development of the Eu-
ropean institutions and rules, and thus of the so-called vincolo esterno.
These questions deserve our attention in the first place since they are not
well known, but also because they allow us to understand unexpected con-
nections between the old circle of ‘vices’ and the new circle of ‘virtues’, in
the dynamics of the First and the Second Republic.
As we have shown in the second chapter, the entry into the ems in Decem-
ber 1978 was the result of an exceptional performance of the fourth An-
dreotti executive, followed by the breaking off of the so-called ‘national sol-
idarity’ pact between Christian Democrats and Communists. Busy as it was
in searching for a third way between Western-type capitalism and Soviet-
type socialism, the Communist Party strongly opposed entry into the new
monetary regime. The periodical ‘Rinascita’ (linked to the pci) stamped it
as an attempt to bind Italy’s hands to those countries ‘still more crudely
class-centred than our own’. Constrained by the main ally of the coalition
(the pci), the Christian Democrat Prime Minister Andreotti was forced to
say ‘no’ to Brussels, when on the 5th of December 1978 the other member
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states (with the exception of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ire-
land) signed the agreement. But once back in Rome, Andreotti searched for
votes within Parliament and found them on the right. On the 13th of De-
cember, 270 members of the Parliament voted in favour of the agreement
(including neo-Fascists and liberals), 218 voted against. How was this dra-
matic choice forged, foreboding virtuous implications for the Italian econo-
my? A detailed account of this story still has to be written8. We know that
the Bank of Italy (i.e. the circle of architects) played an important role, but
when the game became tougher (and the executive was on the verge of a cri-
sis) Andreotti and foreign minister Forlani (i.e. two historical leaders of the
dc) were the ones who decided to go ahead. Were they inspired by far-sight-
edness, noble intentions and incorruptible Europeanism? Maybe, but it is
possible that they acted to pursue specific political advantages. The em-
brace with the Communist Party was becoming politically stifling and more
and more costly in terms of economic resources and international credibili-
ty. To choose a ‘European’ issue to break with the Communists was not very
risky in terms of electoral support (indeed, it could have positive implica-
tions), while the activation of a rather strict external constraint would help
to keep the Socialist Party (psi) in check, which was an ally necessary to
form any government coalition, but was also undisciplined in political and
programmatic perspective – also because of the competition coming from
the left. Craxi was not enthusiastic of the ems, and embraced the cause of
austerity only when he was elected Prime Minister. If this interpretation is
correct, then we need to highlight a connection, even if it is a weak one, be-
tween the logic of functioning of the First Republic and the process of finan-
cial adjustment that took off seriously only after the end, paradoxically, of
the First Republic itself: the political ‘yield’ of the European choices of the
parties which governed that Republic (and in particular the dc) was a pre-
condition of the virtuous circle and the dynamics of substantive and proce-
dural learning that have anchored Italy definitively to the European Union.
The external side of this anchorage is not very well known or appreciated
either. It is true that the flux of ideas (values, knowledge, institutional tech-
niques, and so on) from Europe to Italy has been much more intense and rel-
evant than the flux in the opposite direction. Yet the rhetoric that has depict-
ed Europe as a constraint has had the effect of obfuscating the tiring and
complex game of attack and defence (mainly the latter) played by many Ital-
ian political actors (within both circles mentioned above) since 1979 on-
wards, in various ec fora of decision-making. We are referring, for exam-
ple, to the enervating negotiations on the lira’s re-alignments within the
ems during the 1980s, or to those on the contents and timing of implemen-
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tation of the long series of directives aimed at the completion of the Internal
Market.
The decision-making process that led to the Single Act and some of its con-
tents were also substantially conditioned by the Italian initiative: it was
Craxi who started the process during the Council of Ministers in 1985 in
Milan (which had to decide upon the launching of constitutional revision
through an intergovernmental conference), isolating a recalcitrant and furi-
ous Thatcher. Also, on this external front of Europeanisation several diag-
noses and projects were necessary to protect Italian interests. Furthermore,
it was essential to learn what to do (and how) in order to condition the ec
agenda, to avoid its definition solely on the side of other countries, not so
much against Italian aspirations as against Italy’s institutional capacities.
The most difficult challenge occurred at the beginning of the 1990s, dur-
ing the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty and on the Economic and
Monetary Union in particular. Ciampi (as Governor of the Bank of Italy),
Carli (as Minister of the Treasury), De Michelis (as Minister of the Foreign
Affairs) and, once more, Andreotti (as Prime Minister) had to pursue two
different and – in a sense – contradictory objectives: 1) to define rather rigid
and specific deadlines and procedures with respect to the realisation of the
third phase of the emu, so as to introduce a credible commitment towards
the deepening of integration on the side of the stronger countries (such as
Germany, above all) and, at the same time, to forge an external constraint
strong enough to stimulate the financial adjustment of the weakest coun-
tries; and 2) to avoid the establishment of too prohibitive criteria, which
could mean the relegation of Italy into a sort of Europe of second division
(Ferrera 1991; Dyson and Featherstone 1996). To reach the first objective,
the Italian negotiators first of all had to defend themselves against the
British proposals: Mrs. Thatcher pushed for the consolidation of a system
based on the competition between currencies and opposed any formal com-
mitment to move towards a common currency. The British resistance was
wisely circumvented in the second quarter of 1990, when Andreotti, as
President of the European Council, managed to isolate Thatcher (once
more) in the Rome Summit, which established that the beginning of the sec-
ond phase of the emu was the 1st of January 1994. A short while later, how-
ever, during the negotiations on the Treaty, the strongest countries formed a
new front against the establishment of an ‘automatic’ deadline for the third
and decisive phase. The efforts of the Italian negotiators on this front (with
their French allies) were decisive: it was for the most part the pressures exer-
cised by Andreotti and Mitterrand during the last round of negotiations be-
fore Maastricht that determined the establishment of the 1st of January
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1999 as the ultimate ‘automatic’ deadline for the creation of the Euro.
Retrospectively, considering the hesitations of Germany in the course of
1997, we need to appreciate the importance of that decision.
In order to reach the second objective (i.e. to avoid overly strict conver-
gence criteria, given the general conditions of Italian public finances) the
Italian negotiators had to contrast the powerful fire of the Bundesbank,
which aimed at creating a sort of Germanised Union with respect to its tar-
gets (price stability, absence of public deficits, and so on) as well as institu-
tions (an independent European Central Bank, free from any political con-
ditioning), and at imposing the Deutschmark as the anchor of the ems. On
this front, an important battle was fought against the proposals advanced
by the Dutch Presidency in 1991. These proposals called for a set of conver-
gence criteria based on automatic thresholds which were completely out of
reach for Italy, and suggested that the third phase start in 1997, with the
agreement of only six countries. This, in practice, meant that Italy would
have been excluded. Carli brought a vigorous attack against the Dutch plan
(which was also supported by Germany), defining as ‘aberrating’ the idea of
an automatic inclusion/exclusion, based on arithmetic criteria, without tak-
ing into account the real size, and thereby the actual relevance of a specific
country within the context of the ec. Carli and De Michelis also opposed
the quorum of six countries for the 1997 deadline. Although they accepted
the principle of quantitative convergence criteria, the two Italian ministers
insisted on the interpretation of the criteria in evolutionary rather than stat-
ic terms. They asked, in other words, that variables such as inflation or
deficit be considered not at a certain moment, but that their evolution over
time be taken into account. This would have allowed those countries that
followed a path of convergence to be included, even if they didn’t comply ex-
actly with the quantitative requirements. Carli also insisted that the quorum
necessary for the launch of phase iii be raised from six to seven countries.
This would increase the chances of inclusion for Italy. The proposals of Car-
li, supported by France and the Commission, were eventually included in
the Treaty (articles 104c and 109j). In conclusion, it was Andreotti’s last ex-
ecutive that shaped the emu so that Italy could realistically join the Euro-
group – even if by means of impressive efforts.
As in the case of the ems, the story of the Italian initiatives (proposals, at-
tempts, mistakes, re-elaborations) aimed at influencing the decisions of the
European Union during the last, delicate twenty years of deepening and
widening still has to be written. It is likely that such a reconstruction could
confirm, in general, the impression of a less enterprising and effective mem-
ber state than its role of ‘big fourth’ could potentially involve. But the Italian
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voice, at least in some critical conjunctures, has been loud and successful.
That vincolo esterno which played such an important role in Italy’s adjust-
ment cannot be thought of as totally exogenous. And since in some occa-
sions Italy’s opinions were voiced by protagonists of the First Republic, we
may observe here a further connection between the circle of ‘vices’ and the
circle of ‘virtues’.
4 The political dilemmas of the ‘Olive Tree’coalition
The second process of learning involved the question of how to get the re-
forms passed. As we have previously noted, the project of financial adjust-
ment ‘in the name of Europe’ began to be implemented in the 1980s: the di-
vorce between the Central Bank and the Ministry of the Treasury, the new
budgetary procedures, the measures of financial management of health
care, and so on. The first measures introduced were the least visible, as they
were aimed at affecting the capacity to govern economic policy as a whole,
rather than the deficit spending due to specific policies or to the rigidity and
bad functioning of the labour market. The attempts to intervene on the lat-
ter fronts were much less effective: this is why earlier we referred to the
‘chaotic’ restructuring of welfare and to the ‘uncertain’ deregulation of the
labour market in the 1980s. Indeed, for the government only one clear-cut
signal came from the hard game of politics: keep your hands off the welfare
state, don’t touch social benefits! At the end of the 1980s, the ‘public expen-
diture party’ (largely criss-crossing the official party lines) was still very
strong: in critical conjunctures of policy-making, it commanded enough re-
sources to veto any substantial alteration of the distributive status quo.
The window of opportunity to introduce more incisive changes opened up
in 1992, due to the external and internal dynamics we have already de-
scribed. The feeling of urgency created by the financial crisis of that summer
and by the new European deadlines, the delegitimation of the old establish-
ment, the restructuring of the party system and the reinforcement of the ex-
ecutive led to a series of wide-ranging reforms. After the victory at the level
of ideas, the coalition of architects of the financial adjustment obtained new
resources to implement their objectives within a few months. In the public
policy arena the game based on ideas is always a power game too: as Müller
writes (1995), the prise de parole is at the same time a prise de pouvoir. In
Italy in 1992-1993 this coincidence however took a very strong form: many
architects were invited to enter the very shrine of executive power, i.e. the
central cabinet. Repositioning of the actors in the decision-making arena
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obviously played an important role. But it was only the first step of a new
game, explicitly aimed at influencing the material interests of wide social
(and electoral) constituencies. And this game, too, may be read in terms of
learning: ‘puzzling on how to power’, using the formula discussed in Chap-
ter i. There is an evident dynamic of ‘operational conditioning’ that led the
architects of financial adjustment (many of whom in the meanwhile had
taken up roles of political leadership: Ciampi, Dini and Prodi, to name only
Prime Ministers) to shape the contents, modalities and timing of the re-
forms, taking into account their political and social feasibility. On the other
hand, the dynamic of ‘operational conditioning’ persuaded the advocates of
the status quo (and the trade unions in particular) to accept these same con-
tents, modalities and timing, acknowledging the negative consequences of a
strategy based on vetoes and thus altering their very preferences.
After the fall of the Berlusconi government, in December 1994, it became
clear that also in the new institutional context the reforms could not be
made by means of antagonistic politics, consisting of direct confrontations
with organised interests. It was therefore essential to work out certain com-
promises with these interests. The post-Berlusconi governments began two
different strategies in order to build up the necessary consensus: on the one
hand, they stressed all the medium-term advantages of the entry into the
Euro, and particularly the advantages for trade unions and employers; on
the other, they elaborated a new discourse in support of financial adjust-
ment, in order to further delegitimise the status quo, and make the reform
more acceptable to the trade unions at the symbolic level.
The first effort (which may be considered an example of policy-making
aimed at a form of ‘sequential equity’: first the stick, and then the carrot)
(Barney and Ouchi 1984) led to the acceptance of a large number of subtrac-
tive policies (above all restrictions on social benefits) in exchange for more
or less specific promises for the medium-to-long term (such as the use of the
savings on the debt-service due to the Euro in order to develop and relaunch
employment, particularly in the South, the reduction of social and fiscal
burdens for the employers, etc.). As we will see in more detail in the next sec-
tion, the Amato, Ciampi and Dini agreements (1992-1995) represent the
subtractive part, while the Pact for Work of the Prodi government and the
D’Alema Pact for Development (1996-1998) represent the compensatory
part of this strategy.
The second effort aimed at adding arguments in terms of equity to those
based on considerations of efficiency (such as the entry into emu to adjust
public finances and restoring the whole Italian economy to health): welfare
reform was to be pursued because it would restore a new balance between
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categories which are well protected (the garantiti) and those not protected,
between ‘fathers’ and ‘sons’, between ‘compensations’ and ‘opportunities’,
and so on. Even if these statements were sincere and their arguments objec-
tively relevant, if we consider Italy’s welfare system in comparative perspec-
tive9, we have to acknowledge that this new discourse had an important
communicative and co-ordinative function (Schmidt 2000) not only in or-
der to publicly legitimate the reforms, but also to consolidate relations be-
tween the government and the trade unions.
The Dini and Prodi governments in particular are responsible for this op-
eration of symbolic and normative redefinition of the risanamento. Both
governments were backed by the main party of the left – who had its own
ministers within the Prodi cabinet, for the first time in the history of the Re-
public. Thus, both Dini and Prodi had the possibility of passing reforms that
were unpopular in the eyes of the trade unions. It is a syndrome known with-
in the literature on welfare as ‘Nixon goes to China’. Just as it took a hyper-
conservative politician such as Nixon to persuade the American Congress to
normalise relations with China, it is easier for left-wing parties to persuade
trade unions to reform the welfare state (Ross 1998). When they try to push
through reforms, such parties can also take advantage of a relatively benign
treatment on the side of the opposition: the centre-right can speak for bolder
reforms but would find it difficult to adopt a strategy of boycott. During the
1990s, the ‘Nixon goes to China’ approach was adopted by many other Eu-
ropean centre-left governments, which justified their reforms as measures
aimed at substituting past ‘vices’ (overly generous pensions, passive unem-
ployment benefits, poverty and unemployment traps, and so on) by means of
new ‘virtues’ (such as a contributory pension formula, funded forms of fi-
nancing, active labour policies, fight against social exclusion, etc.) (Levy
1999a; 1999b). Of course, such operations were (and are still) very prob-
lematic. Welfare reform ‘from the left’ needs a number of contortions at the
ideological-programmatic and political-electoral level. It also means taking
a difficult path, step by step (with some steps backwards), by means of re-
peated attempts, revisions, and revisions of revisions: with obvious conse-
quences in terms of coherence, efficiency and effectiveness of the reforms.
But alternative political paths were and still are extremely difficult in all
‘consensual’ democracies – which are the norm in Europe. It is no coinci-
dence that the only two countries in which conservative governments carried
out important and incisive welfare reforms in the 1990s are majoritarian
democracies such as the United Kingdom (where the Conservatives were in
power until 1997) and New Zealand: that is, democracies with a very limit-
ed number of veto players in the decision-making process. Within consensu-
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al democracies, the passing of social reforms during the Maastricht decade
seems to have been easier in the presence of ‘lib-lab’ coalitions, inclined to
reconcile the reasons of efficiency and innovation with those of equity. The
protagonists of the Dutch miracle of the 1990s were ‘purple’ governments
led by socialists (represented by the colour red) and liberals (represented by
the colour blue). “The Third Way” project, which became so popular
among centre-left governments in the second half of the 1990s, can after all
be seen as an attempt at recasting the dilemmas of welfare reform in a sym-
bolic frame resting on a virtuous combination of efficiency and justice, com-
petitiveness and solidarity (Giddens 2001), also with a view to smoothening
trade union opposition to welfare reforms.
But let us return to the Italian case. The efforts described above, making
the restrictive provisions more palatable, allowed the Dini and Prodi gov-
ernments to get ever closer to the trade unions and obtain their confidence.
The unions, on their part, took some steps towards compromise, abandon-
ing the strategy of vetoes, softening up their position and eventually con-
verting themselves to a reformist path. The turning point occurred in the
winter of 1995, during the negotiations on the Dini pension reform. As we
have already explained, in those frantic months the trade unions changed
their position rapidly, elaborating their own articulated platform of initia-
tives. Dropping the Berlusconi draft reform plan, the Dini government actu-
ally took the union draft reform as the starting point for negotiations, and
union experts informally assisted ministerial technicians in each phase of
the drafting of the final bill (Regalia and Regini 1998). But it was under the
blows of the international markets – that worsened the lira’s exchange rate
day after day, obliging the Bank of Italy to raise interest rates, with heavy
consequences for the public budget – that the trade unions ultimately con-
vinced themselves that the status quo was no longer sustainable. During the
first three months of the Dini government (January-March 1995), the
spread between interests on Italy’s and Germany’s state bonds (the ‘btp’
and the ‘Bund’) reached an impressive peak of almost seven base points, up
from three base points of only a year before; in the same months, the proba-
bility assigned by markets (e.g. jp Morgan’s ‘emu calculator’) to Italy’s ad-
mission into the emu by 1999 was as low as 0.127 (Chiorazzo and Spaventa
1999). In other words, the lesson for the trade unions was: there is no status
quo, but a declining trend that is rapidly leading to an abyss unless we agree
on a credible pension reform capable of re-assuring the markets on Italy’s
risanamento. In the first months of 1995, Italian economic and social poli-
cy-making started to function as a sort of ‘Skinner box’, where the interna-
tional markets produced stimuli in terms of variations of the lira’s value and
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of interest rates10. In this case too, the logic of operational conditioning
pushed the trade unions towards compromise. In May, Law no. 335/1995
(the Dini reform) was approved. The opposition (i.e. Berlusconi) abstained
from the final vote: but during the negotiations it displayed a reasonably col-
laboratively stance (Cazzola 1995). The reform was positively received by
international markets. In early 1996, the btp/Bund spread had dropped to
four points, and the probability of emu entry had increased to 0.527. After
Prodi’s new reform in the autumn of 1997 (in the framework of the financial
law for 1998), the spread reduced further to less than one point and the
probability of admission jumped to 0.96. Between 1995 and 1997 the aver-
age cost of public debt declined from 9.2 to 7.9 per cent of gdp11.
In addition to the factors mentioned above, the dynamics of political
learning of the 1990s were sustained and fed by the system of rules and deci-
sion-making practices that is called concerted action (concertazione). Con-
certed action primarily promoted an environment of trust among the differ-
ent actors, enabling them to discover mutually advantageous paths of
change – or at least to avoid turning a single actor into a firescreen against
popular discontent. Let us complete our interpretative reconstruction by
examining in greater detail the system of concerted action and its contribu-
tion to the process of financial adjustment.
5 The return of concerted action in the 1990s
Within the mainstream literature on neo-corporatism, Italy has always
been considered the least corporatist country in Europe. During the 1970s
debate, it was conceived as a case of weak corporatism, at the bottom of in-
ternational classifications, lacking in all the essential functional require-
ments: a strong state, cohesive and centralised interest groups monopolising
the representation of interests, and a pro-labour government (Schmitter
1974; Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1984; Streeck and Schmitter 1985). A sec-
ond generation of studies then tried to rehabilitate the cases in which corpo-
ratism seemed absent, showing how concerted action can develop even
without these functional requirements, as in the United Kingdom at the end
of the 1970s, or in Italy during the 1970s and the 1980s (Goldthorpe 1984;
Regini 1989; 1991).
More recently a good number of scholars have concentrated their atten-
tion on the wave of corporate agreements that spread throughout Europe
during the second half of the 1990s, after the debate had spoken of the
death, or anyway decline, of corporatism (Schmitter and Grote 1997; Wiar-
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da 1997; Gualmini 1997a; 1997b; Salvati 2000). The idea of a new ‘social
contract’ (Rhodes and Meny 1997), centred upon an unusual combination
between deregulation and cost containment, on the one hand, and the main-
tenance of consensus, on the other, led to a sort of ‘third way’ of welfare reg-
ulation: this was situated somewhere between unrestricted capitalism and
state management, and was favoured by several European leaders. The
Dutch model, based on a combination of concerted action, flexibility, wel-
fare reform and wage moderation became a benchmark.
Some writers compared this to the tireless efforts of Sisyphus, charac-
terised by constant, wave-like movement (Schmitter and Grote 1997). The
idea of waves, that is periodical swings between concerted action designed
to produce a mixture of co-ordination, control and consensus, and a strate-
gy of deregulation, designed on the contrary to remove the restrictions im-
posed by institutions (Regini 1999), seems to fit the Italian case quite nicely:
agreements employed as tools, constantly available in the tool box of vari-
ous governments, and dusted down to be used during periods of socio-eco-
nomic crisis.
In Italy concerted political action, rather than being associated with the
political hues of government cabinets (which did not actually change very
much throughout the entire lifetime of the First Republic), has always been
a response to the aggravation of economic conditions, and as such a specific
reaction to the need to construe consensus in order to get ordinary and ex-
traordinary policy decisions passed. Furthermore, the chronic inefficiency
of the parliamentary arena with regard to the provision of laws aimed at
problem-solving led to the search for functional replacements. The Italian
Parliament has always suffered from an extreme sluggishness in the policy-
making process. This is due not only to the high fragmentation and internal
divisions of party coalitions, but also to certain structural elements: in par-
ticular, the duplication of the legislative process between the two Houses
(the Chamber and the Senate) as a result of the ‘perfect bi-parliamentary’
model, and an intense activity of obstructionism. The latter was a perverse
effect of parliamentary regulations granting veto powers to all minor par-
ties and fostering cross-house alliances between the majority and the oppo-
sition. The slow decision-making process of the Parliament, frustrating as
well as distant from the real social and economic problems of Italy, pro-
duced sectorial provisions and regulations. Concerted action to some extent
substituted the Parliament for the elaboration of the main reforms of eco-
nomic and social policy. It had a strong pragmatic and contingent orienta-
tion, in the absence of alternative decision-making circuits12.
This particular mix between the logic of political exchange and the logic
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of problem-solving (i.e. of mutual information and learning) – as we have al-
ready underlined in Chapter i – particularly suits the Italian case where
trade unions and business associations were able, especially in the 1990s, to
provide the governments (weakened as they were by the events of Tangen-
topoli) strategic and relational information (Culpepper 2002) on the possi-
ble solutions to emergency problems. The dialogic capacity of interest
groups was exercised both internally and externally, i.e. towards their rank-
and-file in order to make them accept the contents of negotiated reforms,
and towards the government in order to support it in the formulation and
design of effective policy recipes.
However, action varied throughout the decade. Agreements emerged
from a series of trials and errors producing two kinds of results. On the one
hand, this sequence spurred a learning process, transferring to the actors in-
volved the capacity and experience to plan effective solutions to the prob-
lems on the agenda, on the basis of their technical know-how as well as their
capacity to persuade and mobilise their members; on the other hand, it in-
duced a gradual institutionalisation of the architecture and logic of func-
tioning of that specific model of decision-making, by means of the strength-
ening of the democratic procedures of the unions’ internal decision-making,
which allowed increasing participation and discussion by the rank-and file
(Baccaro 2002). As a first effect, then, the stability of the decision-making
context, the need to maintain the promises already made, the character of a
repeated game, based on an agreement that originates other subsequent
agreements – i.e. a series of conditions guaranteed by concerted action –
produced a sense of loyalty and reciprocal commitment among the partici-
pants, reducing the possibility of defection and free riding, while fostering
the activity of reform13. As a second effect, concerted action worked some-
how to regenerate itself; starting from the Amato, Ciampi and Dini agree-
ments on labour costs and social security, right up to the D’Alema agree-
ment in 1998, more and more specific rules were formally introduced, rein-
forcing not only the development of a model of policy-making based on
pacting, but also its rhetoric and its legitimation in political discourse.
But let us take a closer look at the sequence of negotiations that took place
during the 1990s and its process features. It is possible to identify two dis-
tinct phases marked by different economic contexts, contents and power re-
lationships among the participants (see Table 5.1). The first phase can be de-
fined as ‘emergency political exchange ‘, encouraged by the technical gov-
ernments of transition, covering the Amato, Ciampi and Dini agreements
(1992-1995). During this phase the first moves were made by the technical
governments, which intentionally searched for the help and support of the
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social partners, since they could not turn to Parliament (seriously delegiti-
mated by the events of Tangentopoli)14. Organised interests tended to re-
place political parties at that time, and were given the chance to openly do
what they had been doing in a more secret manner up until then: provide the
keys and formulas of economic and social policy (in lieu of parties), using in-
formational resources and mediating powers developed and put to the test
inside the associations themselves. The contents of the agreements were for
the most part subtractive: wage moderation, restriction of the automatic
wage and social benefit indexation, and the freeze on hirings in the public
sector, all designed to fall in line with the emu15. As has been shown by Bac-
caro (2002), workers accepted to comply with these agreements since they
had been involved in internal discussions and in deliberative referenda at the
plant-level.
The second phase, highly connected to the first one (indeed, impossible
without the first one), can be defined as ‘institutionalised political ex-
change’. Power relationships among the actors and contents of the pacts
changed: political prime ministers (Prodi and D’Alema) leading the first
pro-labour governments took the place of technical prime ministers; eco-
nomic conditions were no longer alarming, with the emergence of the first
benefits of the efforts made over recent years. Political parties started to re-
organise themselves and take more active part in the debate on employment
policies (as was clearly evident in the Parliamentary battles concerning the
approval of the Treu law or the introduction of the 35-hour week). The
number of representative organisations signing the agreement grew (reach-
ing a total of 32 for the so-called Christmas Pact of 1998)16. This modified
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Table 5.1 Concerted action in the 1990s
Emergency political exchange Institutionalised political exchange 
1992-1995 1996-1998
Actors technical governments (first movers) pro-labour political governments
trade unions and business larger no. of trade unions and business 
associations organisations
absence of parties partial return of political parties
Contents subtractive policies policies for local and economic develop-
(wage moderation,welfare cuts) ment
forced financial adjustment active labour policies
‘shared’financial adjustment
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scenario allowed for the continuation of consensual co-operation, adopting
diversified targets: concerted action turned from restrictive policies to poli-
cies of development (active labour and local promotion policies), which be-
came a sort of reward for previous sacrifices (still in an overall dynamic of
learning through trial and error or rather through sacrifices and compensa-
tions). The problem of workers’ legitimation and involvement was paradox-
ically less important in this second phase – since the agreements did not sub-
tract but tried to distribute resources. But at the same time the lack of a
widespread mobilisation and internal collective discussion within firms
somehow lessened the symbolic and substantive strength of the agreements.
This is especially true of the Christmas Pact signed with the D’Alema gov-
ernment, which was bound to remain largely unimplemented.
Concerted emergency action began in 1992, amidst a national outcry over
the Tangentopoli scandal, the ensuing renewal of the entire political class,
and a sudden fiscal and monetary crisis. This situation constituted the back-
ground to the first consensual pact, ten years after the last experience of tri-
angular political exchange (1983-1984). A technical government led by
Amato summoned trade unions and business associations in order to work
out a solution to the economic crisis and the increasingly difficult process of
European integration. As we have already shown in Chapter iii, within a
few months Amato had passed one of the biggest financial adjustment mea-
sures of the entire post-war period. Thanks to this manoeuvre, for the first
time in years a stop could be put to the rise in debt service; the lira was in the
wake of a heavy devaluation, the government, trade unions and business as-
sociations signed a wide-ranging agreement designed to reduce inflation
and slow wage claims. The most visible results of the social pact were the
abolition of the scala mobile (indexing wages to the cost of living) and a
wage freeze in 1992 and 1993. The Amato agreement, like that in Wasse-
naar in the Netherlands ten years earlier, represented a watershed with re-
gard to industrial relations and the decision-making style of the previous
decade, and led to protest among workers, who saw the abolition of the
scala mobile as the end of an era, the end of a symbol of the trade union
movement for half a century. The agreement was in fact signed on the 31st
of July, but it forced the cgil leader Trentin to resign. As was the case in
1984, a fierce opposition rose inside the cgil, especially on the side of self-
organised groups of rank-and-file (the so-called ‘autoconvocati’). Their
protest was related on the one hand to the hierarchical and scarcely democ-
ratic style of policy-making produced by concerted action and on the other
to the ban of plant-level bargaining. In some cities of the north, this part of
the agreement was declared invalid, and union representatives were able to
143the return of concerted action in the 1990s
Rescued by Europe  19-12-2003  20:55  Pagina 143
force management to sign decentralised company-level agreements. The na-
tional leader of the cgil decided to sign the agreement all the same, before
exiting from the scene.
Just one year later, the overall industrial relations scenario radically
changed, and the signature of the Ciampi agreement was both politically
accepted and substantially feasible. Despite the monetary storm in Septem-
ber 1992, Ciampi followed in his predecessor’s path with a further extraor-
dinary budgetary manoeuvre and wage negotiations. The Ciampi pact con-
firmed the abolition of the wage index, completely reformed the structure
of collective bargaining, and established a strict incomes policy. Incomes
policy, indeed, became a fundamental instrument of economic policy de-
signed to achieve a more equitable distribution of incomes by containing
labour costs, inflation and nominal incomes, and promoting job creation
and firm competitiveness. The two budgetary sessions (May/June and Sep-
tember), in fact, were to guarantee the link with the Document of Economic
and Financial Planning (dpef) and the financial law (cf. Chapter iii).
Notwithstanding some internal tensions, the ‘autoconvocati’ movements
did not mobilise this time, because of the higher attention to union democ-
racy. The reform of the factory-based union representatives’ election was
included in the pact with the aim to pursue regular turnover and binding
consultations among the workers on the most important economic and so-
cial matters.
The same emergency approach which led to the return of concerted action
within the labour market and industrial relations was applied to pension
policy. As already illustrated above, the reform of welfare appeared on the
political agenda between 1992 and 1993. The 1992 Amato decree regard-
ing pensions had introduced some important modifications but had not
changed the most important features of the pension system. Thus, a com-
plete reorganisation of the pension system had to be negotiated with the
unions and business associations. The involvement of the latter, and their
admission to the decision-making arena, was necessary in order to avoid the
devastating effects of serious social conflict. Once again, it was Ciampi who
made the first move, in the form of dialogue and mediation with the trade
unions and the Confederation of Italian Industry, in order to map out a con-
sensual platform for the revision of the pension system (Ciampi 1996).
The Ciampi government, however, did not last very long since the reform
of the national voting system was approved and paved the way for new elec-
tions, and Ciampi’s successor, Berlusconi, opted for an alternative approach
to concerted action, introducing provisions designed to abolish seniority
pensions into the 1995 financial law. Trade unions rose up in arms against
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this unilateral move, and the subsequent general strike led to the removal of
such provisions. Trade unions, therefore, offered a further demonstration of
the powerful role they continued to play in economic and social policy-mak-
ing, not only as joint decision-makers, but also as leaders of the opposition
to the centre-right government. Once again, Parliament was literally by-
passed.
It was no coincidence that another technical government, the Dini execu-
tive, started to bargain with the unions and business associations once
again. The consensus obtained by Dini regarding pension reforms was only
a partial one, since the Confederation of Italian Industry did not sign this
agreement, which it saw as doing too little in terms of economic and finan-
cial reform.
The unions on the contrary engaged themselves in the organisation of a
wide wave of assemblies and debates among the workers (about 42,000)
that eventually led to a secret ballot referendum. In addition, they tried to
reach a compromise with the government, accepting the reform of the pen-
sion formula and rejecting the abolition of seniority pensions for strenuous
and hazardous jobs. Almost four and a half million workers voted, and 64
per cent declared themselves in favour of the reform (Baccaro 2002).
With the advent of the first centre-left government, led by Romano Prodi,
certain significant changes were made to the exchange between government
and the unions and business associations. On the one hand, the experience
of previous years could not be radically disrupted, of course, by a govern-
ment that was substantially pro-labour; on the other hand, however, the
state of the economy and public finances were already displaying the first
positive results of the decisions taken up to that moment (the public debt
service and inflation were already falling). The only thing to do was to con-
tinue with concerted action, which the parties involved were already used
to, and to improve its form and content. The Prodi government’s Employ-
ment Agreement (1996) and the D’Alema government’s Economic Develop-
ment Agreement (1998) introduced other innovations in addition to the
usual policy of wage moderation: these included active labour policies and
local development policies, in particular in favour of the south of Italy. Pow-
er relationships within the decision-making arena now changed: the domi-
nance of trade unions, as a result, of business associations was partly weak-
ened by the return of political parties, whose leaders engaged in a hard bat-
tle over the question of employment flexibility.
The role of unions seemed to be less crucial than in the emergency period.
The innovations introduced by the Employment Agreement – above all on
vocational training – were largely agreed upon, with the exception of tem-
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porary work which was strongly contrasted in Parliament by Rifondazione
Comunista and by some parts of the cgil17.
In order to introduce it in the Treu Law of June 1997, the government had
to satisfy the demands made by Rifondazione Comunista and provide con-
spicuous funds for subsidised welfare provisions in the southern regions
(work fellowships and socially useful jobs).
Consequently, the revival of political parties and a friendly government,
on the one hand, and an institutional framework ready to be used for the
purposes of concerted action, on the other, enabled government, the unions
and business associations to continue to co-operate in an atmosphere of
growing loyalty and reciprocal trust.
The development of concerted action came to its apex and at the same time
to its last act with the D’Alema agreement regarding the economy and eco-
nomic development (December 1998 – the so-called ‘Christmas Agree-
ment’), which represented a sort of final balance of the long series of ex-
changes and negotiations of the 1990s, and established the rules and regula-
tions to empower the concerted modalities of policy-making. The concerted
action approach emerged strongly reinforced, in keeping with the guidelines
of the 1993 agreement, and now extended to numerous representative asso-
ciations besides the three main trade union confederations (cgil, uil and
cisl), and covered a number of issues which had previously been debated
only at the local level. The agreement was defined as the new Constitution of
concerted action, just as the 1993 agreement had been seen as the new Con-
stitution of industrial relations (Carinci 1999).
Three different levels of concerted action were established: the first re-
garded negotiations on the welfare state based on the government – trade
unions – employers triangle; the second level concerned those relations be-
tween workers and companies that do not require the intervention of gov-
ernment; the third level covered the domestic implementation of European
directives. The scope of concerted action was therefore widened; it was de-
signed to intervene during the so-called ascending and descending stages of
European decision-making, in the formulation of national laws, in the set-
ting up of regional and local policies, and in the design of social, environ-
mental and development policies (D’Alberti 1999).
However, notwithstanding great expectations and the promises made, the
D’Alema agreement was the final instance of Italian corporatism seen up to
the end of 2001. It was never really implemented; very few measures were
translated into law, and the new consensual style of decision-making sud-
denly came to an end. Entry into the emu seemed to be the last issue on
which consensus was needed; after that, no other shared goal appeared on
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the political stage (Bellardi 1999; Ghera 1999), not even under the aegis of a
pro-labour government, with Amato taking over from D’Alema. Moreover,
the change of the rules of the concertation game within the D’Alema’s pact,
that is the widening of the circle of actors involved (which meant the weak-
ening of the role of federal unions), somehow suspended the experience.
The arrival of the centre-right governing coalition in May 2001 has
opened a new phase for the concertazione and, indeed, for the whole nation-
al system of policy-making.
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VI Rescued,but Still Free to Harm Itself
1 A new virtuous circle: but how stable?
If what matters, in the history of a country, are the big turning points, i.e.
the evolutionary junctures through which a specific path is chosen instead
of another one, then the turbulent 1990s were a successful decade for Italy.
Through an impressive sequence of reforms, the country was able to im-
prove the conditions of its battered public finances and start an incisive mod-
ernisation of its backward bureaucratic apparatus, its rigid labour market
and its unbalanced welfare state, without jeopardising either social peace or
the overall competitiveness of its economy in the global context. The dy-
namics of internationalisation and (especially) European integration were
crucial in instigating this quantum leap in institutional capabilities: indeed,
the Italian experience shows that internationalisation may well be a solu-
tion rather than a problem.
Naturally, internationalisation and European integration have not been
the only factors behind this process of institutional modernisation. Other
factors have played a significant role: the sudden waning of endogenous
blocks to change (the demise of the First Republic), the rapid de-ideologisa-
tion of the political culture (in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall), as well
as its traditional pro-European-integration leanings, the emergence of new
actors (fresh politicians, experts, a new ‘technocratic’ élite), new styles of
policy-making (concerted action) and – as a result of all this – an accelerated
dynamic of social and institutional learning.
As we have illustrated in the second chapter, a major fault of the original
constellation of welfare capitalism ‘Italian-style’ was the fundamental
weakness and ‘porousness’ of the state (a deficit of legality coupled with a
deficit of efficiency and normative integration). Perhaps the 1970s and the
1980s represented the apex of a perverse syndrome where the state acted
primarily as an instrument of creation and an arena of distribution of spoils
on behalf of various social and political groups. The solution of collective
problems by means of any sort of ‘goal-oriented rationality’ was only a sec-
149
Rescued by Europe  19-12-2003  20:55  Pagina 149
ondary function, so to speak, of the state apparatus. The most important ef-
fect produced by the exogenous shocks and the European convergence
process upon the Italian political and institutional system has been exactly
to encourage the ‘hardening’ of the state and of its institutional capabilities:
the state (but also social) élite have learned that to face collective problems
and solve them effectively is a more important task (and surely a prerequi-
site) than contending for the spoils of power on behalf of their own specific
parties and social clients.
The notion of ‘learning’ (both at the level of ideas and of political and so-
cial behaviour) is particularly useful, we believe, for capturing the nature of
the changes that occurred in Italy and, above all, the internal dynamic of the
process of change. At first, in the 1970s, a belief matured that Italy needed
an incisive process of financial adjustment in order to catch up with a virtu-
ous path of economic growth and social modernisation; and the firm an-
chorage to the (then) European Community was seen as the best way (and
maybe the only way) to achieve this objective. This conviction changed into
a more precise institutional project during the 1980s, when its implications
were fully understood, and a wide-ranging agenda of reforms was set up.
The project was principally elaborated and supported by the technical cir-
cles of the Bank of Italy and the Ministry of the Treasury, and started to
spread on various sectoral policy networks. The process of convergence
started at Maastricht, and the 1992 monetary crisis persuaded a wider circle
of actors that failing the ‘financial adjustment in the name of Europe’ would
have led to very dangerous consequences. A real campaign was launched,
aimed at persuading the various interest groups (and in particular the trade
unions) to accept the reforms in view of the long-term advantages of finan-
cial adjustment: economic growth, lower debt service, and hence new pre-
cious opportunities to reduce taxes and requalify public expenditures. As
we have shown in Chapters iv and v, the campaign was successful. The re-
forms have been introduced, the Maastricht criteria have been satisfied, and
a new ‘public discourse’ on economic-social themes has started to develop
in the country: a discourse based on knowledge and reasoning, formulated
in terms of efficiency and equity instead of the old ideological clichés.
True, our positive diagnosis is predicated on the peculiarly bad shape in
which Italy found itself not only in the 1975-1990 period, but even at the
heyday of the so-called golden age of welfare capitalism. Measured against
this domestic historical record, the whole process of financial adjustment
and the final seal of emu membership cannot appear but a remarkable
achievement. If we adopt a more exacting perspective of analysis, we must
admit that the reforms of the 1990s have not fully eradicated the old vices.
150 rescued, but still free to harm itself
Rescued by Europe  19-12-2003  20:55  Pagina 150
In national public debates it is widely recognised that la transizione is not
over yet and that the innovative dynamics that emerged during the 1990s
have not reached a firm point of political and economic equilibrium. In the
remainder of this chapter, we will present and discuss the most recent phase
of the uncompleted transition, which opened with the alternation in govern-
ment in 2001.
2 Enter Berlusconi
On 13 May 2001 Silvio Berlusconi won the elections at the head of the
House of Freedom coalition (Casa delle Libertà) for the second time in a
decade. Compared to 1994, i.e. the first Berlusconi government, the politi-
cal scenario had changed remarkably. Some new elements were in fact ap-
pearing on the stage, all suggesting a strengthening of ‘bipolar democracy’
in Italy, i.e. a political system resting on the (possibility of) alternation in
government between two opposing coalitions. These new elements were: a)
the large size of the majority won by Berlusconi in both Chambers; b) the in-
ner cohesion of the coalition; c) the unchallenged leadership of Berlusconi;
and d) the fragmented and quarrelsome state of the opposition, especially
after the election.
The number of seats gained by the centre-right coalition was large both in
the lower Chamber and in the Senate, and the Berlusconi second executive
was the first in Italy to be formed as the result of a complete turnover of the
governing team. Overall, the Casa della Libertà gained 55.9 per cent of the
seats in the Senate and 59.1 per cent in the Chamber as against 40.6 per cent
and 39.2 per cent of the Olive Tree coalition. Within the centre-right coali-
tion the success of Forza Italia (Berlusconi’s own party) was considerable,
while the other parties of the coalition suffered a decline: Forza Italia gained
29.4 per cent of the vote compared to 20.6 per cent in the 1996 elections
(1996), while Alleanza Nazionale (the right-wing party led by Fini) declined
from 15.7 in 1996 to 12 per cent in 2001, the ccd-cdu (the centre-moder-
ate party, composed of former Christian Democrats) shifted from 5.8 per
cent in 1996 to 3.2 per cent in 2001, and the Lega Nord (led by Bossi) fell to
3.9 per cent compared to 10.1 per cent in 1996 (Diamanti and Lazar 2002:
61). These data reveal that Forza Italia was able to capture the largest share
of centre-moderate voters and to fill the vacuum left by the First Republic
governing parties (like the Christian Democrats and the Socialists).
The second new element of the Berlusconi government is the internal co-
hesion of the coalition itself. The downsizing of the allied parties and espe-
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cially the remarkable drop of the Lega Nord meant that – in contrast with
1994 – the risk of blackmail and vetoes was much lower. The seats of the
Lega Nord are no longer essential for government stability (while in 1994
Bossi’s demands were the main cause of the government’s fall). The forma-
tion of the executive and the distribution of posts reflected the power rela-
tionships among the parties: nine ministries were assigned to FI (four with-
out portfolio), four to Alleanza Nazionale (one without portfolio), three to
the Lega Nord (one without portfolio) and two to the ccd-cdu (both with-
out portfolio). It must be noted that in order to satisfy each party’s expecta-
tions Berlusconi had to bypass the rules introduced by the former govern-
ment, which in 1999 had reduced the number of ministries from 18 to 12:
Berlusconi increased this number to 14. The vice-premiership was assigned
to Gianfranco Fini, the leader of Alleanza Nazionale, the Presidency of the
Senate to Marcello Pera of Forza Italia and the Presidency of the Chamber to
Pier Ferdinando Casini of the centre-moderate party of the coalition (ccd-
cdu).
The third element of novelty is the undisputed centrality of Berlusconi as a
leader of the coalition. No other figure within the House of Freedoms has
ever succeeded in challenging Berlusconi, and the electoral campaign was
mainly focused on his personal characteristics and political strategies –
both on the side of the centre-right coalition and on the side of the opposi-
tion, which did not hesitate to consider Berlusconi as its main enemy and
thus target.
A few days before the elections, on 8 May, during a popular TV show
broadcast on the main state channel, Berlusconi signed a ‘contract with Ital-
ians’, indicating the main priorities of his programme: tax reduction and 
fiscal discounts to firms in case of reinvested profits, incentives for the emer-
gence of underground work, abolition of the tax due for successions and 
donations, administrative simplification, a tax amnesty for capital repatria-
tion from abroad, new rules for the conflict of interest. After the elections,
many of these policy priorities were translated in the so-called ‘100 days
law’ (no. 18/2001), including a host of measures to be implemented in the
first three months of the legislative term.
The fourth factor – no less important – of Berlusconi’s success was, as
mentioned, the internal weakness and negative performance of the Olive
Ttree coalition, which was not able to repeat the 1996 results. The main fac-
tors at the basis of the Olive Tree’s defeat have been clearly identified by the
post-election debate. The slump of the Left Democrats (from 21.1 per cent
in 1996 to 16.6 per cent in 2001) was an unexpected major event. After the
collapse of the First Republic, the Left Democrats found themselves as the
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biggest party in Italy; in May 2001 they had become the smallest left re-
formist party in Europe. The drop was partly the result of the tensions and
conflicts inside the coalition and partly the consequence of the low visibility
of the DS leaders. The President of the party and former Prime Minister
D’Alema, who was perceived inside the Olive Tree as the main culprit of the
Prodi government’s fall, maintained a low profile during the electoral cam-
paign, mainly in his constituency in Gallipoli (Apulia), while the national
secretary Veltroni had already been appointed as centre-left candidate for
the mayoral elections in Rome, after Rutelli (the incumbent mayor) had
been selected as the leader of the Olive Tree. Giuliano Amato, the incumbent
prime minister, also maintained a low profile, in order not to disturb Rutelli.
Another important reason of the Left Democrats’ defeat was the significant
success of the so-called Margherita (Daisy alliance) which assembled five
centre-left moderate parties: the Popular party, the Dini list, Prodi’s Demo-
crats and the Union of Democrats for Europe (udeur). This electoral car-
tel, led by Rutelli, who was also the direct opponent of Berlusconi, scored
14.5 per cent (only two points behind the Left Democrats). Beside the shift
of votes from the left to the centre-left of the coalition, the Olive Tree
seemed to be in great difficulty trying to contrast the centre-right leader on
the communicative point of view, valorising the positive results of the leg-
islative term that was coming to an end (like Italy’s entry into emu): a gen-
eralised sense of defeat already appeared to be widespread in centre-left cir-
cles before the elections. According to a provocative diagnosis of a protago-
nist of the Olive Tree experience, the self-inflicted weakness of the centre-
left coalition finds its roots in the incomplete ‘cultural’ conversion of the
Italian Left (and the DS in particular) to a genuine, pragmatic, European-
style social reformism (Rossi 2002). As we have seen in the previous chap-
ter, the second half of the 1990s did witness a significant discoursive turn on
the side of the Olive Tree (including many ds) leaders, and this turn was es-
sential in forging the necessary consensus for the reforms. But the cognitive
and normative re-orientation did not fully percolate throughout the whole
party apparatus, leaving significant parts of it basically unconvinced about
the new programmatic course.
The defeat of the Olive Tree must also be taken against the background of
Italy’s new electoral system. As a matter of fact, the seats gained by the
Olive Tree, added to those of Rifondazione Comunista and of Di Pietro’s
movement (one of the main judges of the ‘Clean Hands’ investigation that
had brought down the First Republic) might have become a victory, just as
had happened in 1996. However, an alliance with Rifondazione Comunista
– even only for electoral purposes- was impossible, in the wake of rc’s re-
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sponsibility in the fall of Prodi and of the ensuing radicalisation of this par-
ty’s ideological and programmatic profile: another macroscopic symptom
of the legacy of ‘polarised pluralism’ and of the incomplete cultural transfor-
mation of the Left.
The gradual consolidation of the rules of alternation and bipolarism in
Italy mixed with persisting ambiguities and contradictions within the sec-
ond Berlusconi government both in terms of the characteristics of the execu-
tive and of public policy performance.
As for the style and nature of political steering, the leadership of Berlus-
coni in the first two years of the legislative term swung between a presiden-
tial and parliamentary model of co-ordination (Verzichelli and Cotta
2003). On the one hand, the degree of autonomy and the steering capacity
of the Premier made observers underline the presidentialistic traits: for in-
stance, the high concentration of decision-making in the hands of the execu-
tive and the signature on behalf of Berlusconi of most of the laws submitted
to Parliament. On the other hand, however, in many specific circumstances
the Premier’s ability to intervene and co-ordinate executive action seemed
very weak, and the logic of parliamentary democracy seemed to prevail (e.g.
the management of the very turbulent G8 meeting in Genoa in June 2001, or
the management of two ministerial resignations, that of foreign minister
Renato Ruggiero in December 2001 and that of the Minister for the Interior
Scaiola in the spring of 2002).
But it is above all in terms of policies that ambiguities have to be highlight-
ed and examined. In the first place, the gap between Berlusconi’s program-
matic declarations and actual achievements has proved rather large. The
size and stability of its parliamentary majority would have allowed the ex-
ecutive to push through incisive changes; on the contrary the contents and
objectives of the policies introduced have appeared rather modest. During
the two first years of office, 160 measures were introduced (53 government’s
draft bills, 5 delegation laws, 44 decree laws and 58 treaty ratifications) (ibi-
dem); at least 50 per cent of these initiatives brought rather marginal policy
changes, while the remaining part included very controversial reforms, the
majority of which has still to be implemented (e.g. those on devolution, edu-
cation and university, infrastructure, judiciary organisation, telecommuni-
cation systems). As we shall see, very little has been made in the crucial area
of welfare state reform.
In addition, the first year of the Berlusconi government and a major part of
the second were occupied by some legislative initiatives which were stigma-
tised by the opposition (as well as by the international press) as directly con-
nected with Berlusconi’s private interests: i.e. the laws on company accounts
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falsification, on international rogatories, on ‘legitimate suspicion’ as a rea-
son to relocate judicial trials and the one still being discussed at the lower
Chamber on the so-called ‘conflict of interests’ – i.e. rules on the compatibil-
ity between private interests and public offices. The new discipline on com-
pany budget falsification (no. 366/2001) has significantly reduced (from 10
to 3-5 years) the prescription years for the offence and the related penalties;
that on international rogatories (367/2001) has invalidated international
inquiries and investigations which do not respect some specific formal rules,
and the one on legitimate suspicion (no. 248/2002) allows defendants to ap-
peal to a High Court in order to transfer a trial in case of suspicion about the
partiality of the judges or of local conditions supposed to disturb the pro-
ceedings. All of these initiatives can interfere with the legal action in which
Berlusconi is still currently involved.
But the issue which was mostly debated inside and outside the Parliament
is the so-called ‘conflict of interest’, originating from the problem of the
compatibility of Berlusconi’s private empire, including telecommunications
(three highly popular national tv channels), publishing, cinema production
companies, insurance and his political role as Prime Minister. A law propos-
al on the conflict of interests was already presented in the former legislative
term by the centre-left coalition, but it was not approved1. The law project
(no. 1206) presented by the second Berlusconi government has given rise to
a hot political dispute; in the centre-right’s opinion it is the best possible so-
lution, while according to the opposition it is a ‘save Berlusconi’ law. Article
2 of this project introduces the incompatibility between public offices and
business activities but not an incompatibility with the mere ownership of
such activities, thus legitimating the current situation of the Premier, who
has entrusted the control of his empire to third parties. The proposed new
law confers monitoring powers to the Antitrust Authority, which can signal
to Parliament possible situations of conflict. The Authority can also recom-
mend to Parliament measures to remedy such situations. The Olive Tree op-
position contests in particular the weakness of the sanctions foreseen (basi-
cally, symbolic reprimands) and the absence of a real incompatibility rule
between ownership and public offices. It is however true that the opposition
lost its chance to legislate a more effective discipline when in office between
1996 and 2001. The conflict of interest issue will continue to cast a dark
shadow on Italy’s incomplete institutional transition. The issue is a very del-
icate one in abstract terms (there are no univocal remedies in terms of nor-
mative theory and/or institutional engineering), and finding a solution to it
under the premiership of Berlusconi – the most prominent and immediate
target of any possible solution – is a truly daunting challenge for the still
fragile Second Republic.
155enter berlusconi
Rescued by Europe  19-12-2003  20:55  Pagina 155
On economic policy grounds, the aims of the new Berlusconi government
were promptly presented in the first Document of Economic and Financial
Planning (dpef) for the period 2002-2006, whose title was ‘From decline
to development’. According to the document, development should mainly
follow from tax reductions and a simplification of the tax system, new in-
vestment in infrastructure, labour market reform and increases in lower
pensions. The negative international conjuncture and the deep economic
crisis following September 11, 2001, together with the need to comply with
the constraints of the European Growth and Stability Pact, have made it
very difficult for the government to embark on its reform plan. In the new
scenario, Berlusconi’s agenda has been watered down, and the Finance
Minister, Giulio Tremonti, has been forced to resort to traditional ‘patch
up’ measures in order to meet the budgetary targets for 2001 and 2002 (e.g.
the freezing of recruitment in the public sector and one of the largest tax
amnesties of Italian history). Despite the difficult international context of
2002, Italy has been able to maintain its public deficit below 3 per cent in
and to slightly reduce its public debt (106.5 per cent). However, it remains
to be seen whether in the absence of structural reform (or in the wake of
destabilising structural reforms, e.g. on fiscal federalism, as we shall see)
the risanamento of the 1990s will be able to sustain itself in the coming
years.
3 Labour market reform: from concerted action to ‘social dialogue’
and flex-security?
Soon after its establishment, the Berlusconi government tried to inaugurate
a new phase in the realm of ‘concerted action’ with the trade unions. In Oc-
tober 2001 a White Book on the Labour Market was published, which criti-
cized the concertazione for its low effectiveness and innovation potential.
Rather than new trilateral, corporatist agreements, the White Book advo-
cated a new method of interaction with the social partners, dubbed as ‘so-
cial dialogue’ (a term explicitly borrowed from the eu jargon), and basically
consisting of milder forms of consultation and preventive negotiations on
economic and social policy, in which the executive reserved for itself wider
margins of manoeuvre and the role of ‘ultimate’ policy-maker. As we shall
see, mindful of its 1994 failure precisely on this front, the Berlusconi gov-
ernment did not adopt a completely confrontational and adversarial style
vis-à-vis the unions. However, it has clearly embarked upon a strategy of re-
shaping the system of relationships with the social partners, bringing it
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more in line with the changed conditions of the political system and the new
logic of bipolar and ‘quasi-majoritarian’ democracy – in a post-emergency
financial climate.
As we have explained in the previous chapters, the increasing salience of
concertazione as a policy-making method during the 1990s was the result of
three elements: 1) the historical legacy of a hyper-proportional and ‘consen-
sual’ model of democracy, in which polarised pluralism virtually blocked al-
ternation in government, but allowed at the same time numerous veto points
in policy-making; 2) the crisis of the First Republic and its main institutions
(especially parties and Parliament), in combination with pressing European
demands and deadlines for fiscal discipline; and 3) a self-sustaining dynamic
of institutionalisation, once the first social agreements were struck and
started to produce virtuous outcomes. After the 2001 elections, the first two
elements lost their systemic relevance. The House of Freedoms considered
its own victory as a seal on a new model of majoritarian democracy, primar-
ily resting on electoral (rather than corporatist) legitimation. The parlia-
mentary stability and internal cohesion of the new government, on the one
hand, and the less constraining eu environment on the other hand induced
Berlusconi to claim a primacy for executive action both vis-à-vis Parliament
and the social partners that has no precedent in post-war Italy and that pre-
supposes a downsizing of corporate channels of influence. Against this
background it is not difficult to understand why the new government has
embraced a strategy of de-institutionalisation of the concertazione, aimed
at partially dismantling the complex procedural framework foreseen by the
1998 Christmas Pact and resting on a sort of divide et impera tactic. Ac-
cording to the new ‘social dialogue’ approach, the social partners are not
completely deprived of policy-making functions, but these functions must
be exercised within the objectives and priorities set by the government and
within a perimeter of policy guidelines and solutions set – at least in a pre-
liminary and general way – by Parliament (Mania and Sateriale 2002).
The unions (and especially the cgil) certainly did not welcome Berlus-
coni’s new approach. They reacted very negatively to the White Book, both
to its procedural and to its substantive proposals, mainly oriented towards
further steps of liberalization and flexibilization of the labour market. Criti-
cism soon snowballed into an overt battle when the government asked to
Parliament for a broad delegation of powers for labour market reform, in-
cluding the modification of article 18 of the Workers’ Statute of 1970 (cf.
supra, Chapter ii). As shown in Box 1, this norm has created one of the most
protective labour regimes in Europe, and already during the 1990s a debate
had started on how to change it2. What upset the unions in the autumn of
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2001 was, however, the sudden appearance of this issue in the delegation
draft bill, without any prior discussion (not even the White Book had men-
tioned this as a priority). The unions took this move as a clear signal of hos-
tility on the side of Berlusconi, with the employers’ backing.
The government’s proposal was not particularly radical. It suggested a
derogation from article 18 in three cases: if a company with more than 15
employees ‘came out’ from the black economy with a view to regularizing its
position (starting of course from the contractual and social security posi-
tion of its employees); if a company decided to pass the threshold of 15 em-
ployees with the hiring of new regular staff; if a company transformed tem-
porary workers into permanent ones. In these three sets of circumstances,
article 18 was to be suspended for an experimental period of three years.
However, the unions declared that they could not in principle accept any
change of the status quo. On 23 March 2002, the cgil called a general
strike that mobilized about three million workers around the country under
the slogan ‘no to firing, yes to entitlements’. In the following months the
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BOX 1
Article 18 of the Workers’Statute:how it actually works
If a judge finds that a dismissal is ‘unjustified’, the worker is automatically re-integrated
into his or her job,and the employer is sentenced to pay all the wages matured until the
ruling,as well as the social security contributions and a penalty which added together vir-
tually double the payment.This outcome may originate from the first ruling,but also from
a ruling after the fourth possible appeal (6-10 years after the opening of the case). A single
negative ruling (out of the possible five) is sufficient for defeating the employer,with
damages proportional to the length of the trial. Even when the initial negative ruling is in-
validated after a few years, the employer is not allowed to get back the wages and contri-
butions paid in the meantime,which remain with the worker who is provisionally re-inte-
grated and to inps, respectively.There are no statutory limits to the amount an employer
must pay. Labour judges are responsible for interpreting the rightfulness of the cause of
dismissal. Since a single ruling of the whole proceeding may determine the overall out-
come for the employer, the intensity of the protection regime based on article 18 does not
depend on the average orientation of labour judges,but on the orientation of those who
are less benevolent to employers.
The procedures of article 18 apply to firms with more than 15 employees and thus cover
less than 10 million workers (of which 3.5 million are public employees).The remaining 12.5
million workers of Italy’s labour force are not covered and can be fired with no compensa-
tion.
(Summary from Ichino 2002)
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main Italian union radicalised its opposition against any kind of labour
market reform. But the other two unions, the cisl and the uil, softened
their stance and opened  negotiations with the government, which in its turn
manifested an openness to compromise that had not been shown in 1994.
The negotiation led to a new social agreement: the Patto per l’Italia (Pact
for Italy), signed in July 2002 by the cisl and the uil with Berlusconi and
Confindustria, the employers’ association. The Pact contained a watered-
down version of the government’s proposal regarding article 183: an agree-
ment to substantially improve both the replacement rate (from 40 per cent
to 60 per cent) and the duration (from 6 to 12 months) of the ordinary un-
employment benefit; the implementation of most of the liberalising propos-
als of the White Book; the government’s commitment to launch various ini-
tiatives for the development of the Mezzogiorno, the upgrading of human
capital, the support of lower income workers and pensioners. The cgil did
not sign the Pact: after the summer of 2002 its secretary general, Sergio Cof-
ferati, left his post to Guglielmo Epifani and has subsequently become a
prominent political figure of the centre-left opposition.
After the July agreement, parliamentary discussions on labour market re-
form resumed, and in March 2003 a broad delegation law on the labour
market was approved by Parliament. This law is referred to as the ‘Biagi
law’ (no. 30/2003), after the name of the well-known Bologna professor
and technical advisor of many Italian executives (from Prodi to Berlusconi
ii), who had inspired the White Book and who was tragically killed by the
resurrected Red Brigades on 19 March 2002. The main provisions of this
law, which has been acknowledged by the legislative decree no. 276 of 10
september 2003, are listed in Box 2. As can be seen, to a large extent these
provisions constitute further steps down the road opened by the Treu law of
1997- which according to most observers have indeed started to unblock
Italy’s labour market, allowing the creation of more than 1.5 million jobs,
especially for women and the young (Sestito 2002). Besides flexibility mea-
sures, the Biagi law foresees a further modernization of employment ser-
vices – the traditional Achilles’ heel of the Italian labour market. But, again,
it remains to be seen whether this part of the law will be actually and effec-
tively implemented, in parallel with the ameliorative reform of unemploy-
ment insurance. Without effective employment services, decent unemploy-
ment protection and serious vocational training institutions, the Italian
labour market is bound to remain for too many workers ‘a repulsive and
dangerous place’ – to use the crude but appropriate metaphor coined by
Ichino (2002). A change in article 18 will also have to be introduced at some
point in the future, in order to fully modernize Italy’s labour market along
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the lines recommended by the European Employment Strategy. It must be
remembered that, despite recent progress, Italy’s employment rates are still
far behind the targets set by the Lisbon strategy: in 2001 the total employ-
ment rate was 54.5 per cent (Lisbon target = 70 per cent), and the female
employment rate was 40.9 per cent (Lisbon target = 60 per cent) (cf. Table
1.1. in Chapter i).
The events of 2002 have not only de-institutionalised the concertazione
but also produced a rather deep split within the unions. This is not the first
time that the unions have divided themselves into two camps: in Chapter iv
we discussed the divisions of the early 1980s on the scala mobile issue. Giv-
en the presence and long-term persistence of union pluralism in Italy, such
splits should not be regarded as an anomaly, let alone a tragedy. It would be
a great pity, however, if such divisions should disperse the capital of the
problem-solving culture developed by all Italian unions during the 1990s,
i.e. their capacity to seriously puzzle on economic and social dilemmas, to
elaborate innovative proposals and to exercise forms of dialogic persuasion.
True, union pluralism works differently when a centre-right government is
in office: to paraphrase the metaphor used in Chapter v, in such case ‘it is no
longer Nixon who goes to China’, there is less trust and less willingness to
co-operate on both sides. But certainly the new political context allows for
more options that just a fierce power confrontation between juxtaposed
and rigid interests. And, more generally speaking, a divide et impera strate-
gy on the part of the government and a split response on the part of the
unions is not the only possible game of a bipolar democracy. The new epoch
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BOX 2
The Biagi Law (no. 30/2003 and d.lgs. 276/2003) on labour market reform:main provisions
–Placement reformed. Full liberalization of employment services:not only public agencies,
but also private agencies,private consultants and universities. Establishment of a nation-
al placement information system.
–New forms of contract introduced: job on call, job sharing and jobs linked to special pro-
jects.
–Staff leasing introduced:firms can lease workers from specialized agencies.
–Part-time work made more elastic,both horizontally and vertically.
–Regularization of outsourcing practices.
–Training:reform of work and training contracts and of apprenticeships;closer link be-
tween training and the fruition of unemployment benefits.
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of ‘social dialogue’ may be a transitory phase, to be sooner or later followed
by a further re-configuration of industrial relations, possibly linked to
supranational and/or sub-national developments (Mania and Sateriale
2002). In June 2003, after the failure of a national referendum on article
184, encouraging signs have emerged of a more civilised ‘social dialogue’ be-
tween the government and the social partners – including the cgil. If in the
near future unions and government reach a (further) agreement to make the
Italian labour market less ‘repulsive and dangerous’ for the millions of out-
siders through additional measures of desegmentation, this transitory phase
may even turn out to be healthier than the phase of concertazione – certainly
of its post-1998 developments. Admittedly, it is a big ‘if’. But it is not out of
reach, provided that an appropriate balance of flexibility and security is ac-
tively and seriously pursued. This requires not only a prompt implementa-
tion of the Biagi law and of the remaining parts of the Patto per l’Italia, but
also further reforms of the welfare state, to which we now turn.
4 Still a pension state? An unfinished recalibration
At the end of Chapter iv we suggested a positive assessment of the reforms
of the 1990s (at least in terms of fiscal bankruptcy avoidance), but also ar-
gued that the internal recalibration of the Italian welfare state was far from
complete: to a large extent the agenda is still that of the 1997 Onofri plan,
i.e streamlining (if not further downsizing) pensions and improving family
benefits and social services. This diagnosis seems to be widely shared among
commentators and experts – also within the Berlusconi government itself.
But since 2001 very few concrete steps have been made in this direction.
Two important reports on pensions have been produced during the 2001-
2003 period: the report of a governmental commission (the Brambilla Com-
mission), appointed with the task of ‘verifying’ the state of implementation
of the 1995 Dini reform and of trends in expenditure (Ministero del Welfare
2001); and the national strategy on pensions submitted to the eu by the Ital-
ian government in the framework of the new ‘pension process’ launched in
2002 (Ministero del Welfare 2002). Both reports recognize the progress
made through the reforms of the 1990s on three fronts: 1) short-term cost
containment and the long-term financial sustainability of the pension sys-
tem; 2) the reduction of institutional fragmentation and of unjustified dis-
parities of treatment across occupational categories; and 3) the transition
towards a more balanced, multi-pillar pension system, offering incentives
for the development of supplementary schemes.
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When the new system introduced by the Dini reform will become fully op-
erative (around 2035), Italian public pensions will become much less gener-
ous: the replacement rate will be cut from 76.9 (2000) to about 65 per cent5.
An important change is expected to take place in the same period. The so-
called ‘tfr’ (end-of-contract payment) should transform itself into a fully
fledged supplementary pension, hopefully providing approximately another
17 per cent of earnings (Ministero del Welfare 2002). After reaching the
steady state (i.e. when most pensions in payment will be based on the new
formula), the system should be able to stabilise and sustain itself, with an in-
cidence of pension expenditure on gdp of ca. 13.6 per cent (2050). Howev-
er, this scenario poses two major problems. In the first place, the transition
to the steady state is going to be very slow. The old pre-Dini formula will be
phased out gradually, i.e. it will continue to operate fully for all those work-
ers who had paid at least 18 years’ contributions in 1995. In combination
with demographic trends (the retirement of the baby boomers), this will
produce an increase of the incidence of pensions over gdp from 13.8 per
cent (2000) to 16 per cent in 2033: only thereafter will spending start to de-
cline again. This gobba (hunch) in expenditure trends raises serious finan-
cial preoccupations. The second problem is the actual take off of supple-
mentary pension funds: a development which cannot be taken for granted
given the existing legal framework and the sticky preferences of Italian
workers and employers, who are very reluctant to abandon the tfr system6.
Various proposals have been made (e.g. by the Brambilla Commission) in
order to tackle the first problem and the financial challenge linked to the
projected gobba: a faster phasing-in of the Dini formula (especially as re-
gards the notorious seniority pensions), ‘hard’ disincentives for encourag-
ing workers to postpone the decision to retire, higher contributions for the
self-employed and a complete harmonization of rules for all groups, tighter
links between the conversion coefficients of accrued contributions and
demographic developments, etc. As to the second problem, i.e. the rapid
transformation of the tfr into a proper second pillar, there are different
technical views on how precisely to achieve this aim: but the aim itself is
widely supported, as is its temporal urgency.
As in the case of labour market reform, already in 2001 the Berlusconi
government had asked Parliament for a delegation of powers to pass a new
pension reform. The delega on pensions encountered harsh opposition from
the trade unions, and everything remained blocked during the controversy
on article 18, discussed above. After the Patto per l’Italia agreement, dis-
cussions and negotiations resumed also on this front, and, after lengthy de-
bates, the government submitted to Parliament a law of delegation on pen-
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sion reform. The latest version of this law – submitted to Parliament in the
context of the financial law for 2004 – is summarized in box 3. As can be
seen, the government proposes a two-step reform process. During the first
phase (till 2007), the main measure will be a set of incentives to encourage
later retirement, even if the entitlement to a seniority pension has been ma-
tured based on the transition rules set out by the Dini and Prodi reforms.
The second phase will rest on ‘structural’ changes: a higher age of retire-
ment for old age pensions and substantial penalties for seniority pensions –
with exceptions and exemptions. In the projections of the Treasury, the sav-
ings estimated from this reform could amount to ca. 1% of gdp per year,
thus substantially lowering the spending curve in the critical years between
2010 and 2040.
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BOX 3
The delegation law on pensions (no. 2145/2001,amended by the Act of Senate of
27/10/2003,no. 2058):main provisions:
First phase (till 2007)
– workers who mature the right to a seniority pension and opt for staying at work will re-
ceive a tax free bonus equal to the amount of their pension contributions (i.e. 32.7% of
their earnings)
– extraordinary contribution of 3% levied on very high pensions
– further measures of harmonization across various professional schemes
– stricter controls on disability pensions
– workers with disabled relatives who opt for part time work will receive figurative contri-
butions as if they worked full time
Second phase (since 2008)
– Single unified requirement for obtaining an old age pensions:either 65 years of age (60
for women) or 40 years of contribution
– Seniority pensions with 35 years of contributions and 57 years of age still possible,but
calculated with the less favorable contribution-related formula introduced by the Dini
reform
– Exceptions/exemptions for ‘debilitating’jobs,working mothers and workers who start-
ed prior to the age of 18
– Further incentives for the development of supplementary pensions (also for public em-
ployees) and the transfer of TFR contributions into pension funds
– Possible reduction of up to 5% of contributions for newly hired young workers – without
prejudice to their future benefits
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The government’s new plan has encountered harsh opposition by all trade
unions – reuniting their front after the split of 2002. A general strike in Oc-
tober 2003 brought millions of protesters to the streets. The government
has responded by saying that the specific content of the reform can be
changed (even after Parliament’s approval of the delegation bill) through
negotiation, as long as its structural effects on spending trends are main-
tained. 
Expert comments on the reform plan are mixed7.Criticisms focus in par-
ticular on the sudden character of change in 2008 (as opposed to a softer
phasing in period) and on the proposed reduction of contributions, which is
seen as a violation of the whole logic of the Dini reform8. But it is largely rec-
ognized that a new structural intervention is indeed needed to confront the
upward trend of spending projections.
Meeting the ‘hunch’ challenge in the field of pensions through new restric-
tive measures would also be a pre-requisite for a wider strategy of welfare
recalibration, aimed at enhancing standards and levels of protection in oth-
er areas of social protection, most notably family policy and social assis-
tance. In 2000, the share of social spending devoted to the ‘family and chil-
dren’ was still attested at 3.8 per cent, and the share of spending for ‘hous-
ing and social exclusion’ was stuck at 0.2 per cent. These percentages are
the lowest in the eu, and progress ‘by the decimal’ is not enough for serious-
ly tackling the functional and distributive problems originated by Italy’s
distorted pattern of social spending: declining fertility, great difficulties for
women to reconcile paid and unpaid work, low female participation rates,
low territorial mobility, high incidence of poverty (especially among cou-
ples with two or more children and particularly in the south), etc. The im-
provement of family benefits and services is an essential component of the
‘flex-security’ strategy mentioned above in the context of labour market re-
form. Italy’s social expenditure was still below the eu average in 2000 (25.2
per cent as against 27.3 per cent). The room for significant spending in-
creases in the future is, however, severely restricted by the high incidence of
the debt service in a context of rigid budgetary constraints and tax-cutting
priorities. The only way for making room for higher spending on non-pen-
sion benefits is containing pension costs and/or the cost of public employees
(Boeri and Perotti 2002).
The Berlusconi government seems to be aware of the predicament. In Feb-
ruary 2003 it published a White Book on Family and Family Policy that con-
tains a detailed diagnosis of Italy’s problems in this area (Ministero del Wel-
fare 2003). This document highlights the dramatic decline of fertility and
its negative long-term implications for the country’s social and economic
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system. It also recognises the functional overload of Italian families (and
women in particular) and the persisting challenge of poverty. The White
Book is nevertheless very reticent in terms of policy solutions, especially as
regards spending commitments. Its main proposal is increasing tax deduc-
tions for low-income and large households. Very little is said about other
measures, such as family services, and nothing is said about child benefits.
The government also seems inclined to discontinue the experimental pro-
gram of guaranteed minimum income introduced in 1998 by the D’Alema
government (Sacchi, Bastagli and Ferrera 2003), replacing it with a vaguely
defined income guarantee of last resort.
In summary, despite its rhetoric on ‘policy innovation’, the Berlusconi era
does not seem to be promoting any substantial and rapid advancement on
that ‘recalibrative agenda’ of Italy’s unbalanced welfare state that emerged
around the 1990s and that started to be watered down after 1998. The bet
of the new government was that of solving fiscal problems (including those
of the stato sociale) through a big economic boost, prompted by a mix of tax
cuts, labour market flexibility and a more employer- and business-friendly
climate. But the worsened international conjuncture has closed off this op-
tion, ‘sandwiching’ Berlusconi back into the familiar corner of hard con-
straints and unpopular policy choices – a corner in which the Premier is very
likely to remain for the rest of his legislative term. Without further reform,
however, the new institutional constellation put in place in the 1990s may
not be able to sustain itself, and the ‘devolution’ campaign on which the new
government has embarked upon is unlikely to make things easier.
5 ‘EU-friendly’internal federalism: is it feasible?
As was illustrated in the previous chapters, the Italian political system has
undergone a far-reaching institutional reconfiguration in recent years that
has markedly remodelled the relations between levels of government, in the
wider eu framework. This reconfiguration has been the outcome of two in-
terrelated dynamics: the dynamic originated by the sphere of politics proper
(especially after the appearance of the Lega Nord and its impact on the elec-
toral market) and the dynamic linked to the sphere of public policies (the
functional pressures for adjustment and institutional modernization). The
intensity of the latter dynamic was strongly reinforced by the external con-
straint and especially by the creation of emu.
Three main lines of development in this institutional reconfiguration can
be noted. The first has been a strengthening of regional and local govern-
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ments which – after the acceleration impressed by the ‘Bassanini’ laws of
1997 – culminated in the reform of Heading Five of the Italian Constitution
(i.e. the provisions on the internal articulation of the Republic). This re-
form, which was approved in May 2001 and confirmed by a popular refer-
endum in October 2001, has significantly widened the range of policy areas
in which the regions have exclusive or joint competence (basically all social
policy except for cash benefits administered by inps). The second line has
been the restructuring of the national executive and, more generally, of the
whole system of relationships between the executive and the legislative. The
main outcome of this development has been the strengthening of the Presi-
dency of the Council and a reform of the ministries (which has reduced their
number and made them organisationally more efficient) that has been im-
plemented for the first time with the formation of the Berlusconi govern-
ment in June 2001 (cf. above). The third line has been a restructuring of the
whole system of relationships between the central and regional/local gov-
ernments. The most important development in this respect has been the ef-
fort to establish a greater symmetry between ‘upward’ rules (i.e the rules
and processes disciplining the relations between the Italian government and
the eu) and ‘downward’ rules, i.e. those disciplining the relations between
the government and regions/local authorities. The most emblematic exam-
ple of this search for a greater symmetry has been the introduction of a Do-
mestic Stability Pact in 1998, which makes the regions and the municipali-
ties share responsibility for the compliance with the eu Stability Pact of
1997 (Maino 2002).
As argued in the previous chapters, this threefold reconfiguration has pro-
duced some important results in terms of institutional performance. But a
number of questions remain open. Even if correctly oriented towards
greater symmetry and inter-level cooperation, the new system of relations
does not contain all the elements that are needed in order to really work in a
virtuous fashion. The national executive has been strengthened: but – in
spite of Berlusconi’s presidential style – it still lacks stable steering capaci-
ties on both substantive (i.e. in terms of priority setting) and organisational
grounds. The absence of a truly federal Chamber – where the regions can
bring their claims but are also encouraged to reconcile them with each oth-
er, with a view to producing policies of a nation-wide scope – is originating a
sort of tug of war between levels of government that often creates confusion
and stalemate. As a consequence of these two deficits, there are no estab-
lished procedures for monitoring and evaluating regional and local policy
performance – especially in those areas which have become the semi-exclu-
sive competence of decentralised governments such as health care, social as-
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sistance and services, education and training. As the eu experience teaches
us, the key for a successful ‘management by objectives’ is the presence of di-
agnostic capabilities at the centre – capabilities resting on the inputs and
collaboration of the peripheries. Of the whole federal issue (at the suprana-
tional but also national level), the presence of such capabilities is one of the
most fundamental elements: only if adequately steered and monitored, does
a federal (or multi-level) framework operate in a virtuous fashion, encour-
aging politicians and policy-makers at all levels to adopt (or privilege) a
problem-solving logic.
As shown by theories on subsidiarity, the latter is a two-way street: lower
levels of government act first, but the higher levels can (indeed, ought to) in-
tervene if the former fail. It is true that there are no magic formulas to opera-
tionalize subsidiarity: as a matter of fact, in all existing federations, the is-
sue is the object of frequent and heated controversies (on ‘who’, ‘what’,
‘when’, ‘how’), that can only be resolved, in the end, through political nego-
tiations (McKay 2001). But it is equally true that without systematic forms
of monitoring, capable of encouraging empirically grounded arguments and
discussions, inspired by efficiency, effectiveness and equity considerations,
political controversies may easily degenerate into brute power confronta-
tions. Moreover, it is only in a framework of adequate information and co-
operative co-ordination that the principle of ‘substitutive powers’ (i.e. the
right of the centre to intervene vis-à-vis a periphery that fails to act) can find
an effective application. Again, this principle is a tenet of all federal doc-
trines and is explicitly foreseen by the recent Italian reforms. Are the Italian
regions willing to partake in periodical rounds of comparative evaluation,
based on a national frame of guidelines and indicators that the regions 
themselves would contribute to defining, in the wider framework of the eu
social policy agenda? Is the Berlusconi government willing to pursue this in-
stitutional objective?
In the aforementioned White Book on Family and Family Policies pub-
lished in February 2003, the Ministry of Labour has made concrete propos-
als about establishing an ‘open method of co-ordination’ in the realm of all
social policies, involving the central government, the regions, local govern-
ments and representatives of the stakeholders (Ministero del Welfare 2003).
Such a domestic omc should be closely linked with the various eu ongoing
processes, and in particular the employment process and the social inclusion
process. The idea is promising, but the regions have not shown any enthusi-
asm about it. The real stake for them is the new draft bill on ‘devolution’,
which the Lega Nord is trying to push through, further extending the exclu-
sive powers of the regions and formally creating a Federal Republic. Not
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surprisingly, one of the most delicate issues of such a bill is its financial im-
plications: according to technical estimates, the bill would create severe
strains in Italy’s public budget and very likely to worsen the relative position
of poorer regions9. Inter-regional transfers and solidarity, in a context of an
increasing, but poorly monitored fiscal federalism, are bound to become a
very controversial matter in Italian politics in future years: a challenge that,
if not adequately managed, may seriously endanger the fragile achievements
of the risanamento and re-aggravate the never-solved southern question (La
Spina 2003; Viesti 2003).
6 Conclusion
In a recent article on the relationship between Italy and Europe, Tommaso
Padoa-Schioppa has argued that with the creation of emu the European
game has become less favourable for Italy – a country still characterised by
serious shortcomings in terms of administrative capabilities and by a low
‘national determination’ in the pursuit of international success. 
There are no incentives from Brussels or from other member states to
adopt ‘winning’ behaviour. The eu architecture forces each member
state to grant access to foreign competitors, without discrimination; it
commits each member state to not harming the other partners; but it
leaves each country free to harm itself by not being competitive, by being
inefficient, hostile to the forces of production, incapable of guaranteeing
security and order (Padoa-Schioppa 2001: 99). 
If, in many respects, the changes of the 1990s have led to institutional and
behavioural progresses that can now be considered as sufficiently rooted
(this is the main argument of our factual reconstruction), in the new Euro-
pean and international context Italy continues to display a high degree of
vulnerability, especially if its capacity to solve collective problems through
policy innovation remains inferior to that of its partners. As we have shown
in this chapter, there seem to be no signs so far that the new Berlusconi era is
making any serious advancement on this front, thus confirming the de-
calage already initiated after 1998.
In this book we have essentially interpreted Italy’s adjustment in terms of
a ‘rescue by Europe’. In this reading, what has allowed for the quantum
leaps of the 1990s has been the combination of a focusing event (the emu
deadline) with anticipated sanctions (higher interest rates and currency de-
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preciations whenever international markets thought that Italy would not
make it) – in the presence of an articulated institutional project, weakened
veto points in policy-making and a widening advocacy coalition for the
risanamento. For two or three years, this combination of factors (especially
the first and the second) radically altered the interactive constellation
among policy players: what disappeared from the field was the status quo.
In most decision-making processes, if an agreement is not reached, things
remain as they are. But in the Italy of 1995-1998, not reaching an agreement
meant suffering immediate and heavy financial sanctions – a pale anticipa-
tion of the heavier ones that would have followed from an exclusion of the
country from emu. This was the most powerful spur behind the various
coups de reins of the Dini and Prodi governments. After 1998, this spur has
gradually been disappearing: the cost of non-reform has become more
opaque and its implications less immediately clear and perceivable. Entry
into emu has certainly rescued Italy from a potentially very serious and
‘systemic’ crisis. But far from being an easy trail towards success, the new
scenario is that of a rugged path requiring more reforms, which must be un-
dertaken by mobilising all available institutional capabilities and by rapidly
building new ones. ‘Europe’ is still there, of course, with its various sticks
and carrots. But it has become a softer Europe – one in which ‘failure’ is less
clearly recognizable and in which an inefficient status quo can be main-
tained without immediate and explicit penalties. Capacity-building and ca-
pacity mobilization must come from within. Something that, after the ‘glo-
rious’ 1990s, has certainly become easier for Italy, but that still risks being
easier said than done.
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Notes
Notes Chapter I
1 The table also includes three reforms undertaken in 1999-2000, as these reforms
were elaborated in the previous years in the framework of emu convergence and
were enacted by the last Olive Tree governments. 
2 The degree of ‘stateness’ – i.e. the strength, autonomy and cohesion of public ad-
ministration vis-à-vis political institutions (Heper 1987) – notwithstanding a
pervading and highly institutionalised system of administrative law was there-
fore quite low, compared to some other continental bureaucracies like the French
and the German one.
3 The literature on policy learning and policy change is quite extensive. In particu-
lar, cf. Heclo (1974); Hall (1993); Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993); Haas
(1992); Visser and Hemerijck (2001). A review and a critical analysis are offered
in Gualmini (1995). 
4 On the concept of ‘institutionalization’ in political science and policy analysis
see Hall and Taylor (1996); Immergut (1998); March and Olsen (1989; 1995);
Pierson (1993; 1994). 
5 The other basic form of conditioning is classical or ‘Pavlovian’: here the subject
is more passive and learns to associate stimuli and answers based on a logic of
continuity: the sound of a diapason, immediately followed by food, ends up with
causing the dog’s salivation even without feeding him, by means of a conditioned
reflex.
Notes Chapter II
1 It must be noted that at the end of the 1960s the pension formula for civil ser-
vants was already more generous: it allowed for replacement rates of 100 per cent
and for early retirement at any age after 20 years of service. This very generous
provision had been originally introduced by the fascist regime in favour of some
categories of public employees, and then extended to all public employees in the
1950s.
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2 In 1987 a ruling of the Italian Constitutional Court (n. 497) found that the
amount of the allowance (corresponding to 800 Liras, i.e. 0.4 euros per day!) was
not in line with the cost of living. In 1988 Law no. 160 modified the mechanism
of calculus bringing it to 20 per cent of previous earnings, later raised to 40 per
cent (Gualmini 1998). 
3 Confindustria is the national employers’ peak association, mainly representing
big firms. 
4 When we speak in general of trade unions, we refer to the three main Italian
workers’ peak associations, that is the cgil, the biggest Italian left-oriented
union, the cisl, traditionally connected with Catholic movements and the Chris-
tian Democratic party, and the uil, the smallest one, traditionally linked with
minor lay parties.
5 Contrary to the logics of incomes policy, in the period 1969-1975 earnings
growth was disjointed from productivity gains and from inflation dynamics.
Real and nominal wages increased outside of any legal or bargaining regulation.
6 In the period 1970-71 nominal wages increased by 19.9 per cent and in the
1973-75 period by 22.7 per cent (compared to 6.8 per cent in 1968-69). In 1970
real wages rose by 15 per cent (Rossi 1998). One of the most innovative achieve-
ments of the unions was the separation of wage dynamics from productivity
trends; just to mention an example one should consider that in the manufactur-
ing from 1969 to 1973 per capita real earnings rose by 36 per cent compared to
an increase in productivity of 23 per cent (Signorini and Visco 1997). The ensu-
ing rise in the cost of labour was particularly strong in the first half of the 1970s.
7 Indexation had always been a fundamental element of the Italian earnings
regime. The so-called scala mobile had been introduced early in 1945 to safe-
guard wages against inflation. Its functioning was simple: the level of wages was
periodically adjusted to the level of the cost of living (which was measured on the
basis of a pre-defined ‘basket of goods’). In 1975 the employers were basically
forced to agree on the new instrument (which was clearly going to push up
wages) in exchange for the stopping of conflicts and strikes in the firms. But what
was supposed to be a temporary agreement became a permanent feature of the
Italian wage system - and an object of heated controversy until the early 1990s.
8 The indexation dynamic was not in fact perfectly aligned with the consumer
prices trend. If in period ‘A’ the inflation had risen, wages would have grown in
the period immediately following, that is in period ‘B’, when inflation had possi-
bly fallen. And if wages had risen, this was an opportunity for firms to push up
prices; employers had no hesitations in doing this since they could rely on the lira
devaluation mechanism. The 1975 agreement ended up by offering the basis for
an uncontrollable wage-inflation rise. It was not a coincidence that from 1970 to
1979 the percentage of wage increases due to indexations grew from 13.5 per
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cent to 79.7 per cent (Somaini 1989). The earnings dispersion between the medi-
an and first decile (D5-D1) declined from 1.96 in 1979 to 1.50 in 1989 (Scharpf
and Schmidt, 2000, vol. 1, app. Table A.21).
9 From 1965 to 1976 the total outlays of government rose from 34.2 per cent of
gdp to 43.4 per cent; in the same years the revenues remained basically un-
changed, moving from 30 per cent of the gdp to 31.2 per cent.
10 The term ‘civic culture’ was coined in the 1950s by Almond and Verba (1963)
to designate positive traits in the citizenry such as trust in government, willing-
ness to comply with the law, unreadiness to engage in non-conventional (and es-
pecially violent) forms of political participation, etc. From Almond’s and Verba’s
pioneering comparative research (essentially based on survey data) Italy stood
out for its relatively low scores on most indicators of ‘civicness’. For a discussion
and updated analysis of Italy’s political culture, cf. Sani (1980), Sani and Segatti
(2001) and Putnam (1993).
11 Ministero del Tesoro (1981), Ministero del Lavoro (2000).
Notes Chapter III
1 In 1990, 58.2 per cent of exports was addressed to ec countries, 4.9 per cent to
Eastern Europe and 14.7 per cent to developing countries (Onida 1993: 192).
The Italian share of world export also increased from 3.8 per cent in 1980 to 4.7
per cent in 1989 (World Trade Database 1980-1994).
2 In the period 1980-1985 family allowances rose, even though the number of
beneficiaries fell; the average amount of pensions increased more rapidly than the
per capita gdp; the growth of school teachers surpassed that of pupils and the
number of hospital employees significantly expanded (for a discussion, cf. Rossi
1998: 69).
3 In 1993 the first loss of employment in the tertiary sector, after more than 30
years of positive growth, was registered (from 59.9 per cent in 1992 to 59 per
cent in 1993) (Gualmini 1998).
4 The adjective ‘technical’ refers to the presence in the cabinet of at least some
ministers chosen for their substantive competence and professional reputation
(matured in the private sector or in the Bank of Italy or in academia), with only
weak partisan ties. In ‘political’ executives, ministerial positions are instead
typically occupied by career politicians and party leaders.
5 The manoeuvre included also a wide-ranging plan of privatisations, more realis-
tic and feasible than that proposed by Andreotti one year before (Verzichelli
1999).
6 The high propensity of Italian families to save and their preference for state
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bonds (instead of stock market equities) has always been a characteristic feature
of the Italian economic and social behaviour and culture.
7 We will come back to these points in more detail in Chapter V.
8 In December 1996, at the Dublin summit the Growth and Stability Pact was ap-
proved, concerning the constraints and conditions for the countries which were
to join the emu in order to maintain stability and fiscal responsibility. These con-
ditions were to be more precisely stated in the Amsterdam Treaty of June 1997
and in the ec regulations of July 1997.
9 The same law established the merging of the Ministry of the Treasury and the
Ministry of the Budget within a wider Ministry for the Economy. 
10 The main arguments of the debate can be found in: Barca and Visco (1992),
Bodo and Viesti (1997), De Nardis and Galli (1997), Deaglio (1998), Micossi
and Visco (1993), Onida (1993), Cominotti and Mariotti (1997), Garrett
(1999), Lange and Struggs (1999), Lawrence (1996) and Barba Navaretti
(2002).
11 This is especially relevant for the implementation of the Uruguay Round and,
more decisively, for the elimination of the Agreement on Multifibres. This
process will gradually remove the trade barriers which have so far favoured the
Italian producers. More generally, the growing supply of workforce of develop-
ing countries, in a context of global trade liberalisation, will have a deeper influ-
ence on the Italian trade conditions than on other industrialised countries (Faini
et al. 1999). In other words, the ‘niches advantage’ which helped Italy in the in-
ternational economy will be gradually lost.
12 In 1999 Italian social expenditure as a share of gdp was – in addition – lower
than in Germany (29.6 per cent), France (30.3 per cent), United Kindgom (26.9
per cent), the Netherlands (28.1 per cent), Denmark (29.4 per cent) and Sweden
(32.9 per cent) (Eurostat, Social Protection in Europe 2002). 
Notes Chapter IV
1 The Cassa Integrazione scheme is statistically measured in terms of the number
of ‘paid hours’, rather than compensated workers.
2 The pre-retirement scheme had an exceptional success: every year, between
1981 and 1987, 30,000 workers got access to pre-retirement benefits, at a cost of
30,000 billion liras (15,000 million euros) (Capellari 1989).
3 For discussion cf. Amendola, Caroleo and Garofalo (1997).
4 We use the term ‘income testing’ rather than means-testing because assets were
not considered in the early provisions of the 1980s.
5 These data were reported by ‘Il Sole 24 Ore’, 21 March 1996. 
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6 In spite of the huge increase in contributions, the transfer of the central govern-
ment to finance social protection rose by 76 per cent in real terms between 1980
and 1990, increasing from 5.0 per cent to 7.1 per cent of gdp (oecd, Social Ex-
penditure Statistics 1996).
7 The historical series is considered from 1993 onwards, since in 1992 the method
for data collection and analysis was changed by the National Institute for Statis-
tics (istat). The employment and participation rates are calculated on the popu-
lation aged between 15 and 64. Where not mentioned the source is the National
Institute for Statistics, istat, Forze di lavoro, 1993-2001. 
8 On the innovations of the 1990s cf. Esping-Andersen and Regini (2000); Treu
(2001) and Sestito (2002).
9 The decentralisation process involved also the competencies for active labour
policies which were devolved to the regions (completing the process initiated in
1978 with vocational training). 
10 The Law was finally approved by a national confirmative referendum, called in
October 2001, as the procedure for the formal revision of constitutional rules re-
quires.
11 As we will extensively argue in chapter VI, this proposal was finally pursued
through the law no. 30 of 2003, the so-called ‘Biagi law’.
12 For a summary evaluation of the impact of the ees on the Italian labour mar-
ket, cf. Isfol (2002). For a more articulated analysis on the impact of the ees on
Italy’s policy-making, covering also the regional dimension and the role of social
partners, cf. Ferrera and Gualmini (2003).
13 Five main recommendations were outlined at the Essen Council: a) to improve
opportunities for employability; b) to promote labour-intensive economic
growth; c) to reduce labour costs; d) to develop active labour market policies; and
e) to introduce specific measures for long-term unemployment. Member states
were also invited to produce annual reports in order to fit convergence require-
ments (Goetschy 1999).
14 The Dini reform of 1995 equalised the retirement ages of men and women: cf.
infra.
15 Such as freelance workers and other semi-autonomous workers (lavoro para-
subordinato).
16 This revision was made in the course of 1997 and led to the new reform of the
Prodi government (see infra).
17 For a full review of the 1997 pension reform and its financial impact, see Mira
d’Ercole and Terribile (1998). For a comprehensive evaluation of the reforms
which followed the Onofri Report, see the monographic issue of the review ‘Po-
litica Economica’, no. 1, April 1998.
18 A more detailed discussion of these developments is contained in Ferrera
(1999).
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19 On the current state of the RMI and its future prospects, see however infra,
chapter 6.
20 For an illustration of this new process of open co-ordination in the field of in-
clusion, cf. Ferrera, Matsaganis and Sacchi (2002).
Notes Chapter V
1 This was also witnessed by the intense use of delegation laws and of deregula-
tion (Vassallo 2001).
2 The introduction of the direct election of mayors and of provincial presidents
four years before – in 1993 – had strongly contributed to this reinforcement.
3 As a matter of fact, the new Berlusconi government, voted into office in May
2001, modified the previous government’s reform by decree (D.L. 217/2001,
converted into Law 317/2001), bringing the number of ministries up to 14.
4 Every single revision of constitutional rules requires a final approval by means of
a national consultative referendum.
5 On the importance of the ‘cognitive path’ to institutional change and the new
role of experts in Italy during the 1990s, see also Giuliani (1999) and Radaelli
(2002). The same authors have also written an interesting review of different in-
terpretations concerning the process of financial adjustment and the entry into
emu (Giuliani and Radaelli 1999).
6 In the 1980s the idea of an external constraint (and of a virtuous circle consist-
ing of compliance with the constraints, their reinforcement, further alignment of
national behaviours to the European norm, and so on) got progressively institu-
tionalised, becoming a true frame of reference for the interpretation of social re-
ality (what Müller, 1995, defines as referentiel). For further insights on the influ-
ence of this interpretative paradigm upon the Italian financial adjustment, see
Dyson and Featherstone (1996) and Radaelli (1999). On the concept of advocacy
coalition, see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993).
7 On the role of these professors within the Italian policy-making of the 1980s and
the 1990s, see Regonini (1993).
8 For a summary but accurate account, see Dyson and Featherstone (1999) and
Walsh (2000). 
9 With regard to its ‘sincere’ part, the new discourse on equity is indeed part of the
substantive learning we have discussed in the previous paragraph.
10 In the famous Skinner box, the animal is free to move as it wishes: but it gets
food (positive reinforcement) only if it pushes a button spontaneously, by means
of firstly casual and then intentional movements. Naturally, the metaphor is to be
read in its weak sense: the Italian decision-makers did not suffer from passive
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and purely exogenous conditionings, on the part of any ‘gnome’ able to manipu-
late them through financial markets. On the contrary, they reshaped their prefer-
ences on the basis of constraints that could not be negotiated anymore, on the one
hand, and of the unsustainable status quo, on the other. The latter factor played
a very important role: if the status quo is not anymore the default option, the veto
power becomes not only unproductive, but also self-injuring.
11 Despite the convergence achieved under Dini and Prodi, Italy’s admission into
the emu remained uncertain until early 1998. Antonio Fazio, the Governor of
the Bank of Italy, has revealed that as late as March 1998 he had to threaten the
lira’s unilateral exit from the ems if Italy was not admitted, despite the positive
macro-economic trends. For admission, he had to take the commitment to main-
tain a current account surplus in order to reduce public debt (Il Sole 24 Ore, 29
November 2001).
12 On the connection between concerted action and the economic and financial
policy-making, cf. also Paganetto (1999) and Padoa-Schioppa (1998).
13 On this aspect, see Visser and Hemerijck (1997).
14 As Amato himself reveals in a book about his own experience as Prime Minis-
ter (Amato 1994).
15 It is, in fact, no coincidence that the countries in which social pacts experienced
a clear revival in the 1990s were exactly those which had the biggest problems
with respect to entry into the Euro-zone, that is those situated outside the
Deutschmark area (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Finland and Ireland). 
16 Thus, the indicators of the institutionalisation of political exchange would be:
a) the larger number of actors who signed the agreements (wider diffusion of
consensus and higher representativeness of the agreements); b) the presence of a
pro-labour government; and c) the presence, within the agreements, of rules and
principles governing the functioning of the new decision-making procedures.
17 For the parliamentary debate on the approval of temporary work (within the
Treu law of 1997) see Gualmini (1998). 
Notes Chapter VI
1 For a detailed reconstruction of the law projects on the conflict of interests pre-
sented from the xii to the xiv legislative terms see Gitti and Maffeis (2003). 
2 Already in 1997, under the Prodi government, a draft bill aimed at changing the
norms on individual dismissals – and thus art. 18 – had been presented to Parlia-
ment by a number of DS MPs led by Senator Franco Debenedetti. According to
this proposal, workers must be re-integrated into their jobs only in cases of dis-
criminatory, anti-union or ‘capricious’ dismissals. In all other cases, workers
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must receive adequate compensation, but without re-integration (Debenedetti
2002).
3 Article 18 was to be experimentally suspended only in the second of the three
cases given above.
4 A number of left-wing parties and social movements promoted a referendum in
June 2003 with a view to extending its scope of application also to enterprises
with fewer than 15 employees. The turnout was very low (less than 30 per cent),
thus invalidating the whole initiative.
5 After 40 years’ contributions and at the age of 65 (Ministero del Welfare 2002:
15).
6 For workers, the tfr can play the role of an unemployment benefit, in case of
termination of a contract prior to retirement. Without the introduction of more
generous unemployment benefits, it should not be surprising that Italian employ-
ees are reluctant to forego the tfr. For employers, the tfr constitute a cheap
source of financing. tfr contributions are set aside by companies only ‘notional-
ly’. In practice, they remain part of the company’s cash flow. Companies are
obliged to pay a small contribution for bankruptcy insurance.
7 For an articulated debate and informed comments on recent developments of
Italian social and economic policy , cf. the web site: www.lavoce.info.
8 The contribution rebates of the delega may be considered as a partial compensa-
tion to the employers for the obligatory and real (as opposed to notional) pay-
ment of tfr contributions into the pension funds.
9 Cf . Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 February 2003. Cf. also the debate on this issue on
www.lavoce.info.
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policy learning cf. learning dynamics
political exchange 27-28, 89, 121,
141-147
powering 25-28
provinces 98-100, 128
psi cf. socialist party
public administration 122-123, 171
public debt 44, 51, 61-62, 71, 156, 177
public deficit 44, 51, 62, 66, 69, 71,
156
public expenditure 60, 83, 150
public revenues 62, 83
puzzling 25-28, 121, 130, 136
regions 54, 78, 92, 98-99, 166-168,
175
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Rifondazione Comunista 70-71, 117,
128, 146, 153-154
scala mobile cf. wage indexation
second pillar cf. supplementary pen-
sions
Second Republic 87, 124
Single European Act 61, 133
small and medium enterprises 31, 73,
75-76, 102
social assistance 32, 35, 115-120, 164
social dialogue 156-161
social expenditure 35, 41-42, 62, 84,
114, 164, 174
social pacts 51-52, 89, 100, 141-147,
159
social security contributions cf. contri-
butions
Socialist party 15, 33, 47, 132
solidarity contracts 90
South 40-41, 53-54
State administration 17, 45-46, 150-
151
supplementary pensions 110, 112-113,
115, 162-163
Tangentopoli 67, 125
targeting 94, 117
tax evasion 26, 83
taxation 82-83, 96-97, 156
taxation cf. public revenues
temporary employment 100, 102
territorial pacts 100
third Italy 77
tickets cf. co-payments
trade unions 20, 26-28, 38-40, 43-44,
54, 84, 88-89, 95, 99, 110-111, 123-
124, 136-139, 156-162, 172
training 35, 43, 52, 89-91, 100, 160
underground economy 37, 82, 98, 158
unemployment 76-77, 80-81, 98
unemployment insurance 33, 36-40,
110, 115-117, 159
user charges cf. co-payments
vincolo esterno cf. external constraint 
wage indexation 44, 68, 90, 143, 160
women 81, 90-91, 97, 164
Workers’ Statute 36, 38, 157-158
youth unemployment 52, 82, 90, 98
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